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At the center of China’s rapid economic growth are the nearly 300 million migrants who 
have come from rural areas to work in urban factories. Despite their vital role in China’s rise, 
government policies have created many social, economic, and legal problems for this population. 
In response, a small but growing number of Chinese have started NGO programs to improve 
migrants’ access to legal aid, education, and sense of community. In a country with such a state-
dominated society, this type of non-governmental activity takes on particular significance. Based 
on 70-weeks of ethnographic fieldwork, and a review of relevant literature, this dissertation 
analyzes the decision-making of the founders/directors of migrant-focused nongovernmental 
organizations in China in order to: (1) understand the political, economic, and sociocultural 
factors that influence their programs; (2) explore how these factors fit within the broader context 
of China’s economic development; (3) broaden literature on the role of the state in 
nongovernmental activity, and (4) provide insights into changing state-society relations in the 
transition to capitalism. 
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Based on seventy weeks of field research in Beijing and Shenzhen, as well as a review of 
relevant literature, this dissertation explores the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
in creating and redefining local economic relationships with China’s 300 million internal migrant 
workers. The founders/directors of these organizations run programs to improve migrants’ access 
to legal aid, education, and sense of community. Their perspectives, experiences, and decision-
making provide significant insights into China’s paradoxical relationship with its migrant 
workers as well as changing state-society relations in the transition to capitalism.  
The story unfolds on a dusty floor in a rundown building marked for demolition on the 
outskirts of one of China’s largest eastern cities. Several women squat around a woven mat, 
enthusiastically sharing neighborhood gossip. “I’m certainly not here for the food,” one of them 
comments. “It’ll never be as good as home.”1 Spread in front of them are a variety of fabric 
swatches, a rainbow of spooled sewing thread, and an array of beads and decorative accessories. 
While chatting, the women meticulously assemble the raw materials into coin purses, book 
covers, and handbags. 
This is not part of the grueling factory work that brought them to the city. They will sell 
these handmade items at a local market themselves. They will share the profits, using a portion 
of them to fund an afterschool program for the children of other migrant workers. One of the 
women working at the mat is the founder of this program. I do my best to follow her instructions 




and make my own coin purse, but to no avail. She tells me not to worry. Pointing to the other 
women, she says “What they make at the factory is for someone else. What they make here is for 
them.”2      
Even in these past few years of growing consumerism and digital technology innovation, 
the most defining element of China’s development remains the factory-driven export economy. 
“Made in China” has become a ubiquitous label on consumer goods all over the world. It is a 
mark of China’s massive share of global trade. It is often a mark of inexpensive goods. It is a 
mark increasingly downplayed, with propaganda-like taglines such as “designed in the USA, 
made in China”. Yet, more objectively than any of its other meanings, “Made in China” signifies 
“made by Chinese migrants”. It is no exaggeration that migrant workers have a hand in 
producing nearly every single thing made for export from China. 
One of the great puzzles in the study of migrants in China is why the government has 
consistently treated them so poorly. There is no easy or satisfactory answer. China’s strict 
internal residency laws, known as hukou, prevent Chinese citizens from enjoying most legal 
rights and social services anywhere in their own country except in their home provinces. This 
includes access to healthcare, education, and shockingly, in a country so dependent on factory 
workers, most labor protections. The government likely uses these policies to minimize its 
funding of health and social services. Admittedly, mass migration to east coast megacities could 
put enormous strain on metropolitan coffers. However, this should be largely offset by the 
increased tax revenue from labor-based migration. 
Given the massive contribution of internal migrant workers to China’s economic boom, 
the cruelty of current residency laws defies logical explanation. What is particularly interesting, 




however, is that a handful of very committed Chinese citizens run nongovernmental programs to 
help the migrant workers in their country. I wish I could report that a lot more organizations were 
working to solve the many legal, social, and economic problems facing these 300 million internal 
migrants. Someday the number of civil society organizations may become commensurate with 
the breadth and depth of the problem. However, in a country with such a panoptic government 
apparatus, even the limited scope of this non-governmental activity takes on particular 
significance. 
As others have suggested (notably Kleinman 2011), migrant-focused NGOs in China 
could be part of a larger societal shift toward greater social responsibility, what Hopen (2010) 
defines as a sense of obligation both to improve and not to harm society. Comprising a miniscule 
percentage of the more than half a million total registered nongovernmental organizations 
(Economist 2014), migrant-focused NGOs in China support but do not provide sufficient 
evidence for this trend. Yet, the existence of these organizations offers insights into the ways 
China’s state-dominated society influences and is influenced by expressions of social 
responsibly. 
A small but significant body of recent sociological research reveals how the Chinese 
political economy informs and limits the operations of NGOs. Yu (2011) points out that the 
success of NGOs in China is primarily dependent on their goals and programs being in line with 
the state. Hsu, Hsu, and Hasmath (2017) note that the influence of the government is often 
localized. NGO strategies are shaped by the resources and opportunities available in specific 
cities. For example, Beijing and Shanghai have large donor pools. Thus, organizations in the 
largest cities rely less on volunteers than in second-tier cities such as Nanjing. However, because 
NGOs often cannot officially register with government, they rely on personal connections to 
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secure official support. As Cheng, Ngok, and Zhuang (2010) point out, this is a political survival 
strategy that may help improve interaction with the government, but it can become unstable 
when personal relations change. Moreover, Lu (2009) describes how the use of significant 
resources to ensure organizational survival often detracts from the programs NGOs run to help 
others. 
  Absent from these analyses is the anthropological hallmark of attributing agency to 
institutional behavior. Anthropologists working in China have a long tradition of this, for 
example in rural economies (Fei and Chang 1945) and the stock market (Hertz 1998). At least as 
much as external factors, the decision-making of the founders/directors of Chinese NGOs shapes 
the programs they run. 
I gathered data to explore key questions about the roles of NGO’s in China’s economic 
development that remain unanswered by previous research: What obstacles have the 
founders/directors encountered, and what are their successes and failures in dealing with these? 
What motivates them and how does their decision-making reflect their perceptions of what it 
means to be a good citizen and a good person in twenty-first century China? What progress do 
they see, and what societal and political changes do they view as necessary for lasting change to 
occur? What do their perspectives and experiences reveal about changing state-society relations 
in the Chinese development model? 
To answer these questions and offer a holistic perspective on the experiences and 
decision-making of my research population, I first conduct a thorough review of relevant 
literature. In Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework, I situate my research within broader theoretical 
issues concerning the relationship between the state and NGOs.  
 5 
 
In Chapter 2: Research in Context, I delve into the historical and cultural significance of 
nongovernmental organizations in China and their intersection with migrant issues. I trace the 
origins of Chinese modernity and the ways that historical and cultural roots continue to influence 
societal trends in the twenty-first century. I explore how Chinese modernity has impacted and 
been impacted by mass internal migration, and the ways that nongovernmental organizations 
have come to address many problems related to China’s economic development, including 
migrant issues. 
  In Chapter 3: Fieldwork, I detail the logistics, planning, and local circumstances that 
informed the field research for this dissertation. I give an overview of my methods and discuss 
how they each contribute evidence to understanding the experiences and decision-making of my 
research population. I compare distinguishing characteristics of my field sites, particularly as 
they relate to China’s economic development and internal migration. I use emic perspectives 
from guided neighborhood tours to enrich descriptions of my field sites from existing literature 
and from my own observations. Finally, I delve into issues of reflexivity and the realities of 
conducting this research in the Chinese context. 
In Chapter 4: Population Profile, I take a deep dive into the lives and work of my 
research population. I discuss how I sampled this population and the inherent biases of this 
process. Based on survey data and semi-structured interviews, including professional life 
histories, I explore the range of variables that shape their experiences and influence their 
decision-making.  
In Chapter 5: Priorities in Practice, I analyze data from interviews and pile sorts to 
understand how the founders/directors prioritize various aspects of their organizations and how 
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these priorities affect the ways they make decisions related their programs, including their 
structure, marketing, and funding.    
In Chapter 6: Governing the Non-Governmental, I use decision-modelling to understand 
why roughly forty percent of the organizations in my sample receive at least part of their funding 
from the government. By doing so, they morph into the paradoxical institutional form of a 
governmental nongovernmental organization (GONGO). After exploring the factors that 
contribute to this decision, I discuss how the use of these funds further affects decision-making. 
Finally, I look at how these decisions are both unique to China and comparable to the 
nongovernmental sectors in other countries.   
In Chapter 7: Dataset Conclusions, I use the data I collected from fieldwork to provide 
answers to my core research questions (listed above). I also explore the limitations of my dataset 
and propose future research to answer questions for which this study did not provide satisfactory 
answers. Notably, I plan to conduct a follow-up study to understand the impacts of NGO 
programs on localized migrant problems. 
In Chapter 8: Broader Impacts, I discuss how the decision-making of the 
founders/directors holds important implications for understanding the role of the state in shaping 
civil society, as well as changing state-society relations in the transition to capitalism.
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CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 NGOs in China represent a case of civil society organizations operating in a post-socialist 
state. Though the countries of the former Soviet Union experienced significant political 
upheaveal, China transitioned from socialism to capitalism without reforming its political 
system. It has a non-democratic one-party government that interferes in all sectors of the 
economy far more than we are accustomed to in the West. This creates a nongovernmental sector 
that shares many traits in common with other countries while also being unique to China. In this 
chapter, I situate my research within the theoretical frameworks of the anthropology of NGOs 
and literature on social entrepreneurship, i.e., charitable organizations that rely more on 
profitable revenue streams than donations to fund their programs. 
The Anthropology of NGOs 
 One of the main contributions of anthropology to the study of NGOs is complicating the 
relationship between the nongovernmental sector and the state. In a neoliberal framework, 
nondemocratic systems cannot support a nongovernmental sector. Exemplifying this perspective, 
Wedel and Wedel (1992, 323) write about former Soviet-era Eastern Europe: “A ‘civil society’ 
exists when individuals and groups are free to form organizations that function independently of 
the state, and that can mediate between citizens and the state. [The] lack of civil society was part 
of the very essence of the all-pervasive communist state…” 
Such a perspective is transferable to prevailing Western views on China. It assumes that 
only Western style democracies can have properly functioning NGOs. However, such narrow 
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definitions limit our ability to see the diversity of civil society activity around the world. 
Following Edwards (2009), I employ a more inclusive definition of civil society as the space in 
which citizens take part in “associational life” – i.e., where, regardless of government 
interference, the interests of society at large become organized into topical clubs and 
organizations. 
 Participation in voluntary associations is particularly important for migrant populations. 
Leaving their homes means leaving behind their social bonds and support systems. From the 
earliest anthropological research on this topic, there has been an awareness of the role of 
voluntary organizations in alleviating these strains for rural-to-urban migrants. For example, 
Little (1957) notes that in African cities associations serve as functional if somewhat imperfect 
replacements for the social bonds of kinship ties in rural societies. This is a vital component of 
adapting to life in an unfamiliar and often-hostile urban environment, whether in Africa, Latin 
America (e.g., Mangin 1959), or indeed China.  
 Reed-Danahay (2008) posits that the main mechanisms driving these association-based 
support systems are communities of practice. It is important to distinguish this term from the one 
used by Wenger (1999) to describe a group of professionals engaging in situated learning, even 
as it pertains to NGO professionals (Hasmath and Hsu 2016). More than anything, migrant-
focused organizations, like the ones in this study, build spaces for migrants to share knowledge 
with each other to deal with specific problems they face in cities, most often related to 
employment, access to social services, and discrimination. By focusing on the founders/directors 
of these organizations themselves, this dissertation advances the literature on migrant-focused 
associations with a particular focus of the factors affecting the process of building and 
maintaining “replacement” support systems in the form of nongovernmental organizations.  
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 Following Dunn (1996), the prevailing anthropological agenda toward NGOs is to 
particularize and localize nongovernmental activities within specific cultural and political 
economic contexts. Seligman (1995) points out that civil society organizations are not inherently 
locked in zero-sum opposition with the state. Their coexistence occupies the spectrum between 
complete autonomy and total integration. Asad and Kay (2014) advocate for removing the anti-
state bias from considerations of NGOs. The state is no more all bad than NGOs are all good. 
This theoretical framework sets the stage for considerations of NGOs in a range of political 
superstructures. My dissertation shows that NGOs in China’s authoritarian system function 
“properly” insofar as they benefit the lives of their target population, namely internal migrant 
workers, while aligning with the interests of both the state and society at large.  
Clark (1995) notes that the relationship between NGOs and the state is the main 
determinant of nongovernmental programs benefitting their target populations. This effect is 
particularly pronounced in authoritarian systems like China’s. The one-party government tends 
to view NGOs as a potential threat to its official narrative. It seeks to downplay social problems 
and promote an image of prosperity and a harmonious society.3 I will discuss this in detail in the 
next chapter. 
Gallagher (2004) warns that in China the usual state-society dichotomy does not 
accurately represent the often-porous boundary between the government and civil society 
organizations. Hsu (2012b) employs the term “civil society” as a familiar reference point, but 
warns that the nongovernmental sector in China has far more government interference than is 
typical in democratic countries. It is also important to factor into this equation the variety of 
ways the NGO programs in my study help migrant workers gain access to legal aid and 




education for their children. Because this is important to both NGOs and the central government, 
the situation is perhaps best described by Yang and Alpermann (2014, 313) as one in which all 
the actors mutually accommodate each other. 
In this way, NGOs in China fit within Kamat’s (2004, 171) notion that a 
nongovernmental sector is as much part of civil society as it is part of the remaking of state 
institutions to better serve public interests. After all, it is widely accepted that deficiencies in 
government services are one of the main factors leading to the emergence of NGOs globally (e.g. 
Shah 2005). Thus, NGOs operate at the intersection of changing state-society relations. The ways 
they make decisions reflect the interaction of government priorities with societal needs. 
As I discuss in detail in the next chapter, one of the main effects of this is on the ways 
Chinese NGOs fund their programs. Due to strict government regulations and growing public 
skepticism, they are increasingly unable to rely on charitable donations. Thus, they depend on 
profit-making endeavors to fund their programs. This puts them in line with an emerging 
phenomenon known as “social entrepreneurship”. 
In countries around the world, researchers have observed private citizens dubbed “social 
entrepreneurs” starting for-profit businesses to address localized problems related to poverty, 
access to education, and public health (e.g., Bornstein 2004, Dees 1998, Leadbeater 1997, Martin 
and Osberg 2007). Such issues are often linked to larger societal problems resulting from 
inequalities created by capitalism (e.g., Picketty 2014). In the following section, I discuss how 
the Chinese case is representative of the literature on social entrepreneurship. In the next chapter, 




The problems faced by internal migrants in China are representative of circumstances in 
which social entrepreneurs in various parts of the world help migrants participate in the 
economic life of their communities. For example, in India the Aajeevika Bureau helps rural 
migrants navigate the complex process of registering for government identity cards that grant 
them access to banking, healthcare and other social services. Aajeevika funds its operations by 
charging migrants a small processing fee and from revenue generated by advising similar 
programs (Ashoka 2014). In Morocco, La Fondation Orient-Occident offers affordable IT and 
hospitality professional training to migrant workers who are otherwise relegated to low-paying 
and demeaning jobs (Filali 2016). In Beijing, the Dandelion School provides low cost middle 
school education for the children of migrants who lack the legal status to attend public schools 
(Lane 2012, 5). 
These examples seem to support the theory of Austin, Stevenson, and Wei‐Skillern 
(2006) that social entrepreneurs have emerged because commercial market forces both create and 
fail to address economic inequality (see also Poon 2011). This appears to be true in China and 
worldwide. Dees (1998) suggests that for social entrepreneurs the profit from their businesses is 
a means to solve problems faced by these populations. This seems to delineate social 
entrepreneurs from “regular” entrepreneurs who seek to profit from what Prahalad (2009) views 
as the fortune to be made from unmet market demands among the world’s poor. However, other 
than the self-reported mission statements of social entrepreneurs and descriptions of their 
businesses in the existing literature (e.g., Bornstein 2004, Leadbeater 1997), we know little about 
their individual motivations (c.f., Schwartz 2012, who stresses the importance of formative 
experiences in shaping the motivations of social entrepreneurs - see Chapter 4). 
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Social entrepreneurship is a relatively new concept, and the existing literature offers little 
consensus on its definition. From a composite of definitions compiled by Abu-Saifan (2012), I 
define social entrepreneurship broadly as the process of designing, starting and running a 
business with the primary objective of solving a societal problem, particularly one faced by a 
poor or marginalized group. This implies an “altruistic form of capitalism” (Tan, Williams, and 
Tan 2005, 2) that combines the philanthropic goals of nonprofit charities with the profit-seeking 
of “regular” entrepreneurship. Unlike nonprofit charities that rely on financial donations, the 
businesses run by social entrepreneurs generate revenue to fund their projects. Unlike “regular” 
entrepreneurs who measure success predominantly in financial terms, social entrepreneurs 
commit to a “double bottom-line” (e.g., Dart 2014), whereby they measure success both in 
financial terms and in terms of a positive social impact. 
Social entrepreneurship gained widespread international attention when Mohamed Yunus 
received the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. He was lauded for issuing micro-loans to rural women in 
Bangladesh to help them start self-sustaining cottage industries. Like a normal bank, he used the 
profits to offer more loans, but he also had a second bottom-line measured by reductions to rural 
poverty. Thus, Yunus (1999) details how he charged interest on the loans, but not nearly at the 
rates being applied by banks seeking to maximize their profits (see also Bornstein 1997).  
The word “social” does not inherently delineate social entrepreneurship from “regular” 
entrepreneurship. Seelos and Mair (2005, 243) caution that there is no such thing as “non-social” 
entrepreneurship. Reynolds et al. (2002) underscore that “regular” entrepreneurs create 
relationships with customers and employees in a community. In this sense, “social” is defined 
broadly as the creation of voluntary networks of people willing and able either to work for a 
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business or to spend money on its products or services. Thus, the social aspects of “regular” 
businesses aid profit-making. 
This is even the case in Bourdieu’s (1984, 291) description of the ways business people 
who donate to charity improve their reputations for honesty and selflessness, which attracts more 
customers to their businesses. As with corporate gifting practices (e.g., Darr 2003), this behavior 
appears to be a circuitous, if not necessary route to maximizing profits. Indeed, all businesses 
foster strong social ties in the process of making a profit.  
Social entrepreneurs seem to possess motivations that coexist with profit-seeking. Martin 
and Osberg (2007, 35) stress that social entrepreneurs typically have “customers” who cannot 
afford to pay market value for the goods or services they need. Thus, social entrepreneurship 
serves people in society who, like rural-to-urban migrants, have become marginalized, and 
whose quality of life thus suffers. Here social comes to mean “social inclusion”, i.e., helping 
people participate in the economic life of their communities by giving them access to education, 
employment, and financial services (Buckmaster and Thomas 2009, 9). In this way, social 
entrepreneurs seek to remedy the social and economic exclusion inherent in the social aspects of 
“regular” entrepreneurship. 
The existence of these “for-profit charities” suggests an alternate narrative to the 
mechanisms of capitalist industrialization that often disembed social relations from their 
“situatedness” in local economic practices (see Giddens 1990). Emphasizing this social 
dimension situates social entrepreneurship within what Polanyi (2001) calls a “double 
movement” in capitalist economies, whereby individuals strengthen social commitments in 
response to the de-individualizing effects of market economies.  
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Social entrepreneurs appear to be entrepreneurial in the sense of the word’s French 
origin, entreprendre, meaning “to initiate something significant” (Swedberg 2000, 11). This 
definition asserts individual agency in market processes, but does not assume universal 
motivations or outcomes. It departs from Schumpeter’s (1934) legacy of considering wealth as 
the main product of starting a business (e.g., Shane and Venkataraman 2000). Yet, it remains 
grounded in his view of entrepreneurs as innovators who respond to needs in society (see also 
Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
The above literature review situates the Chinese case within broader trends in 
nongovernmental sectors worldwide. The profit-making activities of the founders/directors in my 
study fit into common definitions of social entrepreneurship. Much like social entrepreneurs in 
other contexts, the founders/directors in my study use profit-making as a means to negotiate 
government restrictions, societal demands, and their own motivations for improving the lives of 
others. In the next chapter, I begin to delve into the factors that make China’s NGOs unique. This 
is a theme I return to throughout my discussion of empirical data gathered for this dissertation.     
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH IN CONTEXT 
 
 In this chapter, I trace the convergence of internal migration and civil society in the 
context of China’s economic development in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
For most China observers, the period of “modern” China – and indeed modernizing China – 
begins in 1978 at the onset of the country’s state-run market economy and rapid industrialization. 
Expanding on this framework, I trace the origins of this “modern” China as a progression of 
historical events that appears to directly inform current relations between (1) the state and 
society, (2) individual citizens, and (3) China and the rest of the world. Into this definition of 
Chinese modernity, I also factor influential philosophical traditions that continue to inform these 
relationships, notably Confucianism and Maoism. Finally, I explore the emergence of civil 
society, particularly the role of NGOs, in China’s economic development.  
The Origins of “Modern” China 
 Gillette (2004) asserts that China’s recent past continues to have a traumatic 
psychological effect on both personal and national identity. She is explicitly referencing the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). During this period, Mao Zedong reasserted his political 
dominance by upending social hierarchies. He called for the destruction of the “Four Olds”4, i.e., 
old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas (Spence 1991, 575).  For example, he 
instigated students to ridicule and even physically assault their teachers (Chang 2003, 284), 




thereby upsetting the tradition of respect for elders. He lambasted intellectuals who he argued 
had much more to learn from the knowledge of the workers and peasants than vice versa (Spence 
2006, 99). Sym (1996) even found multiple cases of the revolutionary fervor reaching such 
manic heights that some villagers engaged in cannibalism to demonstrate their disdain for the 
bourgeoisies classes. Millions of Chinese citizens were persecuted or sent to rural labor camps, 
and approximately a half-million people were murdered during the purges of the Cultural 
Revolution (Meisner 1999, 354). 
 Now, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, any Chinese person over the age 
of sixty-five is old enough not only to have experienced these traumas but also to have taken part 
in them. The legacy of the Cultural Revolution lives on in today’s elder teachers, grandparents, 
and mentors. These shared traumas influence the ways they think about their society and about 
their trust of their fellow citizens (or lack thereof). Thurston (1985, 5) found many survivors of 
the Cultural Revolution who describe the long-term effects on their worldview as a “sequela” – 
i.e., a sickness that remains even after the disease is cured.5 
Yet, for the Chinese, the direct influences on how they perceive their society, their world, 
and their lives far predate the Mao Years. At this point, it is important to note that when I discuss 
the “Chinese” I am really talking about the ethnic Han Chinese. At present, they are the largest 
ethnic group on earth, accounting for approximately eighteen percent of the global population. In 
other words, more than one in every six people on this planet are Han. Although present-day 
China has fifty-five minority groups, the Han make up more than ninety percent of China’s 
                                                 
5 The exact Chinese term is 后遗症. 
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current population (China 2012).6 For this reason, the grand narrative of China’s past is largely a 
history of the Han. 
Approximately four thousand years ago, at the advent of the Xia Dynasty (c. 2070–1600 
BCE), the Han began keeping written records. Scholars widely agree that Han civilization likely 
extends at least another thousand years into the past. In fact, archaeological evidence suggests 
that more than nine thousand years ago tribes with direct cultural links to the Han inhabited the 
Yellow River Basin (Liu and Chen 2012). 
 
Figure 1: The Yellow River in Present-Day China 
 
      Needless to say, the Chinese (i.e., the Han) have one of the longest continuous histories 
of any present-day civilization. It is neither my intention nor within my capacity to provide a 
satisfactory overview of the dynastic period. I will leave this Herculean task to the eminently 
devoted historians who have given us windows into one of the most innovative and culturally-
rich periods in human history. These books can be split into two general categories: histories of 
                                                 




the empire and histories of the people. The first is exemplified by Keay (2011) who details how 
Chinese cultural roots from the beginning of the dynastic period have been as much a function of 
the rise and fall of emperors as of a constant redefining of geographical borders. The latter has 
led to the assimilation of outside peoples and philosophical traditions which has been central to 
the long-term development of the Han identity. The second category is well-represented by 
Tanner (2010) who focusses on how changes in economic and social institutions have 
continuously shaped and reshaped the lives of ordinary Chinese citizens. This theme is directly 
transferrable to considerations of state-society relations in the modern era, a topic I will discuss 
in the next section.  
From these, and many other scholarly works, it becomes clear that the single thread 
weaving through the dynastic period, and indeed into the modern era, is Confucianism. 
Confucius lived from 551-479 BCE. His writings on personal and governmental morality had an 
enormous influence over China’s dynastic rulers during his own time and for centuries beyond. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, it is particularly important to understand how Confucian 
thought has and continues to influence both interpersonal and state-society relationships in 
China. Specifically, many aspects of Chinese society revolve around Confucius’ notion of the 
Five Bonds, namely the bond between the ruler and ruled, parents and children, husband and 
wife, elder and younger siblings, and between friends. In a particularly blunt passage, Confucius 
(1997, 7) sums up the core elements of what is generally referred to as filial piety: 
Nowadays people think they are dutiful sons when they feed their 
parents. Yet they also feed their dogs and horses. Unless there is 
respect, where is the difference?7 
 
                                                 
7 论语 2.7：今之孝者、是謂能養。至於犬馬、皆能有養。不敬、何以別乎。  
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 This sentiment is applicable to each of the Five Bonds. Respect undergirds not only 
relationships, but also nearly every interaction I have ever had in China. It is common practice to 
show reverence in both speech and manner to those of higher social status. This is most apparent 
in the use of honorific language. For example, the Chinese use different terms for “you” to refer 
to people of equal or lesser status (你) and higher status (您). These colloquialisms also extend 
beyond individual word use. It is common to speak to people with higher status using less direct 
phrasing that accentuates the privilege of their position and one’s own inability to fully grasp 
what it must be like to enjoy such status. This is a particularly foreign concept for non-native 
speakers who have not been raised with Confucian values. I still struggle to apply it in everyday 
practice. One example that I often use as a point of reference is the very common question of 
inquiring about someone’s job. With someone of equal or lesser status, it is common to ask, 
“Where is your job?”8 or more simply, “What do you do?”9 However, when asking someone 
with higher status, it is advisable to ask, “Where have you been promoted?”10 Beyond simply 
asking about employment, the latter question implies not only that the person has a high position 
but also that he or she has earned the position.  
 Beyond language use, the Confucian social hierarchy demands deference to one’s 
superiors. This is as true of the child-parent relationship as it is of the citizen-state relationship. 
In both cases, it is discouraged to question one’s superiors. The ruling communist party (CCP) 
has made a variety of efforts to minimize the role of competing ideologies in Chinese society, 
notably Confucianism. However, the CCP has also taken full advantage of the long-standing 
tradition to revere one’s superiors. I will discuss its use of social controls in the next section. The 
                                                 
8 你在哪里工作？ 
9 你是做什么的？ 
10 您在哪里高就？(Notice the use of the polite 您.) 
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point here is that the Five Bonds play as significant a role in modern times as they did during the 
dynastic period. However, they are not the only forces that influence relationships, both at the 
interpersonal and societal levels.  
One of the earliest and most prominent Western anthropologists to work in China, 
Morton Fried11, pointed out that family was not necessarily the most important element in 
Chinese social organization. He found that “the friction engendered in the normal living 
arrangements among kinfolk often moves individuals to seek social outlets beyond the circle of 
blood or affinal relatives” (Fried 1953, 206). In fact, he observed that the friendships created 
between classmates were most likely to endure throughout one’s life. 
Forming functional relationship outside of the Five Bonds is really the search for tong, 
best translated as “together” or “in common”.12 The goal is to change strangers into links in 
one’s network by establishing a basis of familiarity by appealing to shared identities, i.e., tong. 
The nature of one’s relationship to another person is more important than the title of that 
relationship. This requires a distinction between the expressive and the practical dimensions of 
relationships. “He is my friend” is not as important to the formation of social networks in China 
as “he is my college roommate” or “he is my colleague”. Thus, “the Chinese version of the self is 
formed and reformed through fluid construction of relationships and positioning itself within 
them” (Smart 1999, 128). 
Even in the dynastic era, when the Confucian ideal of filial piety was at its strongest, 
individuals often sought relationships outside their kin group in order to discuss their problems 
                                                 
11 Fried taught at Columbia University from 1950 until his death in 1986. He is most well-known 
for his adherence and contributions to Julian Steward’s now discredited evolutionary model. 
However, he also contributed some of the only ethnographic research in China prior to the 




with equals. In Chinese society it is often difficult to be entirely honest with one’s father or 
mother, because these parental relationships require children to abide by complex rules of respect 
and humility. Supporting this tradition in the modern era, Olga Lang, who worked in China even 
before Fried, found that a common sentiment among industrial workers in Shanghai was that 
they could ask a friend for help when it was not possible to ask family. One of her informants 
commented, “It is better to go to a friend for a loan, he won’t sneer at you” (Lang 1946, 327). 
As Smart (1999) points out, such relationships should not be conflated with friendship in 
its purest sense. The Chinese use the term guanxi to refer to their type of friendship with implied 
reciprocity. At all levels of society, things get done by forming and maintaining professional 
relationships through gift-giving. One might be tempted to conclude that the Chinese are a 
manipulative people, and that every gift is given with the expectation of reciprocity. While an 
outsider might need an explicit explanation of the nature of a gift being given in a specific 
situation, amongst cultural insiders this knowledge is clearly implied by the circumstances of the 
exchange. The most valuable piece of cultural information is what kind of gift should be given. 
As a general rule, the more important a connection or a favor the more expensive the gift should 
be. Gifts can range from a simple box of fruit to butchered meats and even to expensive luxury 
goods. According to one middle-age factory worker interviewed by Yang (1994, 127), a gift to 
the head of the provincial labor department of fine chinaware and textiles worth a month’s salary 
was necessary to procure a less erratic (and thus more desirable) work schedule. 
The art of guanxi13, i.e., the adherence to styles and methods of exchange, is critical to its 
effectiveness. Gifts are used more than money, which is largely viewed as bribery. Exchanges 
often have a strong ceremonial component. For example, a common offering is a gift card to a 




local department store, which is placed in a red envelope, similar to those used for monetary gifts 
at the new year or weddings. This is then hand delivered, usually through an intermediary to 
minimize the appearance of being a direct bride. In fact, one of the most common terms for this 
kind of purposeful gift-giving is hongbao, which translates to “red envelope”.14 
The final element in a guanxi relationship is the obligation to repay, i.e., implied 
reciprocity. Repayment of a favor (or gift) is seldom of equal value to what was originally given. 
In fact, repayments of greater value are an essential element in maintaining guanxi. Of equal 
importance is the amount of time between favor and repayment. This is indeed a subtle art. If the 
repayment is made too quickly, it appears that one is actually paying for the favor. The art of gift 
giving is entirely geared to avoid any appearance of bribery. Perhaps counterintuitive for 
Westerners is the notion that “an unpaid debt provides opportunities for further cultivating the 
relationship” (Yan 1996, 144). In other words, the length of time between favor and repayment is 
a direct representation of how practical and reliable the relationship is and will continue to be.  
 This is comparable to the Kula Ring in the Trobriand Islands as described by Malinowski 
(2002, 62-79). Like the production and maintenance of guanxi in China, the Kula Ring, aside 
from cultural specifics, uses purposeful gift exchange to preserve long-standing and mutually 
beneficial relationships. In fact, after the islanders exchange symbolic objects, they begin trading 
commodities, such as seafood and other practical items. Both cases exemplify what Mauss 
(2002) calls a “total social phenomenon” in which cultural, religious, and economic institutions 
find simultaneous expression. Thus, these are examples of generating social capital through 
processes of symbolic exchange that precede the “real” business.   




The “business” that is most important for the migrants discussed in this dissertation is 
finding employment. According to Network Theory, personal networks are comprised of both 
strong and weak interpersonal ties. The strong ties, mostly to family and close friends, are 
generally more useful for emotional support (Wellman 1992). However, Granovetter (1977) 
illustrates how weak ties, to acquaintances or even distant kin, are often better for finding 
employment, because they connect people from different groups with strong ties (quoted in Bian 
2018, 257). These are typically the types of networks created by guanxi. 
One caveat is that the status and power of one’s weak ties directly determines how 
effective they will be in a job-search. During field research for this dissertation, I found several 
cases of migrants using tong based on native village to help find available jobs and adapt to new 
conditions by tapping into the networks of migrants who are more established in urban job 
markets. However, these cases were few and far between. It is here that we begin to see the 
limits of guanxi networks. Migrants mainly know other migrants, and few have productive 
connections to managers or other people in hiring positions. Thus, the utility of even vast 
migrant networks is severely limited by homogeneity. This results from various forms of social 
stigma that migrants confront and that I will discuss in the next section of this chapter. 
As with most social problems in China, previous research spotlights many of the 
complications created by guanxi. The difficulty of adding personal connections with higher 
status causes inequalities in healthcare (Tu 2019), income (DaCosta and Li 2017), and access to 
affordable education (Xie and Postiglione 2016) and housing (Wang 2017). However, the 
preceding discussion of the deep cultural roots of social networks in China makes it clear that the 
system of guanxi is unlikely to undergo significant changes in the foreseeable future. 
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In a variety of ways, the organizations I studied for this dissertation help to fill in these 
“guanxi gaps” by bringing migrants into the networks of the founders/directors. As I will discuss 
in Chapter 4, the individuals in my research population tend to be well-educated and, although 
they were often migrants themselves, have far more high-status connections than typical 
migrants. In this way, their programs operate within the longstanding cultural systems that 
inform so many of China’s social norms and indeed also its social problems.     
Modernity and Migration 
 The terms “modernity” and “modernization” often evade precise definition. For the 
purposes of this study, I define them respectively as the state and process of developing 
industrial manufacturing and becoming integrated into the global capitalist economy. This 
integration involves producing goods for export as well as diversifying the domestic economy in 
terms of both consumer and financial markets. By many measures, China has achieved and 
continues to be in the process of realizing this version of modernity.  
 The single most defining factor of China’s economic development is its massive 
population. At 10:00am CST on July 13, 2018, China has a population of 1,415,233,748  
(Worldometer 2018). This accounts for approximately 18% of the current global population. 
China has experienced significant population growth in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
For example, in 1960 its population was roughly 667 million. At that time, it was also the most 
populous country. Interestingly, it actually made up a greater percentage of the total global 
population in 1960 than it does today, accounting for approximately 22% of the world’s people. 
In both relative and absolute terms, China’s population growth has outpaced nearly every 
country on earth in the past sixty years despite its one-child policy. Figure 2 depicts this growth 
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(WorldBank 2018) . With the exception of India, the gap between China’s population and even 
the third most populous country, the United States, has increased significantly. 
 
Figure 2: Population Growth Comparison 
 
 China’s enormous population has been a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it serves as the 
massive labor force necessary for industrial production. On the other hand, it takes an enormous 
amount of resources to feed and provide social services for so many people. These two 
conflicting factors have defined the often-tumultuous path of China’s economic development.   
 In the modern era, Mao Zedong was the first to recognize the true potential of China’s 
population. In 1949, he swept to power on a populist wave, promising to strengthen and protect 
China against foreign imperialism, an experience all too familiar in the Chinese consciousness.  
During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), the Han had been subjugated by the Manchus, relegated 
to second-class status in their own country, and even prohibited from marry into the ruling class 
(Rhoads 2000, 42). During the Opium Wars in the late nineteenth century, the British employed 
their hallmark “gunboat diplomacy” to force the Chinese to allow the sale of opium in the 
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domestic market and enter into a variety of imbalanced trade agreements. This severely 
weakened the Chinese economy, and as Lu, Fang, and Wang (2008) point out, created a drug-
fueled public health crisis. Then in the first few decades of the twentieth century, the Chinese 
endured countless atrocities at the hands of the Japanese. These included mass murder, biological 
weapons testing, and even live vivisections on Chinese peasants (see Cook and Cook 1993).  
 Based on this collective history of trauma and the long-standing tradition of reverence for 
leaders (discussed in the previous section), Mao’s vision for development was met with 
widespread obedience and fervor. After consolidating power around his cult of personality and 
reorganizing Chinese society around rural farming collectives, he launched the Great Leap 
Forward (1958-1961). His goal was to have China catch up to the West by industrializing in a 
single decade. In the end, widespread mismanagement led to one of the deadliest famines in 
human history (Dikötter 2010). However, his policies regarding population control continue to 
inform many of the issues migrants face in present-day China. 
 With twenty-twenty hindsight, one of the biggest mistakes Mao made was decentralizing 
agricultural and industrial production in rural areas. Later in this section, I will discuss the 
significance of reversing this policy after Mao’s death. To accomplish his goal of creating 
farming collectives, Mao severely limited internal migration. This was also due to his paranoia 
about urban intellectuals sowing political dissent (see Spence 2006, 99). Thus, through limiting 
freedom of movement, he hoped to create a dispersed but productive population. 
In 1958 Mao instated the draconian residency policy, known as hukou15. With minor 
amendments, the hukou system remains to this day. Under this law, Chinese citizens only have 
                                                 
15 户口 – This term originated in the dynastic period. At that time, hukou served as a household 
census, and lacked most of the authoritarian undertones of Mao’s policy. 
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legal residency in the province of their birth. This means that they are only eligible for social 
services, healthcare, and education in their home province. During the Mao years, this had the 
effect of binding rural residents to land they could not leave and did not own (Cheng and Selden 
1994, 668). Despite this and the erosion of civil liberties, in the context of Mao’s decentralized 
and rural-based development strategy, the hukou system made a kind of perverse sense. Freedom 
of movement would have severely hindered the sustainability of farming collectives by creating 
an unreliable and transient labor force. As it turned out, Mao’s plan was catastrophic, but less 
because of migration than because of the failures of hardline communism as an economic model 
(a topic for another dissertation perhaps).  
 The end of the upheavals of the Mao years coincided almost exactly with his death in 
1976. Clearly, both the political and cultural appetite for radical Marxism were all but dead as 
well. After a brief period of political reorganization, Deng Xiaoping took the helm of China’s 
central government. He famously proclaimed that Mao had been 70% correct in his approach to 
national development. He and other reform-minded leaders in the new government continued 
promoting the cult of Mao, realizing its importance in fostering political cohesion and a sense of 
national identity (Schmidt-Glintzer 2017). To this day, millions of visitors a year pay homage to 
Mao’s embalmed body in a mausoleum at the center of Tiananmen Square. 
 Cleary, though, even Deng believed that Mao had gotten far more than 30% wrong. In 
1978, he initiated the Reform and Opening Policy.16 Just two years after Mao’s death, China 
embarked on a fundamentally different economic path. Broadly, the Reform Era (1978-present) 
has been defined by a capitalist market economy with much greater government management 
than we are typically accustomed to in the West. Especially in the early years, economic growth 




was driven by the government seeking direct foreign investment in state-run enterprises (SOEs). 
In the last couple decades, the corporate and personal wealth generated by these SOEs has led to 
a more diversified economy, with a strong and growing private sector. However, even the largest 
and most innovative private sector companies, especially in digital technology, are heavily 
scrutinized and managed by the central government. 
The ideological divergence from Mao’s policies has produced rapid urbanization. Deng 
created special economic zones (SEZs) in many east coast cities to promote industrial 
production. I will discuss these further in the next chapter. The effect on urban population 
growth has been dramatic. In 1982, just after the inception of the Reform and Opening Policy, 
China’s urban population was roughly twenty percent of the total population (Census 1982). In 
2016, the urban population had jumped to over fifty-seven percent (Sun 2017). Although the 
growth rate has declined in the second decade of the twenty-first century (TradingEconomics 
2018), China’s urban centers are on pace to reach one billion people by the year 2050 (UNDESA 
2018).     
Unlike economic ideology, the hukou system has not been reversed in the Reform Era. 
Indeed, hukou makes a lot less sense in light of mass urbanization than it did during the Mao 
years. As I will discuss in the following section, modern China has enjoyed many of the benefits 
of a reformed economy. Yet, these have not coincided with a reformed political system. China 
continues to be haunted by the ghosts of its authoritarian past.  
Capitalist production in China has replicated the economic and social inequalities created 
in other developing countries by the concentration of wage-labor in urban industrial centers. The 
hukou system has greatly exacerbated these. As of the last official count, China had more than 
250 million rural-to-urban migrants (NHFPC 2014), a population that doubled from the 
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preceding decade. At the current rate of growth, it is likely that there are already more than 300 
million internal migrants living in Chinese cities. This represents the largest internal migration in 
human history (e.g., Chan 2012). Although migrants from rural areas move to cities in search of 
a better life, they remain a “floating population” and are ineligible for urban residency permits.  
Migrants occasionally fare better than poor local residents, for example by opening their 
own businesses (Cho 2013). However, lacking legal status generally denies migrants access to 
better paying jobs (Yu 2015), social services (Zhou 2016), and education for their children (Chan 
2010). This system is so discriminatory it has been dubbed “China’s apartheid” (e.g., Luard 
2005). Most migrants wind up living in dilapidated neighborhoods that are both unrecognized 
and unsubsidized by city governments – the so-called “urban villages” (e.g., Wen and Hanley 
2015). These factors severely limit social mobility (Chan and Zhang 1999, Yang, Liu, and Zhang 
2015), and exacerbate economic inequality (Fang and Sakellariou 2015, Wang 2004). Even after 
pending reforms to the hukou laws that govern migrants’ ability to live and work in cities, they 
are likely to suffer from the effects of multigenerational poverty (see Wu and Treiman 2007).  
The main problem migrants face is that they cannot find work in their home provinces. 
Thus, there is a geographic disconnect between economic opportunities and the availability of a 
social safety-net. An obvious solution is to decentralize industrial production, moving factories 
inland and away from the eastern cities. This way those who have become migrants could work 
and enjoy all the benefits of legal residency in the same place. However, the patterns of 
migration are now well-established. It will not be so easy to reverse them. 
The eastern cities still hold the allure of opportunity, similar to the “golden mountains” 
that were once promised to Chinese immigrants in the United States. Even if jobs are created in 
other areas, it will be a long time before they have the glamour and glitz of the eastern cites. 
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Many migrants in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen told me that they take enormous pride in 
living in one of the richest cities in the world. This seems comparable to someone from the 
Midwest moving to Hollywood to pursue an acting career. In both cases, few will become stars. 
Yet, in China, as in Tinseltown, tales of rags-to-riches permeate the cultural consciousness.17  On 
a daily basis, potential migrants see wealth beyond their wildest dreams. Yet, it seems that 
economic inequality can be as much a personal motivator as it is the cause of societal problems.  
Given all this, it is unlikely that migrants will stop coming to the large eastern cities in 
the foreseeable future. It is also unlikely that we will see a wholesale move toward incorporating 
migrants into the social safety nets offered to legal residents of eastern cities. This is particularly 
evident in renewed efforts by the city governments to evict migrant workers, most recently in 
Beijing (see Haas 2017). In a convoluted sense, this is understandable. Even with the enormous 
tax pool in these wealthy urban centers, their massive populations already strain local resources. 
However, as discussed above, the labor of migrants has been one of the main drivers of urban, 
and indeed national, prosperity. Herein lies the paradox of government policies toward migrants 
that creates the space in which migrant-focused NGOs operate. I will discuss this central theme 
of my research in the following section. 
Before diving into the role and significance of the Chinese nongovernmental sector, 
particularly as it relates to migrants, it is important to humanize the men, women, and children 
who have come by the hundreds of millions to live and work in China’s urban centers. Macro-
level trends frame their lives but do not adequately represent their experiences with urban life. 
                                                 
17 One of my favorite examples of this, and a story that I have often heard from migrants, is that 
of Zhou Qunfei, a.k.a. “the touchscreen queen”. As a teenager, Qunfei was a migrant worker in a 
factory that made glass screens for cellphones. She realized that she could produce the screens 
better and cheaper. She started her own factory and has since become a multi-billionaire and one 
of the richest women in China (and indeed the world).  
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As discussed above, the hukou system is the overarching problem they all face. Yet, on a daily 
basis they experience a variety of attacks on their civil liberties, group and personal reputations, 
and general well-being. 
Based on their tenuous legal status, it is easy to forget that the migrants are citizens living 
in their own country. As I discuss in Chapter 4, they do not fit into typical definitions of a 
“hidden population”. After all, there are 300 million of them. The government is well aware of 
their presence. In a country that deploys an unusually high number of panoptic surveillance 
techniques, migrants endure even more scrutiny than non-migrant citizens. 
This was first revealed to me from a survey I conducted with one hundred migrants in 
Shanghai during preliminary research for this dissertation. The English version of the survey is 
in Appendix 1 and the Chinese version is in Appendix 2.  I was specifically gathering data on 
what social services were available to migrants and which ones they would like to see offered. 
This was one of my methods for finding the often-not-well-publicized NGOs working in migrant 
areas (an issue I will discuss in the next two chapters). The final question of the survey asked 
migrants what other services they need. One of the most common responses was some iteration 
of “help with identification cards”. 
Initially, I assumed that this meant they needed help with navigating the hukou system. 
This corroborated the prevailing narrative that migrant problems originate with hukou problems. 
However, the hidden complexity of the issue was made clear to me during a visit to an exhibition 
on migrant workers at a community center run by one of the organizations in this study. Figure 3 
below shows the identification cards legally required by a single migrant worker. In total she 
needs twenty-one forms of identification to live and work in the city. According to the curator of 
the exhibit, some of the ID cards allowed her to accomplish mundane activities such as riding 
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public transportation, renting an apartment, and enrolling her children in public primary school. 
Others were necessary for travel outside of the city, for example to visit family in her home 
province during the holidays. Still others were necessary to get a job, get paid, and get the 
meager benefits offered by her employer. From numerous conversations with migrants, I found 
this to be a representative number of required ID cards.   
 
Figure 3: Migrant Identification Cards 
 
 Even if migrants can navigate the process of obtaining all these forms of identification, 
they still face tenuous living and working conditions. I will detail their living conditions in the 
next chapter. Poor labor rights have become a hallmark of developing economies. This results 
from a reliance on cheap labor to remain competitive on the international market. Chinese 
migrants typically earn far below a living wage, work in dirty and often dangerous factories, and 
are routinely made to work unpaid overtime. Gillette (2014, 31) even found cases of migrant 
workers longing for the order and predictability of the Mao years. One of her informants, a 
factory worker in southeastern China, commented, “The factory felt like your own home. We 
had good benefits. It was very stable, and very regular. You knew exactly what you were doing, 
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exactly when you were working, exactly when you got off. And we got end-of-year bonuses 
every year.” 
It speaks volumes to the precarity of present-day working conditions when some migrants 
long for the societal upheavals of the Mao years. I did not encounter any migrants who spoke 
fondly of their lives before the Reform Era. Many of my informants viewed their work in the city 
as a sacrifice for the greater good of their families back home. In most cases, migrants have 
limited economic opportunities in their home provinces and even poorer living conditions than 
they have in cities. Several twenty-something migrants even lamented the boring nightlife in 
their home provinces. During one conversation with a group of young migrant men, a few of 
them joked with me that their favorite kind of unpaid overtime was going to the club to flirt with 
pretty city girls. My survey data reinforces this point. Figure 4 shows the relevant question. 
 
 
Figure 4: Migrant Survey 
  
Less than five percent of respondents indicated that they wanted to return to their home 
province. More than eighty percent were split nearly equally between wanting to stay put and 
moving to a different part of the same city. The remaining fifteen percent wanted to move from 
their current city to another major city where they either had connections or believed there were 
better employment opportunities. None of this is meant to minimize the enormous obstacles 
migrants face on a daily basis. It is merely an effort to create a holistic preceptive of migrants’ 
If you could live anywhere, would you…? 
   Stay where you are 
   Move to a different part of the city 
   Return to your home province 
   Move somewhere else (please specify): ________________ 
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experiences that seem to exist on a spectrum between nostalgia for a lesser-of-two-evils past and 
acceptance (and even enjoyment) of a could-be-worse present.  
Beyond their lives within governmental and corporate bureaucracies, migrants are 
subjected to a variety of societal stigma against them. They typically come from the inner 
provinces, from rural areas where their lives were hard, and their time was spent farming rather 
than pursuing education. For this reason, their knowledge is practical, and certainly not 
intellectual in the cosmopolitan sense valued by urbanites. Fei Xiaotong, one of the first and 
certainly most famous native ethnographers in China18, warned against such stereotypes based in 
the rural-urban divide. He argued that peasants are not stupid simply because they are illiterate, 
“just as an urbanite is not stupid for being unable to catch grasshoppers” (Fei 1992, 46). 
Migrants typically occupy the lower socioeconomic levels. Yet, this does not inherently 
distinguish them from non-migrants. Their appearance tends not to be particularly glamorous. 
Their clothes are worn for practicality not fashion. Yet, there are plenty of urban-poor who look 
similar. Moreover, sometimes they dress up for special occasions, and are then virtually 
indistinguishable from other city dwellers.  In fact, one of the few distinguishing features of 
migrants is the number of children they have. It is common to meet migrant families with 
multiple children, and this makes them stand out. 
In China’s major cities, it is rare to see families with more than one child. Even though 
China’s one-child policy has been relaxed in recent years, most people in cities still choose to 
have only one child. A recent government survey of 10,000 respondents in ten provinces found 
                                                 
18 A student of Bronislaw Malinowski, Fei Xiaotong presented an empathetic and prescient 
account of the problems facing changing village economies in his native land of China. His 
career was greatly disrupted by two decades of persecution under the Cultural Revolution (Fei 
1981). So much suffering and mismanagement could have been avoided if only Mao had listened 
to the brightest social scientist in the land. 
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that over fifty percent of couples with one child did not want another (Wu 2017). This jumped to 
over sixty percent in major east coast cities. Parents cited the financial strain of having more 
children as the main factor influencing their decision-making. 
Under China’s one-child policy (1979-2015), rural residents were often allowed to have 
multiple children. The government recognized the need for families in agricultural areas to have 
more children to help out on the farms. In fact, rural families who had firstborn girls were 
encouraged to have more children, in the hope that even second- or thirdborn sons would prevent 
female infanticide (Baochang et al. 2007). Based on the cultural affinity for sons, China has a 
long and troubled history of killing baby girls, an atrocity made much more common under the 
one-child policy (Mungello 2008). Shi and Kennedy (2016) offer a glimmer of hope, finding that 
as many as 25 million girls who were believed to have been killed were actually hidden by their 
parents and local authorities to circumvent the one-child policy. 
Because they have more children than is common in the cities, migrants face a range of 
overt and micro-aggressions. Several migrant mothers told me that they were unable to enroll 
more than one of their children in local elementary schools. They had to find a friend or relative 
without children to do it for them. Several of my migrant informants reported feeling generally 
uncomfortable when they were travelling with all their children around the city outside of the 
migrant neighborhoods. They felt like other people were staring at them. One woman described 
it as the time when she felt most like an outsider in her own country. She used the term 外地人. 
The most direct translation is out-of-towner. Yet, it is a word often used in a derogatory way 
toward migrants. The first character 外 is also used in two of the most common words for non-
Chinese foreigner, 外国人 and 老外.  
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Beyond linguistic cues, it is difficult to quantify the discrimination migrants face because 
of how they appear to others. One experience I had during fieldwork stands out as clear support 
for the migrants’ perception of their own discrimination. As I will discuss in the next chapter, I 
rode public transportation a lot in China. It is often crowded and standing-room only. One 
feature common to all busses and trains is a row of seats in each section reserved for passengers 
with special needs, for example the elderly, the disabled, pregnant women, and even parents with 
young children (see Figure 5 below). Anyone can sit in these seats, but they are expected to get 
up if someone in need gets on the train. I have seen these types of seats all over the world. 
Asians, and even the usually pushy Chinese commuters, typically abide by these rules with 
religious-like devotion, more so than in any other region where I have travelled. This is likely 
due to deep-rooted cultural respect for the elderly, which of course has its origins in 
Confucianism (as discussed above). 
 
Figure 5: Priority Train Seat 
 
When traveling with young children in China, my wife and I were routinely offered the 
priority seats, sometimes even by older people who wanted to make sure our kids had a safe 
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place to sit on the crowded train. One Sunday I was on a train by myself headed to an afternoon 
meeting. It was not particularly crowded, but all the seats, including the priority seats, were 
taken. At one point, a young Chinese family got on the train – a mother, a father, and three 
children who seemed to be between the ages of four and ten. They made their way to the middle 
of the car, and as the train lurched out of the station, the parents were visibly flustered trying to 
manage several shopping bags while corralling their kids to prevent them from flying all over the 
place. This scene was readily noticeable to everyone in the immediate area. Yet, not a single 
person offered this family a seat. 
Even as a cultural outsider, it was apparent to me that this family was most likely from a 
rural area. The imagery of the three children was further reinforced by the family’s hard-worn 
clothes and tanned skin.19 Obviously, this case does not offer conclusive evidence of 
discrimination against migrants based on their outward appearance. Yet, as someone who has 
spent a significant amount of time in country observing and studying various aspects of Chinese 
society, something about it just felt wrong. 
While I was watching all this happen, various comments I had heard from non-migrant 
Chinese during the course of fieldwork echoed through my head. They [migrants] just don’t 
know any better. They’re not hard workers. They wouldn’t understand. These persistent 
stereotypes, in conjunction with informant reports and my own experiences, make it safe to 
assume that discrimination permeates many aspects of migrants’ lives. This is reinforced by 
Anagnost (1997, 117) who observes that for Chinese parents having one child has expanded 
                                                 
19 Since the dynastic era, wealthy Chinese have prized light skin. In direct opposition to Western 
tastes, the Chinese view tanned skin as a mark manual labor. In the Reform Era, with so many 
more people being elevated into the wealthy classes, the preference for light skin has become 
even more pronounced. In fact, my wife was unable to find facial moisturizer in China without 
some form of whitening cream. 
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from a patriotic duty to modernize their country to a sign of modernity itself. Greenhalgh (2003) 
echoes this sentiment by highlighting the contrast between Chinese perceptions of the modern 
single-child urban family and the “unplanned” and out-of-control multi-child families in rural 
areas. 
In sum, this evidence suggests that the discrimination migrants experience has more to do 
with their identity as migrant workers than with other factors, notably ethnic identity. In my 
survey, respondents represented more than twenty ethnic groups. I was not able to find any 
ethnic data from large scale migrant surveys. However, it seems likely that China’s internal 
migrants include most if not all ethnic minorities, especially given that migrants from every 
internal province have been found in eastern cities (Lu and Xia 2016, 11). 
My survey did not reveal any significant correlation between ethnicity and 
discrimination. Moreover, Zhong et al. (2018) found migrants across ethnic groups share a 
higher-than-normal risk for a variety of mental illnesses. Some of these are related to the stress 
of resettlement, some to work-related stress, and others are a function of everyday stresses, 
particularly related to financial instability and widespread discrimination. 
 Wong and Song (2008) conclude that the most effective way to alleviate these stresses is 
through community support. This was a prescient conclusion. As I will discuss in the following 
section, in 2008 NGOs in China were still in their infancy. In fact, less than a quarter of the 
organizations in my sample were started before 2008. My data suggest that migrant-focused 
NGOs play a strong role in creating a sense of community for the groups they serve. Both the 
migrants that I surveyed and the founders/directors of these organizations report that a sense of 
community is one of the main benefits of the NGO programs. In this way, the primary work of 
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these NGOs is to reduce the stresses of being a migrant. In the following chapters, I will explore 
this topic as it relates to specific programs started by the organizations in this study.  
Nongovernmental China 
 The previous section makes it clear that Reform Era policies have greatly exacerbated 
migrants’ problems. In general, the central government prioritizes economic growth over the 
societal problems created by this growth. This is not an unusual occurrence in capitalist systems, 
especially in developing countries. As Gudeman (2013) points out, rapid industrialization and the 
resulting changes to labor requirements typically produce a systemic reordering of state-society 
relationships. Roseberry (1997, 43) points to the underlying mechanisms at work by asserting 
that “the forms and relations through which humans produce their livelihoods constitute 
fundamental and determining relations in society.” 
The problems faced by China’s migrants seem to be a natural extension of what Marx 
and Engels (1990) called the appropriation of surplus value, whereby workers do not adequately 
benefit from the profits of the goods they produce. The situation in China also seems to support 
Appadurai’s (1996) theory of rupture, whereby modernity is unevenly experienced rather than 
one single moment of break between past and present. As I discuss below, China’s modernity 
has meant that many Chinese have become wealthy even as the migrants continue to be treated 
as second class citizens in their own country.  
Until ten years ago, these critiques of capitalism adequately explained the political and 
economic factors affecting migrants in China. Then, in 2008, China experienced an awakening in 
the nongovernmental sector.20 A lot of significant events occurred that year. In August, Beijing 
                                                 
20 Deng (2010, 184) points to 1995 as the most quantifiable origin of China’s nongovernmental 
sector. In that year, the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing, during which 
there was an NGO forum. After that an increasing number of independent, grassroots NGOs 
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hosted the summer Olympics. In the leadup to the opening ceremony, the central government 
launched a variety of campaigns to sharpen China’s image on the world stage. They pumped 
enormous resources into improving air quality (e.g., Watts 2008), modernizing infrastructure 
(e.g., Cortes 2008), and even had a campaign to teach their citizens to wait in line properly (e.g., 
Gardner 2008) – something they still only do begrudgingly. These efforts produced a spectacular 
and commendable performance to the international community. 
Indirectly, preparations for the Olympics set the stage for greater government interest in 
quality-of-life improvements to Chinese society. However, as in the past (and certainly in the 
present as well), the central government took a heavy-handed, top-down approach to 
development. They did not seek the approval of the population and assumed the ends would 
justify the means. This was brought into sharp relief that same year. 2008 marked a turning point 
not only for China’s soft power on the global stage but also for its citizens use of social media, 
which remains difficult for the central government to censor because of its abbreviated and 
frequently changing text forms (Si 2017). 
Up until that point, messaging apps and microblogging had been novelties for tech-savvy 
urbanites. Then, in the early afternoon of April 12, 2008, an 8.0-magnitude earthquake struck 
near Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province in central China. The damage was catastrophic. 
Roughly 70,000 people died. I have heard that the quake was so strong it rattled buildings in 
Beijing, over 1100 miles from the epicenter. According to Zhou et al. (2015), China suffers from 
frequent natural disasters because of its vast territory, varied climatic and geographical zones, 
and heavy tectonic activity. The central government tends to be quick to respond, but slow and 
                                                 
began to appear in China. Figure 6 (below) suggests a correlation (if not a causal relationship) 
between the conference and the first spike in China’s NGOs. 
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guarded in its release of information to the public. To some degree, the government takes 
responsibility for everything that happens in China and does not want civil society to interfere 
with its disaster relief efforts. In another sense, it knows it will be blamed for any failures and 
does not want to publicize the situation on the ground before it has everything under control. 
Typically, the Chinese public finds out about natural disasters through the national, state-
run news outlets. However, within minutes of the 2008 earthquake, local residents in Sichuan 
began posting on Chinese social media. In fact, Thomas (2008) found that the Chinese military 
used one of these posts to pinpoint survivors in a remote area. Yet, for the first time, the 
government censors were not able to manage information coming out of the disaster site. The 
Chinese public was instantly rivetted. Their social media feeds overflowed with images of 
devastation and suffering. For example, they saw children hiding under desks in rubble-strewn 
classrooms and thousands of office workers congregating outside of crumbling buildings (Moore 
2008). 
The effect of this up-to-the-minute uncensored information about the plight of their 
fellow citizens had a dramatic effect on the Chinese collective consciousness. It sparked a wave 
of volunteerism and philanthropy, with many people travelling hundreds of miles from their 
homes to help with relief efforts. In one instance, several private catering companies from a 
nearby province sent an ad hoc team to hand out fresh food to survivors (Economist 2008). 
Citizen activism like this and the efforts of several small NGOs in the area seem to have 
catalyzed a paradigm shift in China’s nongovernmental sector. No longer did the central 
government have a monopoly on addressing social problems. This had important implications for 
evolving state-society relations in the coming decade.     
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 The civil society response to the 2008 Sichuan earthquake seems to support Kleinman’s 
(2007, 26) assertion that moral decisions are not a result of prolonged self-reflection or 
adherence to a universal moral code, but more typically a response to pressing local 
circumstances. However, in China it is essential to consider the role of ideologies championed by 
the government which tend to have a particularly influential role in shaping societal trends.  
Deng Xiaoping directed and rationalized the Chinese market economy by proclaiming 
that if some people get rich first, the rest of society will benefit.21 This represents a significantly 
different approach to national development than the largely failed anti-capitalist ideals of Mao 
Zedong. Following Deng’s lead, the Reform Era government has promoted the individual pursuit 
of wealth as a path to national prosperity (Hertz 1998, 82). This strategy has brought roughly 
three hundred million people into an urban middle class that enjoys a far more comfortable 
lifestyle than the previous generation (e.g., Barton, Chen, and Jin 2013). Indeed, this large and 
growing segment of the population is increasingly defined by consumerism and self-interest 
(e.g., Ma and Adams 2014, 210). However, as Jankowiak (2004) points out, this rise in 
individualism has coincided with a rise in individual responsibility.  
 Zhang and Ong (2008, 8) describe the Chinese as “post-socialist subjects” who must 
make sense of a society in which the government remains overbearing but has dramatically 
reduced social services. Kleinman (2011, 15) highlights the prevalence of the term 松绑 (to untie) 
in the modern Chinese vocabulary. Chinese citizens have been “untied” from institutions that 
dominated their lives in the Mao years and early Reform Era, notably farming collectives in the 
                                                 
21 In the Chinese, 一部分先富起来, “一部分先” means “one part first” and likely refers both to the 
provinces that got rich first because they were made into special economic zones (SEZs), as well 
as to the people who got rich first because of official government encouragement of 
entrepreneurship (see Hsu 2006).  
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former and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the latter. In fact, between 1998 and 2003, more 
than thirty million workers were laid off from SOEs, representing a forty percent reduction in the 
government-funded workforce (Hurst and Hurst 2009). 
 As the government has reduced the social safety net, Chinese citizens have had to 
shoulder more individual responsibility. This trend is in line with Hsu’s (2007) notion that in the 
Reform Era private citizens, as much as the state and market elites, have a central role in creating 
new institutions and economic relationships. As the collective response to the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake makes clear, some Chinese have interpreted this to mean more than simply being 
responsible for their own well-being. In fact, when another severe earthquake struck Sichuan in 
2013, the volunteer and NGO response was many magnitudes larger and more well-organized 
(Zhang 2013). This mirrors the steadily increasing numbers of NGOs across sectors in twenty-
first century China. Figure 5 (Economist 2014) illustrates this trend in terms of the total number 
of registered NGOs between 1990 and 2013.  
 




 Based on the most recent estimate of 675,000 registered domestic NGOs in China 
(Brookings 2016), it appears that this upward momentum is continuing. Interestingly, as Guo et 
al. (2012) point out, the nongovernmental sector in China consists mostly of small, local 
organizations that are not officially registered with the government. Recent estimates of the 
number of such unregistered NGOs range from eight million (Yu 2008) to ten million (Wang 
2011). Thus, the number of officially registered NGOs represents only a small percentage of 
nongovernmental activity in China. 
The high number of unregistered organizations is mostly a function of strict government 
regulations for registering NGOs. Any organization that wishes to enjoy the tax and other 
benefits of being officially registered must get sponsored by an official in the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs (MOCA). As Ru and Ortolano (2009, 154) point out, this often involves a lot of personal 
networking and bribery, because the sponsors will be held responsible if the NGO breaks any of 
the often-opaque laws governing their activities. For this reason, most NGOs in China register as 
for-profit businesses (e.g., Li 2016b). Their programs often rely more on the revenue streams 
from commercial activity than the donations that are typically associated with the 
nongovernmental sector. This was true of all the organizations in my study. I discuss this in 
detail in Chapter 4.     
Clearly, Chinese NGOs do not operate with the same freedom enjoyed by their 
counterparts in democratic countries. This was foreshadowed by the misguided predictions of 
many China observers in the 1980s that after the implementation of the Reform and Opening 
Policy, China’s market economy would inevitably produce a more democratic political system. 
Representing this optimism, Womack (1984, 436) wrote with confidence that the Chinese 
government had “made a significant commitment to democratic reforms, and it could do so 
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because of its self-understanding as the vanguard of the people.” The violent government 
crackdown on the 1989 pro-democracy protest in Tiananmen Square reinforced the 
government’s actual commitment – to capitalism without democratically elected leaders or 
representative government, a precedent that remains to this day.22 
 Since 1989, the central government has sought to minimize the ways that civil society 
can act independently of the state (Lee 2015, 130). Wallace (2014) asserts that such policies 
contribute to the longevity of the one-party system. However, the transition to a market economy 
in China has replicated many of the inequalities being addressed by NGOs in other 
industrializing nations. Similar societal problems have created political instability and uprisings, 
most recently the Arab Spring (Murphy 2012). In fact, the Chinese government went to great 
lengths to censor news of the Arab Spring (Kennedy 2012). Given the history of populist 
revolutions in China (notably in 1911 and 1949), the central government tends to prioritize social 
issues with the potential to create unrest, of which mass internal migration is most certainly one.  
Despite (and probably because of) this state-level paranoia, the government has looked to 
NGOs to share its burden of dealing with social issues related to rapid development. These 
include environmental pollution (e.g., Yang 2005), pandemic diseases, most notably HIV/AIDS 
(e.g., Kaufman 2011), and poverty alleviation (e.g., Curley 2002). In general, it appears that the 
state hopes NGOs can mobilize resources to supplement its own spending (see Lu 2008, 136). 
This is particularly true for migrant issues. Even with the doomsday models used to make 
population projections in China (see Greenhalgh 2005), the central government never could have 
                                                 
22 I empathize with Womack and his contemporaries. Their faith in the inevitable marriage of 
capitalism and democracy provides a staunch reminder of how much we continue to get wrong 
about China, a country that is following a development path rarely if ever seen before.   
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predicted how many migrants there would be by the second decade of the twenty-first century. 
The numbers have gone way beyond what government agencies alone can handle. 
The challenge for NGOs in China is to remain non-governmental without becoming anti-
governmental. Liu (2011) points out that the government has tried to incorporate NGOs into its 
value system, so as to prevent them from becoming instigators of social crises or competitors for 
public resources. Spires (2011) calls this a “contingent symbiosis” whereby Chinese NGOs 
survive only insofar as they refrain from democratic claims-making and limit their activities to 
addressing social needs that might fuel grievances against the state. For example, in the case of 
migrant workers, NGOs often function as substitutes for official trade unions, from which 
migrant workers are typically excluded (Froissart 2010). This is true of several of the 
organization in my study. However, Froissart (2011) points out that such NGOs serve the 
interests of the central government by channeling complaints in an organized manner, rather than 
allowing migrants to take to the streets. 
For this reason, many NGOs in China morph into GONGOs, i.e., the paradoxical 
government-operated nongovernmental organization (see Yuanfeng 2015). Hsu (2016) dubs this 
“state subcontracting” whereby NGOs conduct unofficial (and often unpaid) research and 
development for government departments. In these cases, NGOs help government officials 
impress their superiors by providing pre-tested programs that have already effectively solved 
social problems, at least on a small-scale. Generally, the NGOs receive no credit, but they often 
do gain government protection and a way to scale up the impact of their programs using state 
funds. I will explore the implications of this for the founders/directors in my study in Chapter 6. 
The state-society relationship described above is generally representative of the 
limitations placed on NGOs by the central government. However, it fails to incorporate what Hsu 
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(2012a) points out as the more direct role of city governments in the operations of local NGOs. 
After all, it is the cities themselves that have the most to gain from NGO programs designed to 
help migrants that live there. The NGOs help alleviate the strain on municipal resources, which 
Chen et al. (2013) show to be the most important factor determining the suitability of local 
communities for resettling migrants. This local-national tension is true across contexts. Glick 
Schiller and Caglar (2010) point out that immigrants/migrants are settled and integrated in local 
communities, yet policy is set at the federal level. A well-known proverb from the dynastic era 
aptly describes this often-disjointed relationship between the central government and local 
authorities: “Heaven is high, and the emperor is far away.”23   
Two recent national policy changes appear to represent an official acknowledgement of 
the capacity of NGOs to effect positive social change. First, the “Charity Law” took effect on 
September 1, 2016. It relaxes policies governing registration and fundraising for most domestic 
NGOs. However, it reaffirms the government’s commitment to crack down on NGOs that 
oppose its official viewpoints on sensitive issues, notably related to human rights and geographic 
borders, specifically with Tibet and other occupied territories. Thus, while encouraging the 
nongovernmental sector to continue expanding, the new law also requires all NGOs to adhere to 
much stricter disclosure guidelines for their programs (see Horsely 2016). This is representative 
of a habitual behavior of the central government to create space for civil society as a means to 
monitor its activities. This strategy likely originated with Mao’s “Hundred Flowers Campaign”24 
in which he encouraged intellectuals to publicly disagree with him as a means to flush out 





opposition and sentence his opponents to hard labor at “reeducation camps” (see Peerenboom 
2001). 
Despite the history of government suppression of civil society, the other recent policy 
change suggests that, given proper nurturing and management, the central government views its 
domestic nongovernmental sector less as an opponent and more as a partner. The “Foreign NGO 
Law” took effect on January 1, 2017. It severely limits the operations of foreign-run NGOs in 
China, requiring them to register with the public security authorities and comply with new 
funding restrictions and reporting obligations (see Horsely 2016). During the course of research 
for this dissertation, I found that this has caused all but the largest international foreign-run 
NGOs to significantly scale back their operations in China. In addition, several of the 
founders/directors in my study report that prior to the new law, they received significant portions 
of their budgets from foreign donors. After January 1, 2017, these have also been severely 
restricted. Now most NGOs in China must seek funding from either the government or Chinese 
foundations. This is likely another strategy of the central government to limit foreign influence in 
domestic affairs.  
Even more so than in the past, China has recently scaled up national security concerns 
about foreign nationals operating within its borders. In fact, a recent publicity campaign 
portrayed Western researchers as potential spies (I will discuss the implications of this for my 
own research in the next chapter in the section on Reflexivity and Research Realities). However, 
more than national security, the new foreign NGO law seems to mimic the protectionist policies 
employed by the central government to catalyze domestic industries. This is particularly apparent 
in the tech sector, where the major US-based internet firms, for example Google and Facebook, 
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have been all but banned from the Chinese market.25 Beyond censoring content, this has resulted 
in a lack of competition for the Chinese equivalents, for example Baidu and WeChat, which have 
come to dominate the massive Chinese internet market. 
Chinese authorities are habitually wary of foreign influence on their domestic affairs. 
Thus, the new prohibitions on foreign NGOs come as little surprise. It is certainly encouraging 
that the government is taking steps to bolster civil society in China. However, even more under 
the new laws, Chinese NGOs are routinely badgered by MOCA and other government agencies. 
It appears that the government wants them to expand their programs, just not their influence, 
particularly over groups prone to civil unrest, for example migrant workers experiencing unjust 
labor conditions. In a similar vein, the government has instated a law allowing domestic NGOs 
to have offices in only one city. This severely limits the reach of an NGO’s influence at the 
national level, while still encouraging programs at the local level. This seems to represent a fear 
of non-governmental entities getting too big and hence challenging the power of the state. 
All of the organizations in my study find their programs both supported and hindered by 
government policies. This contradiction is not particularly surprising given the above discussion 
of government interference in civil society. Yet, NGOs in China also face opposition from the 
Chinese public. It is here that we find a clear distinction between civil society and society at 
large. The former is where citizens find what Edwards (2009, 54) calls “associational life” – i.e., 
where the interests of society at large become organized into topical clubs and associations. 
These topics can include hobbies, common belief systems, and also delve into pressing social 
                                                 
25 Google refused to comply with Chinese censorships laws and was forced to move its servers to 
Hong Kong. For this reason, when accessing Google in China, most of the search results are 
dead ends or severely censored. It is only possible to access Facebook through VPNs, which 
incidentally have also been cracked down on recently. 
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issues. I refer to the latter as the nongovernmental sector. For the purposes of this dissertation, I 
further define civil society as the space in which people can become “civically engaged” – in 
Putnam’s (2000) terms, finding organizational support to address problems that directly affect 
one’s own life or the lives of others.  
The relationship between civil society and society at large can be as intertwined as that 
between the state and civil society. While civil society organizations are intended to represent the 
interests of society a large, the public simultaneously must approve of and support their 
programs. In China, despite growing governmental support for NGOs, the general public has 
grown increasingly skeptical of their activities. This may have to do with limited coverage of 
NGO activities in the state media. This is a factor that Lee, Johnson, and Prakash (2012) view as 
crucial in determining public trust in the nongovernmental sectors in post-communist countries. 
Public perception in these state-dominated societies still tends to rely heavily on official 
narratives. Given the previous discussion of government censorship of even social media, this 
effect is particularly pronounced in China.  
Chinese NGOs are also embedded in a zeitgeist defined by self-interest and the profit-
motive that has flourished since the early Reform Era, when teachers even began selling candy in 
classrooms (Chan, Madsen, and Unger 1992, 274). This has led to what Ikels (1996) calls “the 
return of the god of wealth”, whereby individualism and materialism permeate perceptions of 
success in the Chinese collective consciousness. This is bolstered by the guanxi system 
(discussed above) with its reliance on self-interested reciprocity. It seems safe to conclude that 
charitable giving without the expectation of a tangible return on investment has not entered the 
Chinese collective consciousness in any significant way. 
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Many of the founders/directors I interviewed have been asked at some point during their 
careers at NGOs: “Why don’t you want to make more money?” After all, most of them have the 
education and connections to amass significant personal wealth. Many informants I interviewed 
in the general public question the motives of the people running NGOs. They assume something 
fishy is going on when a person claims to only be interested in doing good for others and not for 
themselves. Unfortunately, these assumptions have been bolstered by several high-profile 
scandals in the nongovernmental sector. Notably, in 2011 a manager at the Red Cross in China 
posted pictures online of her lavish lifestyle. This sparked an investigation into embezzlement, 
which, among other crimes, uncovered misappropriated donations that were meant to go to 
victims of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake (see Tiezzi 2014). Interestingly, after jailing the guilty 
manager, the central government threatened to punish anyone who continued to smear China’s 
Red Cross (Li 2016a). This offers further evidence of the state’s growing support for the 
nongovernmental sector. 
NGOs around the world increasingly face crises of public trust. As in China, some of this 
is due to misappropriation of funds. For example, the American Red Cross famously used $500 
million to build just six homes in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake (Sullivan and Elliot 2016). 
Keating and Thrandardottir (2017) suggest that this is a representative pattern of behavior, 
resulting from the rapid growth of the operating budgets and political influence of 
nongovernmental organizations. Callahan (2017) goes as far to argue that the super-rich use 
massive charitable donations to manipulate public policy, often circumventing elected officials 
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(see also Giridharadas 2018).26 Given the strength of China’s nondemocratic government, mega-
donors seem to be an unlikely contributor to the crisis of public trust.   
Despite the universality of public skepticism of NGO programs, there is also widespread 
concern for social issues around the world. The Chinese want cleaner air, safer food, and less 
poverty. These were sentiments I heard echoed throughout my field research. It seems these 
represent the expression of what Ikels (1996, 270) calls “moral murkiness”, in which there is a 
growing sense of disillusionment in a system that values profit-making above all else. Jankowiak 
(2004, 205) reinforces this point: “The forces that create the opportunity to pursue blind self-
interest with little or no regard for another's well-being are the same forces responsible for the 
expanded moral horizon and heightened civic activism.” 
Billioud and Thoraval (2015) assert that the recent revival of Confucian ideals, though 
probably an effort by the government to promote national identity (Wolin 2015), may also be 
contributing to an increased sense of service to the community. A passage from the Analects I 
heard referenced by several informants supports this claim: “A person of good character 
understands what is right; a person of bad character understands only what will profit.”27 In 
addition, the founders/directors of Chinese NGOs tend to have the credentials to succeed in the 
global market economy, including having a college degree, having previously held a high-paying 
job, and being well-connected. Thus, it appears that some people who have flourished in the 
market economy are beginning to help those who continue to struggle. This trend may represent 
                                                 
26 This is a fair critique, but also seems to be a case of biting the hand that feeds you. After all, 
solving major social issues requires a lot of more money than most individuals or even 
government agencies have to give.  
27 论语 4.16：君子喻于义，小人喻于利。 
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the evolution of Deng Xiaoping’s vision of capitalist wealth accumulation as a path to shared 
prosperity. 
As the above literature review makes clear, political, sociocultural, and economic factors 
are all likely contributing to the growing nongovernmental sector in China. Previous research 
reveals many institutional and organizational obstacles faced by China’s NGOs. These studies 
also suggest a lot of potential motivations for the founders/directors of Chinese NGOs. Yet, they 
devote little time to asking the founders/directors themselves what motivates them. In the 
following chapters, I will detail how my research for this dissertation begins to remedy this 
knowledge gap and broaden our understanding of individual responses to rapid economic and 






CHAPTER 3: FIELDWORK 
 
 This chapter details the logistics, planning, and local circumstances that informed the 
field research for this dissertation. I give an overview of my methods and discuss how they each 
contribute evidence to understanding the experiences and decision-making of my research 
population. I compare distinguishing characteristics of my field sites, particularly as they relate 
to China’s economic development and internal migration. I use emic perspectives from guided 
neighborhood tours to enrich descriptions of my field sites from existing literature and from my 
own observations. Finally, I delve into issues of reflexivity and the realities of conducting this 
research in the Chinese context.  
Methods 
For this study, I surveyed thirty-four organizations in Beijing (n=17) and Shenzhen 
(n=17). From these, I sampled twelve organizations in Beijing (n=6) and Shenzhen (n=6), at each 
taking part in daily operations for three weeks. During these periods of participant observation, I 
also gathered data using the following methods: (1) a survey of organizations to create a baseline 
for each NGO and offer key trends and comparisons between the founders/directors and the two 
field sites; (2) professional life histories to add depth and breadth to the experiences of the 
founders/directors that continue to inform their decision-making; (3) guided neighborhood tours 
to offer insights into how the founders/directors view the neighborhoods and people most closely 
linked to their work; (4) pile sorts to shed light on how the founders/directors prioritize various 
aspects of their organizations; and (5) decision modelling to explore the factors leading some 
 55 
 
founders/directors to accept government funding and the effect of this decision on their 
subsequent decision-making. 
My participation at each organization was not passive. I did not simply wait for things to 
happen for me to observe and participate in. After a preliminary analysis of survey data, I 
compiled a list of my own skills that I could offer to each organization on a daily basis. These 
included some very basic skills, such as word-processing, English language instruction, proof-
reading, and handyman work. I also made a list of more involved tasks I could help with, such as 
grant writing, marketing, and serving as a liaison to potential donors. In one form or another, I 
took on these roles at each of the organizations I visited. In many cases, I was given a 
workspace, put in charge of specific parts of their programs, and in very practical ways 
participated in the daily operations of each organization. Through this method of participation, I 
was able to make observations below the surface of daily operations, often being consulted on 
personnel decisions, accounting, marketing, and program evaluations. 
Initially, I planned to live in a migrant community in each city. However, for a variety of 
reasons that I will discuss in the next section, I did not wind up basing myself in these 
communities. Despite this, I spent most of each day in various migrant neighborhoods 
throughout Beijing and Shenzhen. In addition to conducting participant observation on the daily 
operations of NGOs, I also participated in the daily street life of the various migrant communities 
in which they operated. I frequented neighborhood food stalls, forging friendships with their 
owners who were mostly migrants themselves. These and other people in the neighborhoods 
were an invaluable source of information about the communities and their residents.28 I chatted 
                                                 
28 Most of the migrants in these neighborhoods lacked legal residence. I use the term “residents” 
simply to refer to people that have made their lives in the neighborhood. It is a shame that this is 
not the primary criteria used by the government for “residency”. 
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with anyone on the street who was willing to talk to me. As I discuss in the section on Reflexivity 
and Research Realities, casual conversations often yielded key insights into my project and leads 
to important new connections. 
I designed a fifty-question survey29 to gather categorical data from the founders/directors 
on: (1) their educational and professional histories; (2) the structure and staffing of their 
organizations; (3) metrics they use to measure the success of their programs; and (4) challenges 
they have overcome and/or continue to face. In addition to the survey, I conducted a semi-
structured follow-up interview with each respondent. 
The survey is composed of multiple choice, fill-in-the-blank, and ranking scale questions. 
To minimize respondent bias, I developed and carefully vetted answer choices during five 
months of preliminary research for this dissertation. I crafted the phrasing of each question and 
answer choice from data I gathered from respondents across the third-sector30, including the 
founders/directors of various Chinese and foreign-run NGOs, volunteers, and academics. These 
preliminary respondents helped me refine the phrasing to reflect the appropriate terminology in 
Chinese for my research topic. For example, in the original draft, I used the words 客人 
(customers) and 委托人 (clients) to refer to the people the organizations are trying to help. 
However, numerous respondents in preliminary fieldwork told me that they preferred 受益人 
(beneficiaries). 
                                                 
29 The English version is in Appendix 3 and the Chinese version is in Appendix 4. 
30 The first sector of society is the public sector, i.e., government entities. The second is the 
private sector, i.e., for-profit businesses. The third sector refers to NGOs and other civil society 
organizations, such as clubs and associations. These are typically nonprofits but are not limited 




In the final version of the survey, I exclusively used 受益人 (beneficiaries) to refer to the 
people the organizations are trying to help. This term was universally well-received by survey 
respondents in my sample. Moreover, it reveals that the founders/directors view the migrants not 
in commercial terms, but in terms of people benefitting from their programs. This sentiment was 
often repeated in interviews. Thus, in addition to more accurate phrasing, the use of the word 受
益人 supplies an important insight into how the founders/directors view their own work. 
For the founders/directors of the organizations in this study, their work is not simply a 
career, but a life passion. This became clear to me not just from talking with them but also 
through observing their daily activities. For this reason, it seemed likely that many of their life 
experiences led them to found or direct their organizations and continue to exert significant 
influence on their decision-making. Throughout the three weeks at each NGO in my sample, I 
compiled a thorough professional life history of the founder/director.  
Following Yoshihama et al. (2005), I created a life history calendar for each informant, in 
order to broaden and deepen recall of significant life events and formative experiences. During 
semi-structured interviews, I built a chronological sketch of each informant’s life from 
memorable or easily recalled events. During follow-up interviews, I used open-ended questions 
to probe for less easily recalled memories. Of particular note was the prevalence of what 
Schwartz (2012, 239) calls “the stickiness of past experiences”, i.e., formative life events that 
shape one’s motivations to help others. In the next chapter, I use these to expand on trends 
revealed by survey and interview data. 
I employed all of the methods for this dissertation to understand how the 
founders/directors of NGOs view both the migrant situation and the work they are doing to 
improve it. Although I did not live in migrant communities per se, each organization primarily 
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operates in one or two (often adjacent) migrant neighborhoods. Thus, the Chinese 
founders/directors of NGOs not only have native cultural knowledge, but they also possess deep-
rooted knowledge of the local settings in which they work.  
In order to tap into this knowledge, on the first day of my time at each of the twelve 
organizations, I requested that the founder/director give me a guided tour of the neighborhood(s) 
where their programs primarily operate. The tours lasted between forty-five minutes and an hour, 
and generally coincided with a lunch break. We were often accompanied by office assistants or 
other workers at the organizations. I gave broad criteria for the tours, asking the 
founders/directors to show me parts of the neighborhood that are important to them and their 
work. This was often a sufficient prompt to create a detailed social map of the neighborhood(s). 
It also set a precedent for any time I joined the founders/directors for meetings in the 
neighborhood. The initial tour let them know how interested I was. On subsequent walks in the 
area, they would often go out of their ways to point out and describe other significant 
neighborhood features. In the next section, I pepper the city-specific sections with snippets from 
the neighborhood tours. 
For the preceding methods, I employed semi-structured interviews. I used open-ended 
questions to elicit information from respondents that I might not have anticipated. This allowed 
me to produce a dataset representing the range of perspectives and experiences of my sample. It 
also helped me create a lexicon of common terminology used in China’s third sector. Equipped 
with these data, I developed structured interview exercises to delve deeper into the main topic of 
this study, namely the decision-making of the founders/directors. First, I discuss my use of pile 
sorts to triangulate how the founders/directors prioritize various aspects of their organizations. 
Then I detail my use of decision modelling.  
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Pile sorts are a well-established ethnographic method for understanding how members of 
a group organize and categorize information. For example, Longfield (2004) used pile sorts in 
Côte d'Ivoire to understand how young women’s views of different types of sexual partners 
affect the spread of HIV/AIDS. Doughty, Lu, and Sorensen (2010) used pile sorts with an 
indigenous group in Ecuador to understand how their views of the natural world affected their 
decision to remain in a rapidly developing area, despite disruptions to their traditional way of 
life. Gretzel and Fesenmaier (2010) used pile sorts to capture the personal meanings and feelings 
that people associate with vacations to personalize tourist experiences. Clearly, this method has a 
wide range of applications in a wide range of research populations. The common thread between 
these examples is that the data give insights into the underlying criteria people use to make 
decisions. 
I used pile sorts in this study to understand how the founders/directors prioritize various 
aspects of their organizations’ operations. This approach requires three assumptions: (1) the 
founders/directors are frankly indicating their priorities rather than offering normative sorts; (2) 
there is a significant correlation between the level of priority assigned to a variable and its effect 
on decision-making. The examples above offer strong precedents for this assumption, one that is 
rooted in the pile sorts method; and (3) the founders/directors have comprehensive information 
about the various factors affecting their organizations and are making decisions accordingly. 
The effect of the third assumption on this study is particularly significant. As discussed 
above, the laws in China governing both migrant workers and NGOs are often opaque and 
amended without forewarning. At any given moment, the founders/directors likely have no more 
than limited knowledge about many of the external factors affecting their organizations. They are 
often making decisions that may not be in their organizations’ best interests. That said, this is not 
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a study of optimal outcomes. Rather, it is a study of how the founders/directors are making 
decisions. In varying degrees, this type of information asymmetry affects many decision-making 
situations. This effect is particularly pronounced for civil society organizations in nondemocratic 
systems like China’s. I will discuss this thoroughly in the coming chapters. 
While the second assumption limits the external validity of the pile sorts dataset, it sheds 
light on the political economy in which the founders/directors must operate. In fact, interview 
and survey data confirm that the founders/directors are aware of how the unpredictability of the 
Chinese system restricts their ability to make optimal decisions. Thus, the limitations placed on 
the decision-making of the founders/directors reveal at least as much about their experiences as 
the results of analyzing the pile sorts’ data.  
To produce the categories for the pile sorts, I employed a directed free-listing exercise 
with each respondent in my survey sample in Beijing (n=17) and Shenzhen (n=17). In the 
follow-up interviews, I first asked the founders/directors to list all the important aspects of their 
organizations. Toward the end of the interviews, I asked each respondent to list all the aspects of 
their business that they do daily, weekly, monthly, and only occasionally. This process produced 
a master list of forty-two unique aspects of the organizations. I then removed aspects with no 
clear directionality, i.e., those that appeared on less than fifty percent of individual respondents’ 
lists (see Doughty, Lu, and Sorensen 2010, 23). This left me with fifteen aspects that had 
appeared on at least fifty percent of the individual lists. From these I created the cards for the pile 
sorts.    
I conducted the pile sort exercise at the sample of organizations in Beijing (n=6) and 
Shenzhen (n=6) at which I conducted participant observation. I had the respondents do the pile 
sorting three times on three separate days during my stint at each of their organizations. First, I 
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asked them to do a ranking pile sort, placing each card into one of three categories indicating the 
relative importance of each aspect to their organizations’ operations: (1) less Important; (2) 
important; and (3) very important. The results of the free-listing indicated that all the aspects in 
the pile sort had at least some importance. So, I did not include a “not important” category. 
Next, I asked respondents to place each card in one of five categories related to the 
frequency that they conducted each aspect: (1) infrequently; (2) annually; (3) monthly; (4) 
weekly; and (5) daily. Finally, following Bourey et al. (2012), I created a hypothetical situation 
and asked respondents to place each card in the same three categories as the first exercise 
indicating their relative importance. For this last pile sort, I used the prompt: “How would you 
respond to these questions if there were fewer government regulations [of NGOs]?”31  In 
Chapter 5, I discuss how the results of these three pile sorting exercises interrelate and what this 
analysis suggests about the decision-making of the founders/directors. 
While forty percent of the organizations in my sample received government money, over 
eighty percent of the founders/directors report being faced with this decision. For this reason, I 
created a decision tree to model the criteria used by the founders/directors to decide whether or 
not to accept government funding.32 Following Ryan and Bernard (2006), I sought to elicit as 
many possible rationales for the decision, with the expectation of a finite number of possibilities. 
I created bifurcated decision points by prompting for yes/no responses for decision criteria. I also 
used survey and interview data to incorporate significant individual and organizational factors 
into the model. 
                                                 
31 如果有更少的政府管制，你会怎么回答这些问题？ 




I employ decision-modelling for this dissertation not only to predict future behavior (such 
as Ryan and Martinez 1996), but also to situate choices within what Peterson (2010) calls 
“decision spaces”. These reveal the link between a decision, the political and economic 
environment in which the decision is made, and the action to which the decision leads. Thus, I 
created a second decision tree to model how the decisions to accept or not accept government 
money affect subsequent decision-making. I discuss the results of both models in Chapter 6.  
Field Sites 
 I conducted field research for this dissertation in Beijing and Shenzhen. Both of these 
cities have large migrant populations. Yet, there are significant differences between them that 
likely affect the experiences and decision-making of the founders/directors in my sample. 
Beijing is China’s most internationally visible city. Particularly following the 2008 
Olympics, the central government has used the capital city as a showcase for its 
accomplishments and political stability. Like many industrial hubs in China, there are still 
millions of migrant workers in Beijing who lack legal residency in the city. They often live in 
impermanent housing on the outskirts of the city, and regularly protest their poor living and 
working conditions. This does not fit well into the official government narrative of a harmonious 
society. Thus, nongovernmental programs that provide social services in the nation’s capital tend 
to come under strong government scrutiny. In fact, my requests to meet with at least half a dozen 
organizations in Beijing were met with one of two replies, both of which insinuate strong 
government oversight: (1) we are not permitted to meet with “foreign friends”33; and (2) in order 
to meet with us you must be accompanied by a government official. I will discuss this issue in 
greater detail in the section on Reflexivity and Research Realities. 




In comparison, Shenzhen was the first Special Economic Zone in the country, and 
remains a hub of direct foreign investment, manufacturing, and finance. It is the startup capital of 
China, and as such has become a center for both tech and social innovation. Thus, in Shenzhen 
the government tends to prioritize business over politics.34 Comparing these two cities offers a 
representative perspective on the range of experiences of NGOs working with China’s migrant 
workers. In the following two sections, I will discuss each field site in greater detail.  
China has approximately eighty cities more populous than Dallas. In fact, as of 2017 it 
had 102 cities with more than a million people (Guardian 2017). As the map in Figure 7 
illustrates, these are primarily clustered in the eastern part of the country. They are the hubs of 
manufacturing that have driven China’s meteoric increases in GDP over the past four decades. 
As such, they all have significant populations of migrant workers. 
 
Figure 7: Map of 1 Million+ Cities 
                                                 
34 While this is generally the case, I had at least one instance of government surveillance in 
Shenzhen. I did not receive any rejections from organizations in Shenzhen, but the government 
oversight was far from absent. Again, I will discuss my experiences in greater detail in the 
section on Reflexivity and Research Realities. 
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I could have chosen any of these cities to conduct research for this dissertation. China’s 
300 million migrant workers have dispersed to almost any urban center with manufacturing, 
which is just about every city on the map above. Despite this, however, during the course of my 
research I found only a few of these cities have a significant number of nongovernmental 
organizations helping migrants.35 This is likely due to two factors: (1) as I discussed earlier, the 
central government severely limits the operations of NGOs; and (2) while many cities now have 
large migrant populations, most of the cities shown on the map above only began to ramp up 
their manufacturing in the past ten to fifteen years. Only the main east coast cities have had 
major manufacturing sectors since the onset of the Reform Era (1978-present). The implication is 
that, especially in China, it takes a long time for nongovernmental organizations to develop and 
begin to address societal problems. 
The central government takes great pains to obscure potentially damning social injustices, 
of which the treatment of the migrant population is most certainly one. Thus, I hypothesize that 
NGOs have primarily appeared in those cities with long-established migrant populations. It 
should also be noted that most of the country’s wealth is concentrated in these eastern cities. This 
means that there are more local funding opportunities. This further suggests the importance of 
locality for both interest in and funding of NGO programs. 
During preliminary research for this dissertation, I investigated NGOs in Beijing, 
Shenzhen, and Shanghai. As the financial hub of the country, I actually anticipated finding the 
most organizations in Shanghai. Given the above discussion of funding, this still seems like a 
reasonable hypothesis. In fact, of the major Chinese urban centers, Shanghai has the most 
                                                 
35 In this case, I use the term “significant” to mean a sufficient number of organizations to 
conduct a study with proper sampling. I discuss this in the section on Sampling. 
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migrant laborers who lack legal residency (Yang et al. 2017). These ten to eleven million people 
comprise roughly forty-five percent of the urban population. However, I found no Chinese run 
NGOs helping migrants in Shanghai. This does not definitively mean there are none. In fact, 
during research in 2007-2008, Hsu (2012b) interviewed multiple migrant-focused NGOs in 
Shanghai, though she admits that many of them were not exclusively focused on migrant issues. 
Regardless, in 2016, after an exhaustive Internet search, and nearly two months of research in 
Shanghai, I came across not a single Chinese-run NGO helping migrants in the city.36 
In order to best understand the impacts of China’s development on the Chinese, the focus 
of this study is Chinese-run NGOs. This is not to suggest that the Chinese are the only ones 
helping migrants in China. During research in Shanghai, I found a handful of international NGOs 
working on migrant issues, notably the United Way. Its programs were quite limited in scope. 
When I visited their offices in the summer of 2016, they had only one full-time employee, a 
Chinese woman who was the director of their programs. They also had four or five summer 
interns, who were mostly Chinese undergraduates home for the summer from U.S. universities. 
I did, however, find several foreign-run NGOs working with migrants. Almost 
exclusively, these provided employment training programs. For example, I found a French-run 
organization training migrant teenagers how to bake professionally. This type of culturally-
specific foreign expertise has played a strong role in development during the Reform Era.37 In 
fact, their literature touts this as an important factor in the success of the program’s rate of job 
                                                 
36 I found a variety of Chinese-run NGOs working on other societal problems in Shanghai, such 
as the environment and food safety, as well as those that offer services for senior citizens and the 
disabled.   
37 Another example is the increasing popularity of after-school sports programs that promote 
their coaches’ country of origin as evidence of their talent in a given sport, e.g., British soccer 
coaches or American swim coaches. 
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placement. Unfortunately, the founders of the program declined my request for a visit, citing the 
“privacy” of their students. I respect the need to protect migrants from unnecessary publicity. 
The precarity of migrants’ lives is a reality with which all NGOs in China must deal. However, I 
was unable to learn any specifics about the program, notably funding sources and the actual rates 
of job placement.  
Another foreign-run program I found built a dormitory for homeless migrant teenagers 
(of which there are a surprisingly large number). This program was founded by a Malaysian 
woman and is now run by a man from Europe. Once a month, he sets up shower stalls and a free 
meal for the homeless. At these events, he provides games and other socializing opportunities. 
He and his staff try to find out as much as they can about any teenagers who attend. For those 
who are interested and willing to make a serious commitment, he offers a year of free room and 
board. During this time, participants receive job training. The facility has a small textile factory 
and industrial kitchen. The teens can either learn high-skill factory work or prepare for jobs in 
restaurants. In addition to conducting two weeks of participant observation at the facility, I also 
interviewed several graduates of the program. All of them reported having landed good-paying 
jobs within a month or so of completing the program. The program does receive money from 
donors, but also funds its operations by selling originally designed fashion accessories at tourist 
markets.38   
                                                 
38 I asked the manager if he uses the fact that the items are made by migrants as a selling point. I 
was wondering if Chinese consumers cared about this. He said that he has not found that they do. 
The Chinese will buy a piece if they like it. He only mentions who made the items to foreign 
tourists, who will often buy them because of just that. This may or may not have broader 
implications for the state of Chinese interest in societal problems. However, it is certainly an 
interesting piece of evidence to suggest that the moral shift in China may be far less pervasive 
than some have asserted (e.g., Kleinman 2011). 
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I found one main exception to these and other similar training programs, specifically an 
American-run organization that places foreign English teachers at migrant elementary schools 
around the city. In addition to some donations, the program is funded by contracts with local 
schoolboards. The program seems to have far-reaching impacts, both in terms of improving 
English language education for migrants, as well as spreading awareness of migrant issues, 
especially in expat communities. The manager of this program offered me the most viable 
explanation for the absence of Chinese-run NGOs working with migrants in Shanghai. He told 
me that the Shanghai metropolitan government offers significantly better services to migrants 
than any of the other major cities. Notably, and unlike anywhere in China, Shanghai offers 
migrant children free elementary education up to the sixth grade. After that, there are private 
school options, as well as a handful of spots in public schools for high-achieving migrant kids. 
Other social services for migrants in Shanghai, for example access to healthcare and afterschool 
programs, also rank among the best in China.39 
Shanghai is indeed the wealthiest Chinese city. Although I hypothesized that this would 
mean a large donor pool, the actual (and perhaps more obvious) implication is a huge tax pool. 
Simply, Shanghai can afford to offer social services far beyond the means of almost any other 
Chinese city. Thus, beside anecdotal evidence, the data for this dissertation comes exclusively 
from my fieldwork in Beijing and Shenzhen.   
                                                 
39 Even in Shanghai, migrants are still treated as second-class citizens. After elementary school, 
most migrant kids must either return to their home provinces to continue their education, or else 
remain in Shanghai for informal education through the limited number of NGO programs, or 
simply enter the workforce. The point here is that Shanghai is relatively good for China, but still 




 Beijing 北京, literally “northern capital”, has been the hub of China’s national politics for 
much of the past millennium. Following the success of the communist revolution, it became the 
national capital of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and it remains so to this day. By 
many measures, it is a massive city. Its official population is 20+ million, but with an estimated 
eight to ten million migrants who lack legal residency (Pabon 2017), the actual number of people 
living in the city may be as much as fifty percent more. Even with a low estimate, it is by far the 
most populous national capital on earth. It is also one of the most ancient cities in the world, with 
a history of continuous habitation dating back nearly three thousand years. 
 
Figure 8: Beijing City Ring Roads 
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Twenty-first century Beijing continues to have an imperial feel. The city sprawls within 
six “ring roads” which create concentric circles emanating outward from the center of national 
historical and political power (see Figure 8 above). The heart of the city holds the monumental 
architecture of the Forbidden City and Tiananmen Square. The former stands as a testament to 
the legacy of dynastic China; the latter as both a symbol and seat of the ruling communist 
party.40 The first four rings contain what could be considered the “city proper”. Within them are 
many of the products of China’s rapid urban development over the past four decades. We find 
gleaming, ultra-modern mall complexes, lavish business districts, several national research 
universities, a variety of prominent tourist attractions, and even the Olympic Park. In general, the 
residential neighborhoods within the four rings are upscale, well-manicured, and exclusive, often 
having front gates and private security guards. 
A major exception to this generalization are the Hutong, traditional neighborhoods that 
have been spared the bulldozer of modernization. The narrow, maze-like streets of the Hutong 
are interwoven throughout the concrete jungle of Beijing proper. They house humble residences 
and small store-fronts, street-side eateries, and musty gaming rooms. Children dart around 
corners, and it is common to find a group of old men playing cards on a stoop at any time of day. 
The old-style overhanging roofs offer open-air shelter on rainy and sunny days alike. Stepping 
into a Hutong is like stepping into a time with a slower pace of life than is common in twenty-
first century Beijing. The sense of community is palpable, and a welcome contrast to the “me 
first” mentality that has swept over China in the Reform Era. It is not surprising that “Hutong 
tourism” has grown increasingly popular. The old neighborhoods offer an idyllic reprieve from 
the frenetic pace of modern urban living.  
                                                 
40 I discussed the significance of Tiananmen Square in the previous chapter. 
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Despite the positive functional and symbolic aspects of the Hutong, they are increasingly 
at odds with the image of modernity projected by the central government. In particular, a lot of 
migrants use money they have saved from factory work to open small shops in the Hutong. 
These are usually no more than walk-up windows cut into the side of residential buildings. Local 
residents and tourists can buy snacks and sundries at very reasonable prices. These shops add a 
distinctive feel of petty-capitalism to the Hutong. However, in the past couple years, the 
government has begun to shutter these stores. One resident of a Hutong (who also happened to 
be a migrant) told me that she received no warning from the authorities before her store was shut 
down. One night she went to bed, and the next morning she woke up to find her storefront 
bricked over. Tacked to the mortar was an official notice that her commercial license had been 
revoked. There was no option for an appeal. She declined to let me photograph the notice 
because it contained her name and other identifying information. Figure 9 shows her storefront 




Figure 9: Bricked Up Hutong Storefront 
 
 The rushed and shoddy masonry is readily apparent from the picture above. Little if any 
effort was made to match the brickwork on the surrounding building. This heavy-handedness is 
representative of an increasingly pervasive government tendency to make migrants feel as 
unwelcome as possible in the city. The message seems clear: come to work, but don’t make a life 
here. This attitude results in a variety of cruel and inconsistent policies. In addition to 
discouraging migrant entrepreneurship, the government has recently announced that many 
migrant neighborhoods contain “illegal” structures and have begun evicting local residents (see 
Haas 2017). This all seems meant to unsettle migrant communities. It speaks to the irreconcilable 
needs of China’s labor market, on the one hand, and the government’s desire to send migrants 
back to their home provinces, on the other. 
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 Migrant problems are even worse beyond the fourth ring. At the fifth and sixth rings, the 
density of the urban jungle gives way to expansive industrial parks, interspersed with farmland 
and the low-rent tenements and narrow alleys of migrant enclaves, the so-called “urban 
villages”.41 Figure 10 shows a typical street scene from one such neighborhood in which I 
conducted research for this dissertation. I will describe my experiences in urban villages in the 
section on Reflexivity and Research Realities. 
 
Figure 10: Urban Village Street Scene 
 
Mirroring the geographical separation, there is also a significant policy divide between 
these outlying areas and the central parts of the city. Because these areas are predominantly made 
up of migrants who lack legal residency in the city, the government feels emboldened to make 




sweeping demolitions from time to time. After all, they do not have to account for housing 
occupied by legal residents. At least that seems to be the authorities’ rationale. I will discuss the 
issue of demolitions in the next the chapter.  
Shenzhen 
 Forty years ago, Shenzhen 深圳, located at the Pearl River Delta, was little more than a 
sprawling series of fishing and farming villages, with less than a hundred thousand people 
between them. Then, in 1980, Deng Xiaoping declared it a special economic zone. Overnight, 
direct foreign investment began flowing into the city from across the border in Hong Kong and 
beyond. People also began pouring into the area from all over China and overseas. The urban 
landscape changed at a speed fast even by Chinese standards. Figure 11 shows the results of 
urbanization in what was a generation ago a sparsely populated backwater. 
 




In today’s Shenzhen, the crescent-shaped urban sprawl begins in the southeast with the 
bustling, often-chaotic Dongmen Market. The Chinese expression 人山人海 (lit: people mountain, 
people sea) seems apt for an area that, according to a survey I conducted in 2014, receives 
approximately half-a-million visitors on any given weekend. The narrow alleys, wet markets and 
vibrant street vendors season this border area with the spice of raw, human commerce. Moving 
west along the main arc of the city, we come to Futian and Coco Park, Windows of the World, 
and swooping south, finally arrive at Shekou. These areas, in varying degrees, are sharp 
departures from the street-level petty capitalism of Dongmen. The shimmering windows of high-
rise office buildings tower above broad, clean boulevards. There are numerous high-end malls, 
and both the shopping and eating are priced for the business elite, Chinese and expat alike. 
Currently, the urban area has more than eleven million people. Eight million of these are 
migrants (Lin 2017). Beijing, a city of nearly double the population, has roughly the same 
number. Assuming not all of the migrants are counted in the official population, migrants make 
up roughly eighty percent of the people in Shenzhen. During fieldwork for this dissertation, 
Shenzhen’s status as a “migrant city” became particularly apparent. During the Chinese New 
Year in most cities, shops and business are closed for a week to ten days. However, in Shenzhen 
I found myself in a three-week period during which I was not able to schedule any appointments. 
Most of the restaurants in my neighborhood were closed for this long as well. I spent the time 
eating cup ramen and analyzing data. During the Chinese New Year, it is common for migrants 
to return to their home provinces. In fact, it is widely believed that this is the largest annual 
human migration on earth (e.g., McCarthy 2018). With approximately eighty percent of the 
urban population engaging in this ritual, there was essentially a “closed for business” sign 
hanging on the entire city. 
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Shenzhen has become a beacon for the possibilities of the Reform Era, but also for the 
inequalities created by the market economy. Like Beijing, Shenzhen has countless urban 
villages, where migrants reside in the same legal limbo that they endure in other urban centers.  
Unlike Beijing, these villages are primarily not on the outskirts, but rather scattered throughout 
the city. This is largely a function of how Shenzhen has developed from farmland to major 
metropolis in a single generation. Many of the original neighborhoods have been demolished to 
make room for sprawling malls and corporate complexes. However, many still remain, 
sandwiched between ultramodern business and shopping districts. During fieldwork for this 
dissertation, I lived in one such neighborhood. I will discuss my experiences in the next section. 
More than in any other major city, the villages in Shenzhen represent the paradoxical 
treatment of migrants in China as whole. Bach (2010, 423) comments that “the villages appear 
simultaneously as the city’s condition of existence and perceived obstacle to progress, its 
recognized heritage and its hidden past, its location for menace or entrepreneurial exuberance.” 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, this statement could easily be applied to Chinese views of 
migrant workers. 
Interestingly, for the central government, Shenzhen cements the legitimacy of its brand of 
one-party capitalism. As stated above, the city is a beacon of skyrocketing corporate profits 
which have even led to the formation of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the only other national 
stock exchange outside of Shanghai. However, Shenzhen is also a hub of illicit capitalism. Even 
by Chinese standards, Shenzhen has a lot of counterfeits and black-market business, much of it 
centered in the urban villages. Here again, like their work in factories, the government 
simultaneously views the migrants as the best and worst of the Chinese economic model. Thus, 
the reality is that Shenzhen’s success, like the nation as a whole, has emerged from significant 
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divergence from the officially approved agenda, which has been retroactively incorporated into 
the official narrative. O’Donnell, Wong, and Bach (2017) view this as a form of myth-making, 
whereby the success of rogue experiments become models of intentional policies. Thus, the 
contradictions of Shenzhen’s development and defining ethos create a space that is at once 
welcoming to innovation, both business and social, and dismissive of the problems facing its 
majority migrant population.     
Reflexivity and Research Realities 
 Research can happen anywhere. This is perhaps the most valuable lesson I learned during 
fieldwork. I was regularly surprised by the sources of key insights or leads. In particular, I found 
informal conversations on local busses to be an excellent source of otherwise elusive 
information. 
 The single biggest challenge I faced during field research was actually locating the 
NGOs. While some maintain websites, most keep a low profile. This is primarily due to the 
heavy government scrutiny of their programs. From my preliminary research, I knew that many 
of them operated in the so-called urban villages, the makeshift neighborhoods on the outskirts of 
major cities where migrant workers typically live. So, this is where I continued my search for 
organizations to survey, and eventually sample for participant observation. 
Initially, I planned to base myself in a single migrant community in each city, sampling 
from all the NGOs working in that area. However, after entering the field, I found that typically 
only one or two organizations worked within each community. In fact, most organizations in my 
sample worked with migrants from several different communities. Thus, it was more practical to 
base myself in a location with easy access to many migrant communities within each city. 
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Migrant workers are a group that suffers from both economic and political 
marginalization. Thus, few people with intimate knowledge of urban demographics in China are 
willing to discuss the urban villages, much less their exact locations. In fact, even researchers at 
a prominent Chinese university research institute could only point to general vicinities on a map 
for me to search. 
 This problem has similarities to conducting research on other hidden populations, for 
example drug addicts and people with HIV/AIDS. As I discuss in the section on Sampling, 
accessing such populations typically requires a respondent-driven approach. In essence, this 
involves finding one individual or small group of the target population and asking them to assist 
in contacting others. This can involve a variety of entry methods, including targeting locations 
known to be frequented by the population under study (see Magnani et al. 2005), the use of daily 
routines to anticipate the location of people at certain times of the day (Ferreira et al. 2008), and 
even using monetary incentives to entice members of the group to participate in both the study 
and generating more participants (Heckathorn 1997).  
I did not find any of the above methods necessary during my research. Migrant workers 
in China have one significant difference with most of these other marginalized groups: there are 
approximately 300 million of them, mostly concentrated in the major cities along China’s eastern 
seaboard. Quite simply, they are a massive population hidden in plain sight. Like other hidden 
populations, the lives of migrant workers in China are entangled in illegal and stigmatized 
circumstances, notably living in cities without legal residency. Paradoxically, and unlike most 
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other hidden populations, they have contributed essential work to their country’s steady 
development over the past forty years.42 
Armed with the knowledge of their massive numbers, and a vague sense of their 
whereabouts, during the first phase of fieldwork, I boarded local busses and headed in the 
general direction of migrant enclaves.43 One morning stands out as representative of my 
experiences during this phase. Loaded with my field bag44, I boarded a bus around the corner 
from my apartment in Beijing. As on most days, I waited until after the morning rush-hour to 
start my excursion. At the bus stop, I only had to wait a few minutes for the bus to my first 
destination, a transfer point about forty-five minutes west. When the bus pulled up, about a 
dozen people rushed the door. As is customary in China, I pushed my way ahead of at least a 
couple of them. I got on, swiped my transit card, and found a place to stand midway down the 
aisle. I took off my field pack, placed it on the floor between my feet, and reached up to grab one 
                                                 
42 I am in no way suggesting that other hidden populations lack importance in their own 
societies. I am merely pointing out the absurdity of such a large and indispensable population 
having to remain hidden in China.  
43 Local busses in China’s major cities, even to remote suburbs, are very reliable and affordable. 
A multi-hour ride on several busses costs no more than $5. More remarkable is the accuracy of 
the public transportation option on Baidu Maps (the Chinese equivalent of Google Maps). Not 
only could I use it to plan complex, multi-stop routes, but it even gave me up-to-the-minute 
scheduling information. I truly appreciated our digital age when, standing on the side of a dirt 
road thirty miles from the nearest train station in Beijing, I could not only see that the next bus 
would arrive in seven minutes, but also monitor its progress via GPS.  
44 In the field, I carry a dark grey, nondescript JanSport schoolbag. In China I obviously stand 
out in a crowd because of my skin color and facial features. To remain as unassuming as 
possible, like my bag, I typically dress in muted tones and wear a hat with the same color profile. 
My field bag contains what I need for the unexpected nature of fieldwork: water, snacks, an 
umbrella, business cards, pens, an encrypted jump drive, an external battery pack, charging 
cables, sunblock, gifts for the founders/managers of organizations, lollipops for the migrant kids, 
and a waterproof pouch with a notebook, a tablet, and surveys.   
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of the dangling handholds. A couple seats remained open, but in the high-density areas of the 
city, someone far more deserving of them is likely to get on at any stop.45 
Still on the western side of the city center, the passengers represented a broad mix of 
Chinese society. A few well-dressed young professionals stared and tapped at their cell phones. 
Several older ladies sat with wheeled shopping bags between their legs. Some of the bags were 
full to the brim, overflowing with greens and root vegetables. Others were still empty, 
presumably soon to be filled. Another old lady in a brightly flowered shirt sat with a young child 
on her lap. Several middle-aged men stood in the aisle and swayed with the flow of traffic. I 
swayed with them, and was the only white person on that bus.46   
 The bus made frequent stops on the way to the transfer station. When we arrived, 
everyone got off, and I navigated through the crowds to board the bus bound for the outskirts of 
the city. As we progressed westward, the stops became fewer and farther between. The crowd 
thinned out and, by many measures, became more homogenous (except for me, of course). None 
of the passengers wore suits. On average their clothing appeared more practical, drab, and well-
worn than passengers in the center of the city. There were no elderly people onboard.47 Most of 
the passengers appeared to be in their thirties or forties. A few women had children with them. 
One woman had three children. I found a seat at the back next to them. 
                                                 
45On crowded public transportation, I prefer to carve out a comfortable place to stand right from 
the start. Typically, if I grab a seat, I wind up giving it to a senior citizen or someone with 
children, only to have to fight through the standing crowd once the train or bus is moving.  
46 I cannot say for sure that I was the only non-Chinese person on that bus. Even after a decade-
and-a-half working throughout Asia, I still cannot differentiate Asians by outward appearance 
alone. On that day, however, I can safely say that I was the only non-Asian on the bus. 
47 This was common on buses in migrant areas of the city. Typically, grandparents stayed at 
home to watch their grandkids, while the parents ventured into the city to work long hours.  
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 The oldest boy (10) began staring at me immediately. Although non-Asian foreigners are 
common in the central parts of Chinese cities, it is quite rare to encounter them on the outskirts, 
especially for migrant children. We had at least an hour-long ride ahead of us, so I wasted no 
time breaking the ice. I politely asked the woman if the children were all hers.48 She said yes, 
and then I asked her if I could give them each a lollipop. She nodded, and I pulled the bag of 
candy from my backpack. As the children enjoyed their lollipops, I told them I had two 
daughters who also loved lollipops. The oldest boy looked at me incredulously, so I pulled out 
my cellphone to show him pictures of the girls. As he looked at them, I said, “See, foreigners can 
have kids too.” His mom laughed and told him to be polite. Several other passengers at the back 
of the bus, who were obviously listening to our conversation, turned around and shared a good 
laugh.  
One of the passengers, a man who appeared to be in forties, complimented my Chinese. I 
gave a well-practiced and humble response, which immediately endeared me to everyone in 
earshot.49 I used the opportunity to get some information from the mom and anyone else who 
would talk to me. I asked her what province she was from. This may seem like an overly direct 
                                                 
48 This may seem like an odd question. However, given the One-Child Policy, most urban 
parents have only a single child. Although some wealthy parents pay the government to have 
more children, most of the official exceptions to the policy are given to rural families. Given 
their clothing and use of public transportation on the outskirts of the city, it seemed fair to 
assume that this mother was not wealthy. Thus, her affirmative reply indicated that she was most 
likely a migrant.  
49 Non-native Chinese speakers should never thank a Chinese person for complimenting their 
language abilities. In Chinese this sounds both arrogant and, quite frankly, inaccurate. There are 
a variety of humble responses I have spent many years perfecting (as far that is possible in 
Chinese). One of my favorite and most-used is: 哪儿的话，我的中文还有很大的进步空. In English 
this best translates as: “What the heck are you talking about?! My Chinese (obviously) has a lot 
of room for improvement.” This response is a humble brag. It lets the listener know that I speak 
more than basic Chinese and allows me to interject my own personality into the conversation – 
one of the greatest challenges faced by all foreign language learners.  
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opening question. Yet, given the evidence I already had (see Footnote 43 above), it was a fair 
assumption that she was not from Beijing. Without hesitation, she told me that she was from 
Hunan Province. I then asked her what part of Hunan she was from. She told me the western 
part. “Have you been there?” she asked. 
“Not yet,” I replied, “But I really want to go. I’ve heard it’s beautiful.” Her face lit up 
with my interest in her home province. Honestly, I give the same reply to migrants no matter 
where they say they come from. Half the time I have no idea where their home regions are until I 
check the map later. Yet, I do not intend this to be insincere. I have learned to tailor this response 
to reflect how much pride all migrants I have interviewed take in their home provinces. Given 
their tenuous legal status, they typically have mixed feelings about the cities in which they now 
work and live. However, they have resoundingly positive views of their original homes, and 
typically hope to return to them someday. 
I chatted with the mother about her work in a sewing factory, how she was having trouble 
finding schooling for her oldest son50, and the rising rent in her neighborhood. A few other 
passengers in the back of the bus chimed in with similar stories. Then one of the men asked me 
what I did. I love this question. First, I ask so many questions to other people that it is refreshing 
to be asked one in return. Second, it gives me an opportunity to use one of my most well-
rehearsed and effective responses: I told him, and at least ten other people who were now 
listening to the conversation, that I was a student, studying a variety of problems in Chinese 
society. I told them I heard that people not from Beijing (or whatever other city I happen to be 
in) are the nicest people, and so I want to talk to them about their problems.  
                                                 
50 It is common for migrant children in the major east coast cities to receive free public schooling 
only through fifth grade. 
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While seemingly an oversimplification of my research topic, I feel strongly that this 
explanation accurately reflects the core issues of my research. It resonates with the migrants, 
who are often looked down upon by legal residents of the big cities, and is readily 
understandable to people who often have no more than a middle school education. Also, like my 
response to compliments of my language ability, it interjects humor into the dialog and catalyzes 
conversation. It certainly had these effects on the people at the back of that particular bus. Not 
only did I get a more exact location of the neighborhood where they all lived, but one of the men 
offered me a ride from the bus station in the back of his pickup. In fact, he wound up taking me 
back to his house for some tea and lunch, and then introduced me to several other people in the 
neighborhood. 
Through this and similar experiences, I was able to locate several so-called “urban 
villages” in both Beijing and Shenzhen. Admittedly, I also spent many hours travelling out to 
remote locations only to wind up squatting in an abandoned neighborhood by a pile of trash (see 
Figure 12). Fortunately, this was the exception. More often than not, my excursions landed me in 
vibrant migrant communities. On the day described above, I actually did not wind up finding any 
NGOs. However, the guy who invited me to his house told me about another community where 
he had heard about a museum dedicated to migrant workers.51 He helped me pinpoint it on the 
map. As luck would have it, the community with the museum turned out to be one of the most 
important sites of my research.    
                                                 
51 This is the museum I discussed in Chapter 1 where I found the exhibit on migrant 




Figure 12: Squatting in the Field 
 
The museum was run by an NGO that also operated a community center in the 
neighborhood. I wound up conducting participant observation at the center and several of the 
other programs run by that NGO. I will discuss this in the next chapter. Before I went to the 
museum, however, I considered a hard-earned lesson from my preliminary fieldwork: While 
many Chinese NGOs are happy to discuss the generalities of their programs via email, they are 
much less likely to accept my request for a face-to-face interview. I discussed my experiences 
with these kinds of rejections earlier in this chapter. I suspect that this is significantly due to my 
not being Chinese. For this reason, and to help me with a variety of other cultural and language 
barriers inherent to doing research in China, I hired a research assistant. This proved to be 
invaluable, both in terms of gaining access and in navigating highly specific technical language 
that far exceeds my Chinese abilities.  
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My assistant was born near Shanghai. She attended high school and currently attends 
university in the US. For this reason, she is a near ideal mix of Chinese native and true bilingual 
speaker, both in terms of vocabulary and cultural awareness. What impressed me most about her, 
however, was her initiative. I first met her at a conference on social entrepreneurship in Beijing. 
At the time, she worked for the organization that put on the event. At the final dinner, I wound 
up at the same table as she and several of her colleagues. I mentioned in passing that I was 
having trouble finding a chain of thrift stores in the city that were run by a migrant-focused 
NGO. Then, as is common at such dinners, the topic of conversation quickly changed. After 
exchanging business cards with the whole table, I headed back to my apartment. 
Later the same night, I got a text from my future assistant. She located several of the 
thrift stores, including their GPS locations and the bus routes I needed to take to get within 
walking distance. She also recommended I stop using Google Maps and start using Baidu Maps, 
which is far more accurate in China. As I discussed above, this was invaluable throughout 
fieldwork. Needless to say, I offered her a job the next day. 
Together we composed an introductory email that immediately got much higher response 
rates than the original version I had been using. She helped me soften the language but make the 
wording more direct. She sent the emails from her account on my behalf. This also seemed to 
improve the response rate. In my experience, the Chinese feel much more comfortable dealing 
with one of their own. In fact, many foreign companies in China hire someone to be the “Chinese 
face” of their business. Much like my research, this person initiates contact and subsequently 
introduces the foreigners as his/her associates. However, beyond putting the Chinese at ease, my 
assistant’s sincere interest in my research topic made her less of an assistant and more of a 
partner in my project.  
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 When I asked her to contact the NGO that runs the museum, she took the initiative to find 
another NGO with programs in the same neighborhood. The museum graciously accepted our 
request. The other NGO sent us a cordial but blunt rejection on the grounds that we would need a 
government escort to visit their organization. As I discussed earlier, this was a fairly common 
justification for rejecting my requests. I made several attempts to find a government official to 
accompany me on visits to the NGOs, but none were willing to help me. I can only assume that 
this has something to do with another common rejection that I received, stating that an 
organization will not meet with “foreign friends” (again, I discussed this above).  
 On the day of the museum visit, we headed to the community on the outskirts of the city 
where it is located. After almost two hours on a couple trains, a bus, and a long walk along a 
dusty, smog-clogged road (at first in the wrong direction), we finally arrived at the entrance to 
the urban village. I asked a couple locals if they knew the museum, and they pointed us in the 
right direction. Obviously, I could have found it with the GPS on my phone. However, I try to 
take every opportunity to chat with people on the street, especially in migrant neighborhoods. In 
this case, the three people I chatted with were really excited that we wanted to go to the museum. 
They told me they would probably see me later at the community center, and in fact I wound up 
chatting with all of them over the next few weeks. 
 We met with the founder of the organization. He gave us a personal tour of the museum, 
answered all of my questions, and filled out my survey. I will discuss the data I collected from 
him and his organization in the context of my methods and analysis in the following chapters. 
For the purposes of the current section, what happened after our visit with him reveals some 
representative challenges that I faced during fieldwork. After leaving the museum, we wondered 
around the neighborhood, eventually winding up in a courtyard enclosed by a high stone wall. At 
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first, it looked like a temple, with several one-story buildings around the perimeter of the 
complex. Then my assistant noticed a sign on one of the buildings, indicating that it was in fact 
the headquarters of the NGO that had rejected our request. 
 We snooped around a bit and found that one of the buildings was a cafeteria and several 
others were dormitories. Judging from toys and tricycles scattered around, there seemed to be 
several families living in the cramped but well-constructed facilities. The building with the sign 
over it looked like an office. Even though our request had been denied by the director of the 
organization herself, we decided to enter the office anyway. We were greeted warmly by a 
woman working at a long table in the middle of the small room. We told her exactly who we 
were (except of course that our original request had been denied), and she was excited to talk 
with us. She was the director of the organization’s childhood education program. She was a 
migrant herself from Inner Mongolia. She came to the city to work in the publishing industry and 
then started working for the NGO a year ago. She agreed to fill out a survey. She signed the 
consent form and meticulously answered all the questions.52 
 She told us that a group of donors were coming in few minutes and asked us to stay for 
the meeting. This type of chance occurrence is the stuff research dreams. Then we got a rude 
awakening. Not surprisingly, the director of the organization was also attending the donor 
meeting. Just as we were settling into our seats at the conference table, she walked through the 
front door. She immediately caught sight of us, and after a curt introduction, she reminded us 
that she had rejected our request. She asked us to leave but wanted us to wait in the library across 
the street. She said she would pick us up for lunch. As we sat in the musty library, I was not 
                                                 
52 Despite my initial concerns, using a written consent form seemed to reassure informants that I 
was conducting serious research, and not just a foreigner asking too many questions.  
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optimistic that she would actually come get us. And we were starving! But after twenty minutes 
she came in, all smiles. 
 She gave us a really informative tour of the neighborhood. She pointed out the museum 
and told us about several other NGOs that operated in the area (most of which I wound up 
visiting). Just as I was about to collapse from hunger, we rounded a corner and she told us we 
were at the best restaurant in town. Before we went in for what was one of the best meals I ate 
during fieldwork, I noticed a half dozen or so luxury cars parked outside. They were particularly 
conspicuous against the backdrop of the dusty, narrow back alley where the restaurant was. The 
director explained that they were probably wealthy people from the city who came to ride horses 
at a nearby ranch. It would be hard to find a more representative scene of inequality in twenty-
first century China. Apparently, the restaurant was even up to the standards of the urban elite. 
 Much to my surprise, after lunch the director wanted to continue the tour. She took us to 
an elementary school dedicated to teaching migrant children. The principal told us that although 
the school had received some threats from local authorities, it had been serving the community 
for more than ten years. Given all the problems migrant parents have finding schools for their 
children, it was refreshing to see such dedication to providing a truly nurturing educational 
environment. The motto hanging over the schoolyard goes a long way to reinforce this 




Figure 13: "Attending a good school makes good people" 
 
 The director did not wind up telling us much about the programs run by her organization. 
However, she clearly took a lot of time out of her busy day to show us the situation for migrants 
in the neighborhood and some of the initiatives aimed at improving it. It seems fair to assume 
that she is under heavy government scrutiny and cannot be seen having official meetings with 
foreigners (even those represented by Chinese assistants). In fact, the specter of government 
surveillance hung over much of my fieldwork. 
 For the most part, it was a slightly ominous presence lurking in the background. 
Sometimes, however, it came hauntingly close. On one occasion, my assistant and I arrived for a 
meeting with a legal NGO. The founder greeted us warmly. He then promptly told us that 
minutes before our arrival a national security official had called him to discourage our meeting. I 
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had communicated with the founder over WeChat, the most widely used messaging app in 
China. The founder told us that his phones and WeChat account are monitored by the 
government. Several years ago, he helped sixty thousand factory workers hold a strike to get 
their company to pay for insurance. The government finally had to intervene, and the workers 
got what they wanted. But the government was not happy with him. They even sent a spy to 
work for him. He finally discovered this, but ever since then his phones and communications 
have been tapped. They even tried to dissuade him from attending a movie about workers’ rights. 
When he sent his assistant, they contacted him to ask why he had still sent his assistant. 
 This occurred relatively early in my fieldwork. In my fieldnotes from that meeting, I 
wrote: “He may be used to this, but I am not – pretty nervous.” It stands to reason that my 
WeChat account is now also being monitored. A friend in the intelligence community tells me 
that this is fairly common for foreign nationals in China. I have come to accept this as an 
inherent risk of conducting research in China. After that meeting, I continued to set up interviews 
over WeChat, because quite honestly it is the only way to get in touch with most people in 
China. In fact, for the first quarter of 2018, WeChat had more than a billion monthly active users, 
more than double the number of the same quarter four years earlier (Statista 2018). 
To minimize the risks, I typically send voice messages over WeChat. I have heard these 
are significantly harder to monitor than text messages. I suspect that most of my informants are, 
to varying degrees, being monitored. For this reason, I take great pains to protect the data I 
collect from them. I use military-grade encryption for all files and use a complex alphanumeric 
code for all identifying information.53 I am also purposefully vague in describing the activities of 
                                                 




the NGOs in this study. I do not believe this is at odds with my research. After all, this 
dissertation is not a character study. In the coming chapters, I will use the data gathered from 
fieldwork to situate the decision-making of the founders/directors within larger societal trends in 
China. My goal is to reveal the various levels of significance of the migrant-focused NGOs in 
China, without endangering their founders/directors for whom I have unwavering respect 
(probably my single biggest research bias).  
In this chapter, I detailed the setting for my research. The political, economic, and 
sociocultural context of China as a whole, and my two field sites specifically, plays a significant 
role in influencing the decision-making of the founders/directors in my sample. In the next 
chapter, I delve into significant characteristics and distinguishing experiences of my research 
population. This is what places my research squarely in the realm of anthropological inquiry. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, previous studies of NGOs in China give centrality to institutions and 
organizational structures. My research takes a human-centered approach, spotlighting the 
individuals making decisions to define and redefine the role of their organizations in China’s 
economic development.      
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CHAPTER 4: POPULATION PROFILE 
 
In this chapter, I take a deep dive into the lives and work of my research population. I 
discuss how I sampled this population and the inherent biases of this process. Based on survey 
data and semi-structured interviews, including professional life histories, I explore the range of 
variables that shape their experiences and influence their decision-making. 
Sampling 
 I surveyed the founders/directors from a total of thirty-four organizations in Beijing 
(n=17) and Shenzhen (n=17). I surveyed all the organizations I found in Beijing. I came across 
twenty-three organizations in Shenzhen. It is not particularly surprising to find approximately a 
third more organizations in Shenzhen. This further supports the hypothesis I discussed in the last 
chapter that Shenzhen offers a somewhat more welcoming political economic environment for 
NGOs. In order to maintain equal sample sizes in my two field sites, I used a randomizer to 
remove six organizations from the sample in Shenzhen. Shenzhen does have slightly more 
NGOs. However, the two cities have similar population sizes54, as well as other comparable 
demographics I discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, researching organizations in these two 
cities reveals important insights into the range of circumstances and experiences of migrant-
focused NGOs.      
                                                 
54 Although Beijing has roughly double the population of Shenzhen, both cities are in the 
“megacity” category of 10+ million people. They are two of the most populous cities on earth. 
Comparisons of cities in this category are common, regardless of differing population sizes (e.g. 
Kötter and Friesecke 2009). 
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All organizations I surveyed agreed to allow me to participate in their daily operations. 
From these (n=34), I sampled a total of twelve organizations in Beijing (n=6) and Shenzhen 
(n=6). At each organization, I conducted three weeks of participant observation and conducted 
in-depth interviews. After preliminary analysis of survey data, I stratified this sample to 
represent the two main types of programs offered by the organizations I surveyed, legal and 
educational. The “legal” category includes organizations run by lawyers, those that teach migrant 
workers how to use the law to protect their rights, and still others that organize collective 
bargaining and workers’ strikes. Much of this, of course, involves educating workers. Yet, a lot 
of the educational programs do not involve legal training. This “educational” category includes 
early childhood programs for migrant families, and a variety of skills training programs and job 
placement assistance. In the following sections, I will discuss the range of programs within each 
category.  
Roughly half of all the organizations I surveyed fit into each category. Thus, across both 
field sites I conducted participant observation at six organizations in each category. However, 
among the organizations I surveyed, the percentage in each category was not the same across 
field sites. Approximately thirty percent of the organizations in Beijing were in the “legal” 
category, whereas this category made up sixty percent of the organizations in Shenzhen. Thus, I 
visited two (n=2) “legal” organizations in Beijing and four (n=4) in Shenzhen. The proportions 
were nearly reversed for the “educational” category. Thus, in Beijing I visited two (n=2) “legal” 
organizations and four (n=4) “educational” organizations. In Shenzhen I visited four (n=4) 
“legal” organizations and two (n=2) “educational” organizations. In the next section, I will 
discuss the discrepancy in the proportions of each category of organization between field sites. 
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I intended to use quota sampling to include representative numbers of males and females. 
Following Lane (2012), I expected roughly forty percent of the founders/directors in my study to 
be women. Across both field sites, approximately thirty percent were women. This in itself does 
not represent a significantly different gender ratio than I expected. In fact, approximately fifty 
percent of the organizations in Beijing had female founders/directors. Thus, in Beijing the 
sample at which I conducted participant observation included women (n=3) and men (n=3). 
However, only one of the founders/directors I surveyed in Shenzhen was a woman. Thus, in 
Shenzhen I was only able to include one female founder in my sample. 
It is difficult for me to account for this discrepancy between field sites. On the one hand, 
it may be a sampling bias. As I discussed in the section on Reflexivity and Research Realities, 
locating the organizations was one of the biggest challenges I encountered in the field. Once I 
was able to locate one organization, I typically asked its founder/director if he/she knew of any 
other organizations that offer programs to help migrant workers. This method led me to what I 
believe are exhaustive lists of such organizations in each city. 
While this type of respondent-driven sampling can bias a sample, it is largely 
unavoidable when researching hidden populations. I discussed this in detail in the previous 
chapter. Nonetheless, it is possible that because my sampling in Shenzhen began with a male, he 
(and the subsequent males whom I surveyed) exclusively knew other males to whom they 
directed me. In fact, I found the sole female founder during a chance meeting with a 
businesswoman on a train.55 However, my sampling in Beijing also began with a male, and using 
a similar sampling method, produced a much more even gender ratio. Thus, sampling bias is a 
                                                 
55 As I discussed in Reflexivity and Research Realities, public transportation led to many 
important insights. I used every opportunity to tell strangers about my research.  
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possible, if not somewhat incomplete, explanation for the near absence of women in my 
Shenzhen sample.  
The proportion of each category of NGO in the two cities may also partially explain the 
skewed gender ratio. As I discussed earlier in this section, Shenzhen has significantly more 
“legal” organizations – sixty percent, as compared to thirty percent in Beijing. Michelson (2009) 
aggregated survey data on the Chinese legal profession from 1995 through 2007. On average 
during this period, roughly twenty-five percent of lawyers in China were women. Over those 
twelve years, this percentage had little variability. More recent studies (e.g., Considine 2016) 
suggest that the percentage of female lawyers in China has begun to trend slightly upward. Yet, 
the gender ratio remains highly skewed toward males. Given the relatively small sample size of 
my study, it is conceivable that my sampling failed to represent a small but significant 
percentage of female founders/directors of “legal” organizations in Shenzhen. 
Of course, not all the organizations I sampled in Shenzhen are in the “legal” category. 
Thus, sampling bias and profession-specific gender ratios offer unsatisfactory explanations for 
the near lack of women in my Shenzhen sample. Other than the ratio of “legal” organizations, 
my data does not support a cause related to differences between the two field sites. It is 
conceivable that because significantly more men are lawyers (and they have been for a long 
time), that there are more men in a financial and professional position to devote time to helping 
migrant workers. It is even conceivable that there are proportionally very few female layers in 
this position, and that none of them have chosen to help migrants. However, I have no gender 
ratio data specific to lawyers in Shenzhen. 
Not all the organization in the “legal” category have lawyers as their founders/directors. 
As I discuss in the following section, many of these organizations employ lawyers to train 
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migrants to advocate for themselves. Finally, a third of the organizations in Shenzhen are in the 
“educational” category. I can offer no viable explanation for why there are so few women in 
these organizations, especially because approximately half of the founders/directors of 
educational organizations in Beijing are women. Despite having only partial explanations for the 
limited number of women in my Shenzhen sample, nearly a third of the total founders/directors I 
surveyed were women. Moreover, based on the distinguishing characteristics of the two field 
sites (discussed above), I still believe that comparing organizations in Beijing and Shenzhen 
yields important insights into the experiences and decision-making of the founder/directors.      
Founders/Directors 
 I collected data for this dissertation from the founders/directors of nongovernmental 
organizations in China. The primary target population of each NGO under study is migrant 
workers. In many cases, the founders of the NGOs still run the daily operations. In other cases, 
and for a variety of reasons, they have handed over control of the daily operations to a director, 
typically (though not exclusively) someone who helped them found the organization.56 In all 
cases, the person actively in charge of daily operations served as my key informant in each 
organization. The primary criteria I used to include people in my sample is that they are either 
the founder or director of an NGO. This definition does not necessitate that they earn a salary 
from the organization. In fact, many of the founders/directors have other jobs outside of their 
work at the NGOs. 
 For the purposes of this study, I define “NGO” in broad terms as an organization that was 
not originally created by the government. This is as close to “non-governmental” as an 
organization can get in China. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the government often takes over 
                                                 
56 I will discuss a specific case of this in detail in following section. 
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programs originally started by NGOs. All of the organizations I sampled are still run by their 
own management. However, roughly forty percent of the organizations I surveyed report 
receiving at least some of their funding from the government. Thus, sources of funding and 
revenue do not define an organization as being an NGO. In my sample, there are organizations 
that are both traditional non-profits, as well as those that generate revenue through the sale of 
goods and/or services. Moreover, the Chinese government tends to scrutinize the operations of 
all NGOs. This is particularly pronounced for organizations working on sensitive issues, of 
which migrant workers are most certainly one. 
All of the founders/directors in this study are Chinese. Many foreign-run NGOs also help 
migrant workers in China. It is not my intention to diminish the impact of their programs. For 
this dissertation, I chose to focus exclusively on Chinese-run NGOs in order to understand how 
the Chinese themselves are reacting to societal problems created by economic development in 
their own country. There are so many factors contributing to their decision making that I did not 
want to further complicate my analysis by factoring for “country of origin”. After completing 
this dissertation, I would like to conduct a follow-up study on foreign-run NGOs in China, in 
order to create a more holistic perspective of the role of all NGOs in helping the migrant 
workers. 
In addition to all being Chinese, the founders/directors of the NGOs in this study are all 
ethnic Han Chinese. According to the 2010 Chinese national census, the Han account for more 
than ninety percent of China’s overall population (China 2012). The rest of the population is 
made up of as many as fifty-five minority ethnic groups. Most of these originate from the middle 
and western provinces, which are also the main points of origin for China’s migrant workers. 
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Many of the migrant workers I met during this study belong to one of these non-Han 
ethnic groups. Predictably, most of them report being discriminated against at some point in their 
lives because of their ethnicity. I only gathered limited survey data for this study from migrant 
workers. Yet, I interacted regularly with them while conducting participant observation at each 
organization. I enjoyed many casual conversations with migrant workers from all over China and 
of many different Chinese ethnicities. One of the most common themes is that the problems and 
discrimination they now face have much more to do with them being migrant workers than with 
their ethnicity. As I discussed in Chapter 2, past research reveals a lot about the many problems 
created by the identity of “migrant worker” in China. It is an all-consuming identity, superseding 
even ethnicity. This realization led me to study solutions to the problems faced by migrant 
workers, and not simply spend more time criticizing the system that creates these problems. 
Interestingly, more than eighty percent of the founders/directors in this study were 
migrant workers themselves. Beyond the shared identity of being migrant workers, survey data 
from this study reveals several other defining demographic features of the founders/directors. 
Approximately two-thirds of the founders/directors are male. The fact that roughly thirty percent 
are female is significant given the male-dominated business culture in China. Approximately 
seventy percent have at least a bachelor’s degree. This high-level of education (as compared to 
the general public) likely has a strong effect on both the decision to found an NGO and decision-
making related to the daily operations. 
 Approximately forty-five percent of the founders/directors in this study are in their 
thirties. Roughly thirty-five percent are in their forties. Only about ten percent are in their 
twenties. The same is true for those in their sixties. No one in my sample is in their fifties or in 
the cohort above seventy years old. As with the other categories mentioned above, I will 
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deconstruct these age cohorts in the following sections, in order to understand significant effects 
of this variable on the overall operations and decision-making of each founder/director and my 
research population as a whole.  
Defining Their Own Work 
At the heart of the ways the founders/directors perceive their own work are the Chinese 
terms they use to describe their organizations. Existing literature and my preliminary research 
offered me enough terms to create seven answer choices in my survey (see Figure 14 below). 
For ease of use, in the snippet of question 11 below, I included the approximate English 
translation of each term in parentheses. This did not appear in the survey I used for this study. 
 
Figure 14: Terms for Chinese NGOs 
 Some of these terms have identical or very similar English translations. For example, the 
second and third answer choices both translate as “social enterprise”. Yet, the Chinese characters 
in these terms are slightly different. The first two characters 社会 are the same for both terms. 社
会 means “society” as in “Chinese society” (中国社会). For the second answer choice, the last two 
characters 企业 are the same characters used in the first answer choice, meaning “a for-profit 
enterprise”. In the third answer choice, the last two characters 创业 imply a strong sense of the 
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act of founding a business. This term is thus derivative of the French origin of the word 
“entrepreneur”, entreprendre, meaning “to initiate something significant” (see Swedberg 
2000:11). Thus, while both of these terms accurately translate as “social enterprise”, their 
meanings hold subtle differences in Chinese. This is also true for the two terms used for 
“charitable organization”. 
 Interestingly, only about ten percent of respondents selected the second answer choice, 
and none selected the third. This is certainly representative of a major reality of conducting field 
work: a sample does not always represent the full range of possibilities for a given population. In 
this case, however, the discrepancy between what I expected to find and what my data revealed 
is likely more subtle than mere sampling error. 
Defined broadly, a “social enterprise” is a for-profit charity, i.e., it has a revenue stream 
instead of (or at least supplemental to) donations. Abu-Saifan (2012) asserts that social 
enterprises commit to a double bottom-line, whereby they measure success in financial terms and 
in terms of a positive social impact. By these definitions, all of the organizations in my sample 
qualify as social enterprises. None of them receive more than thirty percent of their revenue from 
donations. While eighty percent of the organizations I surveyed receive at least some money 
from government and/or private sector grants, all of them generate at least twenty percent of their 
revenue from the sale of goods and/or services. I discuss these goods and services in detail later 
in this chapter.   
Moreover, none of the organizations rely on financial reports alone to measure their 
success. More than sixty percent of them employ independent consultants to assess the success 
of their programs, using “community improvement” (对社区的改善) as the primary metric of 
success. The survey data reveals a consensus among the founders/directors that the financial 
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health of their organizations is a means to an end, but is not the end itself. One respondent 
summarized this sentiment: “Economics determines the construction of a better civilization.”57 It 
seems reasonable to conclude that this indicates the use of a double bottom-line.  
 The organizations in my sample fit within the common definition of “social enterprise”. 
This is, however, an English term. Most participants in the study, and many I interviewed during 
preliminary research, are familiar with the two common Chinese translations of the English term. 
However, most do not recognize their organizations as fitting into English-language definitions 
of “social enterprise”. This could have to do with the Chinese terms being relatively new and 
poorly defined. However, in 2016 I attended a conference in Beijing on Chinese social enterprise 
and investment. The title of the conference used 社会企业 for “social enterprise”. This is the same 
term I used for the second answer choice in question 11 (see Figure 14 above). This does not 
mean the term is widespread in China. Yet, it does indicate that it is understood by professionals 
in the third-sector. This last point is supported by the frequent use of both Chinese terms for 
“social enterprise” by participants in my preliminary research. 
 Obviously, a nuance of terminology does not adequately explain why so few of the 
founders/directors in my sample view their organizations as social enterprises. Nearly sixty 
percent chose “nonprofit organization”. Approximately thirty percent chose “nongovernmental 
organization”. And, as I mentioned earlier in this section, about ten percent actually chose 
“social enterprise”.58 No one chose “for-profit enterprise” or either of the terms for “charitable 
organization”. 
                                                 
57 经济决定上层文化建设。 
58 Only one respondent wrote in an answer: 公益性非营利性. It translates as: “A civilian-run 
charitable non-profit.” This is a very specific term, and likely applies to other organizations. Yet, 
with ninety-seven percent of respondents choosing one of the seven answer choices, I opted not 
to amend the survey to include this outlier response.   
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In a way, the founders/directors suffer from an institutional identity crisis. The reality is 
that none of the organizations in my study are nonprofits. This is not necessarily by choice. As I 
discussed in Chapter 2, the process for legally registering as a nonprofit in China is essentially 
unnavigable. Because they are not officially registered as nonprofits in China, they are able to 
receive donations from foreign entities. However, they are unable to accept money from Chinese 
donors, a much deeper and more readily-accessible donor pool. As I mentioned above, all the 
organizations in my sample supplement whatever donations they are able to raise with other 
revenue streams. The irony is that all of the founders/directors in my sample view their programs 
in terms of common definitions of charitable and nonprofit work. Yet, for lack of a well-defined 
and commonly used alternative, i.e., “social enterprise”, they refer to their organizations by what 
they want them to be, and what the government dictates they should be called, not what they 
actually are. I discuss the theoretical implications of this in Chapter 8. 
It is important to note that every person who filled out a survey was either the founder or 
director of a Chinese NGO that helps migrant workers. Ten percent of respondents indicated that 
they were either an employee or a volunteer. However, when I questioned them about their roles 
during interviews, it became clear that even this ten percent directed major aspects of their 
organizations’ programs. A couple of these were indeed volunteers. Yet, as I discussed in the 
previous section, for the purposes of this study, earning a salary does not define one’s role in an 
organization. In fact, more than forty percent of respondents report having another job, or at least 
another source of income outside of their work at the NGO.  
Approximately fifty percent of respondents in Shenzhen were the founders of their 
organizations. This was true for thirty percent in Beijing. Yet, interviews reveal that the directors 
typically have similar roles to the founders both in the planning and daily operations of their 
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organizations. Thus, this discrepancy between samples from the two field sites does not seem to 
exert a significant effect on the quality of the dataset.  
 This conclusion is further supported by the time respondents have worked at their 
respective organizations in relation to how long the organizations have existed. The 
organizations in Beijing have existed for between three and nineteen years, with a mean of 
approximately 7.5 years. The organizations in Shenzhen have existed for between three and 
seventeen years, with a mean of approximately 7.8 years. This does not represent a statistically 
significant difference between organizations from the two field sites. The small difference in 
mean years also likely has an insignificant effect on their institutional structures and operations. 
Thus, in terms of their time in existence, the two groups of organizations are readily comparable. 
In the next section, I will categorize organizations based on their time in existence to compare 
their experiences with obstacles and external opposition. 
‘Years in Existence’ as a Key Variable: The Case of Law One 
More than eighty percent of survey respondents in Beijing reported having worked at 
their organizations since their founding. This is true for a comparable percentage of respondents 
in Shenzhen, approximately seventy percent. From the entire sample, all but one respondent who 
started work at their organizations after the founding did so within two years of the founding. I 
will discuss this outlier in the next few paragraphs. Aside from this one case, even respondents 
who were not around for the founding of their organizations have worked at them for at least 
eighty percent of their time in operation. This further suggests that all respondents, regardless of 




I will use the pseudonym “Law One” to refer to the outlier case mentioned above. In 
addition to surveying the director, I also included Law One in the sample of organizations at 
which I conducted participant observation. This offers me a perspective on probable explanations 
for this outlier. Yet, data I gathered on Law One also suggests that although it is an outlier in 
terms of the tenure of its director, the experiences of Law One may also be representative of (and 
foreshadow) the circumstances under which all NGOs in China must operate.  
Law One has existed for nearly seventeen years. It is the second longest running 
organization in my sample.59 The current director of Law One has been with the organization for 
only about two years. As the name suggests, Law One can be generally categorized as an 
organization that offers legal services and counseling to migrant workers, i.e., the “legal” 
category. Roughly half of all the organizations I surveyed fit into this category – approximately 
thirty percent in Beijing and sixty percent in Shenzhen. As I detailed in the section on Sampling, 
these percentages were the primary criteria I used to sample organizations at which to conduct 
participant observation. 
Like many organizations in the “legal” category, the founder of Law One was a migrant. 
As a young man, he came from his home in a neighboring province to work at a factory on the 
outskirts of the city. One day at work he was seriously burnt by an industrial chemical. He was 
unable to receive compensation from his bosses or to navigate the legal system to seek justice. 
Like many of the founders of organizations in my sample, his personal experiences led him to 
understand that other migrants had similar problems. This similarity between the founders is 
repeatedly reinforced by data from the professional life histories.  
                                                 
59 The longest running organization has been around for nineteen years. 
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While still working at the factory, the founder formed Law One to host lectures on labor 
law. He hired lawyers to train him and his coworkers to navigate the legal processes of getting 
compensation for workplace injuries, as well as negotiating better wages and improved 
workplace safety. He began publishing a regular newsletter and brochures with articles on 
collective bargaining and other topics related to labor rights. His goal was to empower the 
workers to advocate for themselves. He found that this was a much more effective system than 
hiring lawyers to handle specific cases. 
According to the director, the lawyers appointed to labor cases typically do not fight hard 
for the migrants. In fact, the appointed lawyers often do such a bad job that the migrants who 
hire them wind up coming to Legal One for help. These lawyers are appointed by the 
government. They are part of a system likely designed to lull workers into a sense of false hope. 
Once court cases have been filed and hearings held, the lawyers often advise their clients to drop 
the charges, or at least accept a greatly reduced compensation package. Otherwise, they are told, 
the fees and complex legal proceedings will limit their chances of getting any further payouts. If 
the workers accept this outcome, they are led to believe that their opportunities for legal recourse 
have been exhausted. Thus, the legal system serves as a proverbial tilt-a-whirl, disorienting 
workers with a dizzying array of inaction. After being spit out of this nauseating ride, they are 
understandably disinterested in ever getting back on.60 
For this reason, Law One relies on lawyers for training, but not for actual legal services. 
According to the director of Law One, workers trust each other far more than they trust lawyers, 
especially when their livelihoods are on the line. The founders/directors of several other 
                                                 
60 I am not suggesting that all labor lawyers in China treat migrant workers with this kind of 
disregard – just a lot of them. Later in this section, I discuss several cases of lawyers going above 
and beyond their fiduciary obligations to help migrant clients.  
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organizations in the “legal” category repeated this sentiment. When workers have specific legal 
needs, members of the organization who have been trained by lawyers are able to write up legal 
documents and submit them in court. In fact, starting in 2008, the court fees for submission of 
such documents has been paid for by the government. This subsidy, like many other nuances of 
the legal system, is not well-publicized. 
The members of Legal One are able to take advantage of such hidden benefits only 
because of the training they receive from lawyers. This situation conceals a deceptively 
important question, and one that gets to heart of my research: Given all the legal obstacles 
hindering migrants from defending their rights, and many lawyers’ complicity in this system, 
why do some lawyers choose to help workers, if not as litigators, then at least in an advisory 
role? 
I attended several training sessions at Legal One run by lawyers. Each time, the lawyers 
were very interested in learning about my research, but were not interested in participating, 
particularly when I asked for written consent. This is understandable given governmental 
scrutiny of labor law. However, my sample also included several organizations founded and run 
by lawyers. These organizations offer a variety of legal services, from filing court documents to 
representing clients in the courtroom. The founders/directors of these organizations, all of whom 
are lawyers, frequently repeated a plausible explanation for why they and other lawyers, despite 
governmental opposition, are interested in helping migrant workers: As lawyers they have been 
trained and have an obligation to seek justice and the greatest benefits for their clients within the 
limits of the law. 
Lawyers interpret this guiding principle in numerous ways. Clearly, defending migrant 
workers is a legal specialty that is neither the most lucrative nor one that has a particularly high 
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rate of success in the courtroom. In twenty-first century Chinese society, much like American 
society, status is largely based on financial success. Thus, relatively “low income” lawyers enjoy 
very little prestige. They are obviously not doing it for fame or fortune. I found that lawyers who 
choose to interpret their legal obligations as a duty to serve an underrepresented group such as 
migrant workers typically have had experiences that in some way inspire them to empathize with 
the plights of these workers. These include, for example, having a volunteer experience with 
migrants while in college or law school, or witnessing the mistreatment of workers while 
actually representing a factory owner. These are the “sticky” experiences that were ubiquitous in 
the professional life histories. The important point here is that the lawyers who train members of 
Law One have also likely had these kinds of experiences. My data do not suggest other 
motivations that they may have. 
Regardless of their motivations, the lawyers who train members of Law One have given 
the organization a variety of legal tools to fight for the labor rights of migrant workers. With 
these tools the founder and other members of the organization were able to help workers achieve 
several important legal victories and numerous successful negations with factory owners.  
Unlike many other organizations in this study, Law One has not suffered from a 
reduction in funding. I cover this issue later in this section as it relates to opposition faced by the 
organizations. In the early days of Law One, the founder was able to secure ample funding to 
hire lawyers for training, build and maintain a community center, and publish training manuals 
and the newsletter. Even though his application to register Law One as an NGO was rejected by 
the Chinese government, foreign donors nevertheless treated him as an NGO. He received 
funding from several international charitable funds, as well as a handful of foreign religious 
groups with an interest in labor rights. In fact, the rejection of his NGO application has been a 
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blessing in disguise. As I discussed in Chapter 2, recent laws severely limit foreign donations to 
organizations registered as NGOs in China. Thus, because Law One is not officially registered as 
an NGO, these laws have not affected its fundraising or revenue stream. 
Yet, the current director reports that in the last few years these patterns of success have 
yielded to some discouraging realties. Notably, as I insinuated at the beginning of this case study, 
the founder of Law One is no longer involved in the organization’s daily operations. Until a 
couple years ago, he was involved in nearly every aspect of the programs he started. The 
organization never paid him more than a small stipend for his work. In fact, until a couple years 
ago, he worked at the same factory at which he originally developed the idea for Law One. In 
addition to his work on the factory floor, he also served as a liaison between the workers and 
management. During a particularly heated workers’ strike, which the founder helped organize, he 
was beaten by security guards hired by the factory owner. He was subsequently fired from his 
job, and never received compensation for his injuries. 
In the aftermath of the strike, the local government cracked down on Law One. The 
brochures they hand out are now deemed illegal. They still have a few copies in the community 
center for workers that come in, but they are no longer allowed to publish them. In addition, they 
have to move offices almost every year, because the government routinely marks the buildings 
they rent for demolition. This is common in migrant neighborhoods (see Figure 15). Yet, the 
demolition of their specific building has formed an obvious pattern in the years since that fateful 
strike. In short, the local government appears to be taking purposeful steps to limit the size and 
scope of Law One’s programs. This is likely due to government fears of worker strikes that grow 




Figure 15: Marked for demolition with a 拆 
Law One is the longest running organization in the “legal” category of my sample by at 
least five years. Yet, its programs and operations are categorically similar to at least fifty percent 
of the organizations I surveyed. It follows that the experiences of Law One may be shared by 
other similar organizations when they have been in existence for as long. Notably, it is likely that 
they will experience comparable economic, legal, and political opposition, and that these will 
have similar impacts on their management and operations. This is supported by survey data that 
suggests a strong correlation between years in existence and opposition faced. In fact, 
organizations that have been in existence for nine or more years are approximately two-thirds 
more likely to face opposition than those that have been in existence for less than nine years. 
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In Chapter 6, I discuss ‘years in existence’ as a key variable determining whether the 
founders/directors decide to accept (or are even offered) government funds. In the following 
section, I detail the types of opposition faced by the organizations in my sample and the ways 
that these likely inform the decision-making of the founders/directors. 
Determinants and Types of Opposition 
A United Nations NGO questionnaire (Hanfstaengl 2009) informed the survey I 
developed for this study, particularly questions related to opposition faced by organizations, 
partnerships with other organizations, and key factors contributing to the success of programs. 
However, I did not simply translate this (or any other) survey into Chinese. The biggest 
weakness of the UN survey (and many others) is that it only asks for each type of information 
once. For example, to understand opposition faced by each organization, I asked questions about 
this directly (questions 23-23d), as well as asking questions about significant changes in the 
organization over the past five years (questions 26-27). 
The results of cross-referencing the answers to these two groups of related questions 
reveals interesting discrepancies in the data. More than half of the founders/directors reported 
that their organizations have or continue to face opposition. This was true for less than twenty 
percent of the Beijing organizations. However, all of the Shenzhen organizations reported 
opposition to their programs. This difference between the field sites appears to contradict my 
hypothesis that the organizations in Shenzhen come under less scrutiny than those in Beijing. It 
is also possible that due to less scrutiny, the Shenzhen founders/directors feel less constrained in 
discussing opposition. 
While plausible, these conclusions are difficult, if not impossible to verify. The survey 
data suggests an alternative explanation. More than eighty percent of the founders/directors in 
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Beijing reported facing no opposition. Yet, all of the Beijing sample reported that increased 
government regulations over the past five years have decreased their sources of funding and 
donations. In fact, one hundred percent of my total sample reported this. Indeed, recent changes 
to the laws governing NGOs and their capacity to raise funds have likely negatively affected 
every nongovernmental organization in China. The fact that my Beijing sample does not view 
this as opposition may actually support my original hypothesis about the differences between 
field sites. Not only are the Beijing organizations likely under more scrutiny, they have also 
become somewhat desensitized to it. This sentiment was echoed in numerous interviews. As one 
informant in Beijing put it, “There’s nothing nongovernmental about this NGO.” In other words, 
while her organization is not part of the government, it is also not entirely separate from the 
government. 
As I mentioned above, all of the organizations in Shenzhen report facing opposition, in 
contrast to only a few in Beijing. In China’s one-party system, government interference is a 
reality of doing business. This seems as true for corporate industries as it is for the 
nongovernmental sector. Nowhere is this more tangible than in the national capital. Thus, it 
makes sense that NGOs in Beijing, more than those in Shenzhen, do not view government 
interference in their programs as opposition. 
The situation for organizations in Beijing is further underscored by survey data related to 
partnerships. Every organization in my sample has partnered with at least one other entity. These 
include local, national, and multinational businesses, other NGOs, community groups, local 
governments, the national government, and even media outlets. Interestingly, nearly seventy 
percent of the organizations in Beijing have partnered with either the local or national 
 111 
 
government, or both. In contrast, none of the organizations in Shenzhen report having 
partnerships with either the local or national government. 
As I discussed in Chapter 2, the state has looked to nongovernmental organizations to 
share its burden of dealing with social issues related to rapid development. In a variety of ways, 
Chinese NGOs benefit migrant workers by mobilizing local resources not available to the 
government. However, since the 1989 pro-democracy rally in Tiananmen Square, the central 
government has sought to minimize the ways that civil society can act independently of the state 
(Lee 2015:130). The government’s role in civil society will likely become more intrusive now 
that Xi Jinping has eliminated term limits for the presidency. 
Herein lies the power of the government to affect the construction of institutions and how 
even the most well-intentioned people perceive those institutions. I will discuss the theoretical 
implications of this in Chapter 8. However, this explanation does not account for the individual 
agency of the founders/directors. The main purpose of this research is to understand how the 
founders/directors view the work of their organizations and how these views affect their 
decision-making. One way I operationalized their views is in terms of the factors that they 
believe have led to the success of their programs.61 
I used ranking scale questions to collect data on these factors. Based on my previous 
experience using these types of questions, and on the strong results produced with them by 
Wutich et al. (2014), I have confidence in their ability to capture how respondents rank various 
factors that contribute to a certain outcome – in this case, the success of their organizations. In 
the final series of questions in the survey (questions #28.1-28.14), I asked respondents to rank 
                                                 
61 Despite various forms of opposition, all the founders/directors in my sample think their 




various factors on a scale of 1 (not important) to 5 (most important). The English language 
version of this series of questions is in Figure 16. The Chinese language version can be found in 
in Appendix 4. 
 
Figure 16: Success of Organizations 
 Across both field sites, “benefits to society” had the highest overall ranking, with a mean 
score of 4.27. In this category, no respondents selected 1 or 2. Twenty-two percent selected 3, 
and the other seventy-five percent selected 4 or 5. See Figure 17 for a breakdown of these 
results. For this question, there was no significant difference between the means or ranges of the 
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two field sites.62 This indicates that, regardless of government interference or other forms of 
opposition, the founders/directors universally view “benefits to society” as the most important 
factor leading to the success of their organizations. During interviews, respondents frequently 
attributed the success of their programs to the multitude of ways they were not only helping 











Figure 17: Survey Response Percentages 
 
 When compared using a T-test assuming unequal variances and p<.05, there were three 
other factors in the total sample whose means were not significantly different than “benefits to 
society”: (1) “fulfilling work”; (2) “benefits to community”63; and (3) “support of 
                                                 
62 “Government support” is the only factor that produced significantly different means between 
the two field sites (p=.04). Unsurprisingly, the sample from Beijing had a mean of 3.67, whereas 
the sample from Shenzhen had a mean of 2.0. This further supports the hypothesis that NGOs in 
Beijing are not only under greater government scrutiny but also rely more heavily on government 
support for the success of their programs.  
63 For this survey, I define “community” in terms of the specific localities in which NGOs 
operate. These may be neighborhoods, series of neighborhoods, or districts in the cities. In 
contrast, I use “society” to refer to the cultural, political, and economic context in which NGOs 
view their localized work in broader terms.  
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family/friends”. Supported by interview data, the relative importance of these factors highlights 
the main motivations of the founders/directors. Preliminary research and evidence from the 
sample in this study do not imply a diminished importance for financial factors, such as “access 
to funding” and “earning potential”. Echoing a sentiment from the discussion of measures of 
success, the financial factors enable the motivations that are most important to the 
founders/directors. 
 Earlier in the survey (questions 20.1-20.14), I asked respondents to rank factors that 
contributed to their decision to start/work for their organizations. I included the same factors in 
the same order as the questions in #28 (Figure 17 above). I compared mean responses to these 
two groups of questions to understand the relationship between the original motivations of the 
founders/directors and how these continue to inform their current views of their organizations’ 
success. 
Question 20: How did the following factors contribute to your decision to start/work for this 
organization? 
Question 28: How do the following factors contribute to the success of your organization? 
 
 
Figure 18: Comparison of Survey Questions 
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 As the graph in Figure 18 illustrates, each corresponding question in these two groups 
produced nearly identical means. In fact, not one question pairing had a statistically significant 
difference. “Benefits to society” (#6), “benefits to community” (#5), and “fulfilling work” (#4) 
are viewed as the most important factors in both question groupings. In contrast, the financial 
factors, such as “access to funding” (#3), “earning potential” (#2), and “corporate support” are 
viewed as the least important, both in terms of deciding to start/work for an organization and in 
terms of the success of programs. 
Tempting as it is, I dare not extrapolate too much from the synergy between these two 
sets of questions. This dissertation is not based on a restudy of organizations that I surveyed five 
or ten years ago. Thus, I do not have longitudinal data to compare the viewpoints of the 
founders/directors now with those when they first started or started working for their 
organizations.64 
The parallels between #20 and #28 do seem to indicate that the founders/directors have a 
strong sense of purpose, and that they take enormous pride in what they see as the value of their 
work. This could certainly be a case of presenting oneself in a favorable light. Yet, as the 
example of Law One reveals, the founders/directors are in many ways immersed in their 
programs. Their lives, and often personal safety, are intertwined with the successes and failures 
of their organizations. Thus, their decision-making is perhaps less a function of practical matters, 
such as funding, than it is of deep beliefs in the importance of their work. 
                                                 
64 I took steps to minimize the chances of respondents copying their responses from question-set 
#20 into #28. Notably, I separated these two question-sets by fifteen questions and four pages. In 
addition, I printed #28 on the back cover of the survey, so that the booklet would be closed when 
they filled it out. I did not witness any respondents open the booklet while filling out #28. 
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Handy, Kassam, and Renade (2002) found that among the female founders of female-
focused NGOs in India, self-actualization is one of the key factors affecting decision-making. 
The informants view their organizations as vehicles to promote their core beliefs. One 
respondent asserts, “only women can create a platform and empathize with other [women] at a 
grassroots level” (Handy, Kassam, and Renade 2002, 146). This appears readily transferable to 
migrants in China who found and/or direct migrant-focused NGOs. As I discussed above, this 
accounts for the majority of respondents in my sample. 
Light (2002) found that more than half of people in the nongovernmental sector in the 
United States know that jobs in other sectors would pay better. They are significantly more likely 
than people employed in the public and private sectors to report that they sought their current 
positions in order to make a difference or do something worthwhile, rather than seeking job 
security, salary, or beneﬁts. Onyx and Maclean (1996) found a similar situation in Australia, 
where strong personal conviction to an organization’s mission is the strongest factor determining 
the decision to work in the nongovernmental sector. Based on a comparison of NGO workers in 
the developing world, Flanigan (2010) concludes that personal convictions are an equally strong 
factor in decision-making across contexts.    
Self-actualization, i.e., putting one’s core beliefs into action, clearly contributes to the 
decision to found an NGO. This was true of all the founders/directors in my sample. From the 
existing literature, what remains unclear is how commitment to such self-actualization affects 
subsequent decision-making related to running NGO programs. To remedy this knowledge gap, I 
investigated how the founders/directors in my sample prioritize various aspects of their 
organizations and the ways that these priorities affect their decision-making. I discuss the results 
of this analysis in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 5: PRIORITIES IN PRACTICE 
 
In this chapter, I analyze data from pile sorting exercises and semi-structured interviews 
to understand how the founders/directors prioritize various aspects of their work. I use the 
metrics of relative importance, relative frequency, and the relative importance assigned to the 
hypothetical situation of reduced government oversight to triangulate their decision criteria and 
gain insights into their decision-making processes. 
The results of the first pile sort reveal what relative importance the founders/directors 
assign to each aspect of their organizations. Figure 19 (below) depicts the mean scores for the 
samples in Beijing and Shenzhen. The general trend of these scores is roughly the same for both 
samples. For example, on average the founders/directors reported that “generating revenue” and 
“beneficiary recruitment and training” are the most important aspects of their organizations. The 
beneficiaries of the NGOs in my study, i.e., migrant workers, are at the core of the organizations’ 
self-professed mission statements. It is thus reassuring to see that the founders/directors place 
such high importance on beneficiary recruitment and training. This is of course a common (and 
prerequisite) concern of NGOs across contexts. Nonetheless, it is significant to find this level of 
concern for the plight of others in an emergent capitalist system where individualism and 





Figure 19: Pile Sorts - Relative Importance 
 
The results of the second pile sort reveal the relative frequency that the founders/directors 
conduct each aspect of their organizations. Figure 20 (below) depicts the mean scores for the 
samples in Beijing and Shenzhen. Like the first pile sort, the general trend of these scores is 
roughly the same for both samples. Notably, both groups of founders/directors devote the most 
time to generating revenue and to beneficiary recruitment and training. They spend the least time 
on marketing, publicity, and media relations. These correlate with the relative importance 
assigned to these tasks in the first pile sort (see Figure 19 above). My participant observation 




Figure 20: Pile Sorts - Relative Frequency 
 
 The first pile sort illustrates the significant differences between the relative importance 
assigned by the founders/directors in the two field sites. These relative differences remain for the 
frequency data produced by the second pile sort exercise. However, several factors that were 
assigned relatively high importance by both groups were assigned relatively low frequency. 
Thus, beyond a comparison of the two field sites, comparing data trends from the first and 
second pile sorts for the whole sample reveals some important insights into how the 
founders/directors are making decisions. 
It is important to note that data from the first and second pile sorts are not on the same 
scale. The first uses a three-point scale: (1) less important, (2) important, and (3) very important. 
The second uses a five-point scale: (1) infrequently, (2) annually, (3) monthly, (4) weekly, and 
(5) daily. As I discussed in Chapter 3, I used these to present informants with an appropriate 
range of responses for the specific pile sorting exercise. To normalize the data for comparison, I 
converted responses to a percentage of the maximum score, 3 in the case of the first exercise and 
 120 
 
5 for the second. This generated normalized mean responses for both datasets that are normally 
distributed and have equal variances. Thus, to compare various criteria from the two exercises, I 
ran an Independent Group t-test. 
The results of the third pile sort reveal the relative importance the founders/directors 
assign to each aspect of their organizations under the hypothetical situation of reduced 
government oversight. For this exercise, I used the prompt: “How would you respond to these 
questions if there were fewer government regulations [of NGOs]?”65 Figure 21 (below) depicts 
the mean scores for the samples in Beijing and Shenzhen. Like the other two pile sorts, the 
general trend of these scores is roughly the same for both samples. Similar to the first exercise, 
the organizations in Shenzhen have slightly higher scores for marketing, publicity, and 
publishing literature. However, unlike the first exercise, these differences are not statistically 
significant. 
 
Figure 21: Pile Sorts - Relative Importance w/ Hypothetical 
  




In the following topical sections, I discuss how data from the three pile sorting exercises 
in sum reveals the complexity of how the founders/directors prioritize various aspects of their 
organizations. These include generating revenue, fundraising, government relations, and 
marketing, publicity, and media relations. I also situate the analysis of these priorities within 
broader issues related to factors affecting decision-making within nongovernmental sectors 
across contexts.       
Revenue and Fundraising 
Given the laws restricting the formation and fundraising of NGOs in China, it is not 
surprising that generating revenue is seen as so important. As discussed in Chapter 1, such 
profit-making activities are common for social entrepreneurs across contexts. However, 
Hildebrandt (2013, 95) notes that in authoritarian regimes, like China’s, charitable fundraising is 
far more intertwined with political concerns than is common in democracies. This constrains 
funding options and necessitates a greater reliance on alternative funding sources. 
Comparing data from the first and second pile sorts reveals that the founders/directors 
assign significantly higher importance than frequency to fundraising (p=.03). This is not 
particularly surprising. As I discussed earlier, fundraising is an integral part of running any 
NGO. However, it is not an activity that has to occur daily. All of the organizations in my sample 
raised funds either at designated events or at meetings with individual donors. This is not an 
activity that was regularly scheduled into daily operations. In fact, I was present for a donor 
meeting at only three of the organizations in my sample. I did not witness any fundraising events 
during my participant observation. 
As I discussed in Chapter 2, the laws governing charitable donations in China have 
become stricter over the past decade. Yet, my data do not suggest that these laws have a 
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significant effect on the frequency of fundraising. They have likely increased both the 
importance and frequency of NGOs generating revenue. However, the founders/directors in my 
sample still view fundraising as one of the most important aspects of their organizations’ 
sustainability. Regardless of specific funding sources, all of the organizations in my sample 
receive significant proportions of their annual operating budgets from charitable donations. Thus, 
the infrequency of fundraising appears to reflect a prioritizing of daily operations over long-term 
planning. This is supported by the high relative importance and frequency assigned to 
beneficiary training, i.e., serving the needs of migrant workers. I discuss this in the following 
section.  
Introducing the hypothetical prompt in the third pile sort caused the founders/directors to 
assign significantly less importance to generating revenue (p=.05). In the first exercise, the 
founders/directors from both samples assign similarly high importance to generating revenue. In 
fact, nearly tied with beneficiary training, generating revenue produces the overall highest score 
of any criteria. The Beijing sample has a mean score of 2.7/3.0, and Shenzhen has 2.8/3.0. This 
indicates a very high relative importance assigned to this activity. In contrast, the third exercise 
produces a 1.8/3.0 in Beijing and a 2.3/3.0 in Shenzhen. 
The effect of the hypothetical prompt is particularly pronounced for the Beijing sample. 
Whereas the founders/directors in Shenzhen still assign relative importance to generating 
revenue, the scores from the Beijing sample are mostly clustered in the “less important” 
category. Notably, there are two outliers in Beijing that skewed the mean upward. Removing 
these generates a mean of 1.5, indicating that the modal number of founders/directors in Beijing 
view generating revenue as one of the least important activities under the hypothetical situation.  
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This outcome is not particularly surprising. As the first pile sort reveals, government 
regulations tend to have a significantly stronger effect on the decision-making of the Beijing 
sample. While conducting the third exercise, I asked the founders/directors what specific 
regulations they would like removed. Some said all regulations. Other were more specific. The 
most common answer, and one given nearly unanimously in Beijing, was the laws limiting 
donations to NGOs. These affect all the organizations, but appear to be more strictly enforced in 
Beijing. By removing them, the founders/directors would not have to rely as heavily on revenue 
generating activities. 
My conversations with the founders/directors about this hypothetical situation typically 
became far more complex than a single issue. Even donations are governed by more than the 
laws that specifically regulate them. As I discussed in Chapter 2, most NGOs in China are not 
officially registered with the government. This is true for the majority of organizations in my 
sample. Thus, they do not have the legal structures to accept charitable donations, at least 
domestically. Growing societal skepticism of the nongovernmental sector further limits the 
potential donor pool. This complexity underscores the limits of the data from the third pile 
sorting exercise. Following Straughan (1975), it becomes clear that the main limitation of 
hypothetical prompts is that they lack the situational features of real-world circumstances.  
Government Relations 
Comparing data from the first and second pile sorts reveals that the founders/directors 
assign significantly higher importance than frequency to bribes (p=.05) and government relations 
(p=.04). During my participant observation, I most often accompanied the founders/directors in 
either managing logistics of a current program or in dealing with an immediate crisis. Examples 
of the latter include finding housing for a woman unexpectedly fired from her job late at night, 
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bailing three young men out of jail for shoplifting, and rushing a mother to the hospital after her 
toddler became violently ill. Each of these cases exemplifies the ways that the founders/directors 
become intertwined in the precarity of migrants’ lives. 
The founder of one organization was up all night helping the woman in the first case find 
a place to sleep. He eventually also found her a new job. I discuss this case in greater detail in 
Chapter 6. I went with another founder to bail the guys out of jail. As it turned out, there was no 
evidence that they had stolen anything. The three of them had entered into a heated argument 
with a shop owner over the price of a pair of sneakers. They eventually walked away without 
buying them. Apparently out of spite, the shop owner called the police who arrested the boys 
further down the block. Not surprisingly, the officers believed the report of the shop owner and 
his neighbors who had witnessed the episode. The boys were dressed in typical migrant clothing, 
similar to what I described in Chapter 3. This likely contributed to the obvious prejudice of their 
arrest. In the third case, the director of the organization had to pay out of pocket for the child’s 
medical care. The mother lacked insurance and did not have enough cash to pay the bill, which 
the hospital demanded up front. As I discussed in Chapter 2, poor access to affordable healthcare 
is a common problem for migrants.  
With so many immediate concerns, the founders/directors have little time to devote to 
issues which objectively have enormous importance to the long-term success of their programs. 
Other than fundraising, these largely involve fostering strong relationships with local and 
national government officials. This process ranges from tapping into personal networks to 
bribery, which in China are really two sides of the same coin. 
The exchange of gifts or money for favors is commonplace in China. Recently, the 
national government has cracked down on this practice as a form corruption, punishable by 
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increasing draconian measures (e.g., Baculinao 2018). However, more broadly in Chinese 
society, such exchanges are utilitarian and central to the production and maintenance of guanxi 
networks (discussed in Chapter 2). Though China has a long-established gift economy, Smart 
(1999, 130) points out that guanxi has proven critical to conducting business under the current 
system of market socialism with its ambiguous and often-changing bureaucratic rules. This is as 
true in the business sector as it is in the nongovernmental sector.  
Universally, the founders/directors in my sample recognize the importance of fostering 
strong relationships with government officials. The relative infrequency that they engage in such 
networking conceals several complexities of their decision-making process. On the one hand, 
they all understand that government approval (or at least lack of disapproval) is an unavoidable 
component of creating a sustainable and impactful NGO program in China. I discuss this in 
detail in the next chapter. While they engage in requisite network building activities, they do not 
appear to prioritize it in their daily decision-making. This is a behavioral trend revealed by the 
pile sort data and supported by my participant observation at their organizations.   
On a daily basis, the founders/directors in my sample engage in a variety of activities that 
directly or indirectly contradict government policies. It follows that they also serve to weaken 
relationships with government officials. In a general sense, the founders/directors prioritize the 
well-being of the migrants over most other considerations, even the viability of their own 
programs. More specifically, the founders/directors are making the cities more hospitable to 
migrants, something which the government increasingly opposes (see Field Sites above). By 
doing so, the founders/directors often endanger not only their programs but also their own well-
being. This is exemplified by the case of the founder I discussed in Reflexivity and Research 
Realities who was being actively spied on by the government. Though an extreme example, it is 
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representative of the conflicting priorities underlying much of the decision-making of the 
founders/directors. 
Is this self-destructive behavior? Or is it a form of protest? Does it strengthen the impact 
of the programs? Does it improve migrants’ lives? My data do not provide consensus answers to 
these questions. The behavior of the founder discussed above seems to lie somewhere between 
self-destruction and civil disobedience. Though most of the founders/directors in my sample do 
not act as brazenly, all their programs are by nature at odds with the prevailing government 
attitudes toward migrant workers. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the government seems to be 
doing everything in its power to discourage migrants from settling long-term in the cities. Thus, 
creating programs to improve migrants’ lives requires opposition to the national government, 
even if at times it also requires working in conjunction with local governments. As I discuss in 
the next chapter, government support is essential for creating successful programs. 
This dizzying paradox makes clear why most of the founders/directors in my sample 
prioritize the activities over which they can exert immediate and identifiable influence. Too 
much focus on larger issues quickly becomes overwhelming. The director of one organization 
summed up the situation brusquely: “I don’t understand them [government officials] and I don’t 
want to.”66 In fact, as the pile sort data reveal, the founders/directors do not even devote much 
time to assessing the success of their programs, something they unanimously view as very 
important. This speaks volumes to the enormous impact of China’s political economy on their 
decision-making. I will delve into the theoretical implications of this in Chapter 8. 
For now, it is important to note that under ideal circumstances the lack of large-scale planning 
and development likely limits the overall impacts of the NGO programs in my sample. However, 




the founders/directors are making the best of suboptimal conditions. At this point, there is no one 
else working to improve migrants’ lives. It seems safe to conclude that their priorities, and in 
turn their decision-making, are resulting in the greatest possible impact on migrants’ lives. 
Marketing and Publicity 
Both samples report that the least important aspects of their organizations are marketing, 
publicity, and media relations. As I discussed above, the organizations in both field sites try not 
to attract much attention to their programs, largely because the migrant workers have such 
tenuous legal status in the cities. This is also a function of intense government scrutiny of their 
programs, particularly those concerned with labor relations and workers’ rights. Interestingly, 
Ebrahim (2003) points to publicity as one of the main ways NGOs reassure donors of their 
accountability for the outcomes of their programs. His paper is a meta study of research on 
NGOs globally, and like most academic work on NGOs, it covers the behaviors of organizations 
in democratic societies. 
The Chinese organizations would probably benefit from increased publicity. Even though 
new laws restrict their ability to fundraise, they are still using other ways to generate revenue. 
They rely on word-of-mouth to market and publicize both their programs and their goods and 
services. In a study of private sector businesses, Bughin, Doogan, and Vetvik (2010) argue for 
the effectiveness of word-of-mouth advertising, noting that it is the primary factor behind twenty 
to fifty percent of consumer spending. This is transferable to social entrepreneurs who also rely 
on profit-making activities to generate revenue. Yet, this implies that at least half of people’s 
awareness of products and services comes from other forms of marketing and publicity, which 
the Chinese NGOs in my study do not seem to be using. Based on the other data in this study, it 
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is not surprising to find that government regulations are both shaping and limiting the ways 
NGOs in China are publicizing their programs. 
What is somewhat unsettling is that the founders/directors do not view marketing and 
publicity as important to the success of their organizations. Other than government regulations, 
the lack of marketing and publicity seems to be one of the main limitations on the scale and 
scope of their organizations’ programs. Herein lies the power of the authoritarian state to affect 
the construction of both institutions and how even the most well-intentioned people perceive 
those institutions. It is important to note that government regulations appear to be influencing the 
founders/directors to apply self-imposed limitations on their own organizations.  
As a counterpoint to the above argument, even though the government severely limits 
fundraising, data from the first pile sort exercise suggests that the founders/directors still view it 
as a relatively important part of their organizations. As revealed by the survey data, regardless of 
their organizations’ official legal structure, the founders/directors typically perceive their 
organizations within “normal” definitions of NGOs. In fact, many foreign donors disregard the 
lack of official designations and donate to the Chinese NGOs as if they were registered as 
nonprofit organizations. Thus, government regulations can limit how the founders/directors 
assign importance to certain aspects of their organizations but not how they view their core 
missions. In this way, they are working within the limits of the system to rebel against it, notably 
against the codified and institutionalized mistreatment of migrant workers. 
T-tests for the means of the first pile sort exercise reveal significant differences between 
the two field sites for publicity (p=.04) and marketing (p=.03). In both cases, the 
founders/directors in Shenzhen view these factors as being more important to their organizations. 
This may have to do with less government regulation. It may also be a factor of less government 
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management of and support for their programs. However, as noted above, the founders/directors 
from both field sites assign relatively low importance to these factors. Thus, despite statistical 
significance, this may simply represent a significant difference in degree not in kind, as well as 
the importance of context. 
Not surprisingly, the founders/directors in Beijing put more importance on government 
relations (p=.02). Yet, it should be noted that the mean score for both field sites is greater than 2, 
indicating that government relations factor heavily into the decision-making of all the 
founders/directors – just more heavily for those in Beijing. This offers further evidence for the 
preeminence of the authoritarian state in determining decision-making within the 
nongovernmental sector.  
Organizations in Beijing certainly appear to come under greater government scrutiny than 
those in Shenzhen. Further supporting this conclusion, though admittedly tangentially, is the 
significantly lower importance assigned by respondents in Beijing to publishing literature 
(p=.02). Interviews reveal that they experience much greater censorship than the 
founders/directors in Shenzhen. Again, this is objectively a very important part of most NGO 
programs. The articles and pamphlets published by NGOs educate beneficiaries as well as 
publicize programs to donors and other interested parties.  
The literature published by one organization in Shenzhen stands out both because of its 
originality and because it represents the pride and thoughtfulness with which all the 
founders/directors in my sample approach their work. I will call this organization Women Work. 
It helps female domestic workers understand their legal rights and deal with a variety of 
problems and hazards common in their profession. These include discrimination by both their 
employers and the general population. Not only are these women migrant workers, a second-tier 
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social class at best, but they also typically lack labor contracts and are thus not covered by 
existing (and limited) labor laws. Figure 22 and Figure 23 depict a sampling of the literature 
published by Women Work. 
 
Figure 22: Surveillance of Domestic Workers 
 
Figure 23: Harassment of Domestic Workers by “employers” 
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 The illustrations above come from pamphlets in the Women Work community center. 
Figure 22 depicts one of the most common forms of harassment faced by domestic workers. 
Wealthy homeowners often subject the women to overt (and hidden) surveillance. It is 
surprisingly common for the homeowners to use embellished video “evidence” to withhold pay 
from the women, accusing them of a variety of minor and major infractions. To make matters 
worse, many of the women are listed on websites for domestic workers. Even a single negative 
review can lead to a woman being blacklisted, or at least cause a dramatic decrease in her 
earning potential. Like migrants in China, this precarity is experienced by domestic workers 
worldwide, in contexts as diverse as Hong Kong (Constable 2007), South Africa (Ally 2011), 
Italy (Näre 2011), and Saudi Arabia (Johnson 2010). 
 The founder of Women Work was a migrant herself. She actually came to the city to 
attend college. She has been able to ascend the socioeconomic ladder far more easily than less 
educated migrants. Because of this, she has had many opportunities to interact with the city’s 
economic elites. On several occasions, while attending dinner parties or other events at the 
homes of wealthy friends, she was appalled at the way they treated the domestic workers. In a 
particularly candid interview, she likened the experiences to those of a freed slave, watching 
people still in slavery being whipped on a pole – and for little more than spilling tea on the 
carpet. Of course, the abuse was seldom physical. But, for her, the mental toll was palpable. 
“I’ve been fortunate, never having to do this kind of work. But it was like I was in their 
uniform.67 I had to do something.” 
  This is an interesting variation on the idea of walking in someone else’s shoes. It 
conveys a strong occupational imagery. Interestingly, the word for uniform 制服 can also mean 
                                                 
67 像我也穿一样的制服: “It was like I was also wearing the same uniform.” 
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“to subdue” or “to bring under control”. Although domestic workers typically do not have 
prescribed attire, the precarity and hostility of their employment situations share many qualities 
with the abrasive and restrictive fabrics used in most uniforms.   
 In response to her experiences, she started the Women Work community center. It offers 
the domestic workers a safe place to vent their frustrations. It also offers the founder and her staff 
a place to learn the intricacies of the workers’ situations. Previously, the women had no forum to 
openly share knowledge. The community center began to remedy this problem. The founder 
published brochures, similar to the ones above. She immediately began hearing from the women 
that they were more easily able to avoid bad situations, such as “getting caught” on camera68 or 
being harassed by husbands (see Figure 23 above). Simply knowing the experiences of other 
women had a positive effect on their situations. If nothing else, both the literature and the 
community center gave them a way to make fun of the often-ridiculous behavior of their 
employers. 
 As with most NGOs, the literature published by Women Work adds a lot of value to its 
programs. The founder clearly wants to do everything in her power to help the beneficiaries of 
her organization. To support this goal, she has decided to put a lot of resources and time into 
publishing literature. I was not able to gather comprehensive financial data from the 
organizations in this study. Many declined my requests, while others only granted me partial 
                                                 
68 The founder admits that some of the women actually do commit small crimes, such as theft 
and occasionally vandalism. In her opinion, the abuse they endure instigates these crimes, and in 
some ways justifies them. I remain objective on this issue. Clearly, her support for the domestic 
workers is unapologetic and unwavering.  
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access to their financial reports.69 However, I was able to gather data on the frequencies with 
which decisions are made and the resulting actions. 
Assuming the removal of government regulations, the founders/directors assigned 
significantly higher importance to publicity (p=.05). Letting her imagination run wild, one 
founder in Beijing envisioned taking out advertisements on state-run television. Another 
imagined his program being featured on the nightly news. Yet, these fantasies would require 
changes to not only the laws and attitudes governing NGOs but also far-reaching policies toward 
the migrants themselves, for example relaxing residency laws and improving labor protects. 
Most of my informants acknowledged this complexity. In fact, other than generating revenue and 
publicity, the hypothetical situation in the third pile sort did not produce a significant effect on 
any other criteria. 
The limited effect of my hypothetical prompt suggests that the reach of the Chinese-state 
extends beyond regulating institutional behavior. It appears to exert a significant influence on the 
way even the most well-intentioned people view institutions. This represents a natural extension 
of Foucault’s (1991, 105) notion that the state wields authority by obscuring power structures  
behind complex legal mechanisms. In this framework, the laws governing NGOs in China 
manufacture perceptions that extend throughout society. These have led the founders/directors to 
engage in a form of self-discipline, whereby state policies not only shape their operational 
decision-making but also limit the ways they imagine the possibilities of their institutions. 
Spires (2011) found this type of self-regulating behavior to be a common feature of  
across the Chinese nongovernmental sector. In Gugerty’s (2010) study of NGOs in twenty-two 
                                                 
69 After a handful of rejections, I stopped asking for access to financial information. I found it 
had a negative impact on rapport. Since I lacked financial data from some organizations, I could 
not make comparisons across my entire sample.  
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African nations, national political structure plays the most significant role in determining the 
degree of self-regulation in NGOs. In more democratic countries, such as Ethiopia, self-
regulation takes the form of performance assessments and donor reviews. These have a strong 
effect on organizational decision-making, but are easily amendable and consistently enforced. In 
contrast, for NGOs in more authoritarian countries, such as Kenya, self-regulation occurs in 
response to perceived and actual threats of government interference. Like the organizations in 
China, these tenuous relationship with the state often result in NGOs over-regulating their own 
programs and thus limiting their effectiveness.   
As I discussed in Chapter 1, previous research spotlights the influence of political 
systems on nongovernmental activity. Certainly, democratic systems are the ideal. Yet, the 
organizations in my sample reveal that through self-regulation they can operate effective 
programs in even the most limiting of authoritarian systems. What remains unclear is how this 
state-driven self-regulation affects specific decisions. In the next chapter, I discuss the 
implications of the asymmetrical relationship between the state and civil society in terms of the 





CHAPTER 6: GOVERNING THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
 
The term “governing” in the title of this chapter has a double meaning. First, it references 
the economic controls employed by the Chinese state to govern the nongovernmental sector. At 
minimum, the state uses funding to exert influence over non-governmental programs. However, 
it often outright usurps programs begun by NGOs. The second meaning of “governing” relates to 
the ways state interference governs the decision-making of the founders/directors of NGOs. In 
this way, the founders/directors are both shaped by and find space to work within government 
control frameworks. I will discuss the theoretical implications of this in Chapter 8. In this 
chapter, I analyze data from decision modelling to understand how this process affects the 
decision of the founders/directors to accept or not accept government funds and how this 
decision affects subsequent decision-making.  
Accepting Government Funds  
 Forty percent of the organizations in my sample accept at least some funding from the 
government. It is a misconception that these organizations are forced to take government money. 
The Chinese state is certainly overbearing. Yet, if this dissertation proves nothing else, my data 
strongly suggest that Chinese citizens have many ways to exert their agency, particularly in civil 
society organizations. These are not “weapons of the weak” in the traditional sense of tactics 
used to resist or overthrow a “bad” regime (see Ginzberg 2017). Such an outcome is unlikely, 
especially given that so many Chinese have benefited from China’s strong central government. I 
got no sense from my informants that regime change was even on their radar. They take 
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enormous pride in their country and are seeking ways to work within the system to improve it. 
When faced with government pressure, a founder/director can simply shut down the current 
program and begin a new one under a different organizational structure. In fact, several 
founders/directors in my sample reported that their current programs resulted from just such a 
process. 
I also found several cases of founders/directors choosing not to accept government 
money and still able to maintain their programs. I will discuss specific examples later in this 
chapter. The point is that the founders/directors have a choice whether or not to accept 
government funding. As I discussed in Chapter 4, the founders/directors in my sample feel 
passionately about their work. They are typically not willing to walk away from their programs 
simply because they face obstacles, even from the state. In the following chapter, I will discuss 
this topic more broadly. 
For these reasons, I wanted to understand the criteria used by the founders/directors to 
decide whether or not to accept government funding. While forty percent of the organizations in 
my sample received government money, over eighty percent of the founders/directors report 
being faced with this decision. Figure 24 depicts the decision tree I created from interviewing the 




Figure 24: Accepting Government Funds 
 
 This decision tree reveals only two pathways by which the founders/directors decide to 
accept government funds (shown in green). However, as I mentioned above, this represents the 
experiences of forty percent of the organizations in my sample. Moreover, it points to some 
significant factors affecting the decision-making of the founders/directors, regardless of whether 
they accept government money. 
 None of the organizations that have been in existence less than five years accepted 
government funding. In my sample, none of them were offered government funding. This 
correlates with survey data that found a similar relationship between years in existence and 
obstacles faced (see Chapter 4). It also suggests that the government is more discerning than we 
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might want to give it credit for, and is likely looking for programs with at least a five-year track 
record to share its burden of dealing with migrant issues. 
 Of those in existence longer than five years, roughly sixty percent are “educational” and 
forty percent are “legal” organizations. For both categories of organization, the decision to 
accept government funds is largely a function of the availability of other funding sources. 
Notably, only organizations that bring in less than fifty percent of their operating budgets from 
commercial revenue accept government funds. The availability of foreign funding also 
contributes to the decision to accept or not accept government money. Interestingly, this is a 
significantly more important factor for the educational organizations. They must receive at least 
seventy percent of their funding from foreign donors in order not to take government money – as 
compared to a thirty percent threshold for the legal organizations. 
 Bolstering survey and interview data, this discrepancy further suggests government 
preferences for certain NGO programs over others. The decision tree in Figure 24 underscores 
how these preferences affect the decision-making of the founders/directors. Within the 
“educational” category, all of the decision-criteria relate to the availability of funding. However, 
in the “legal” category, in addition to funding criteria, the types of programs and their structures 
strongly influence the final decision. Notably, programs run by lawyers and those that promote 
collective bargaining do not receive government money. 
Some founders/directors who are lawyers report being offered funding from the 
government. None of them decided to accept it. In most cases, this has to do with their greater 
access to personal and network wealth than other founders/directors. In China, as in many 
countries, even lawyers who engage in nonprofit work are top-earners. Several of these lawyers 
also cited fiduciary duty as an important decision criterion. As attorneys, they have a 
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professional obligation to represent the interests of their clients and avoid conflicts of interest. 
Lawyers who take on migrant clients are often defending them against government policies 
related to labor rights and collective bargaining. The government tends to favor business interests 
in both of these areas. As one informant commented, “Money from the government is a payment 
not to oppose the government.”70 
The above analysis of Figure 24 provides insights into what personal, organizational, and 
political factors lead some founders/directors to accept government funds. However, it reveals 
little about how this important decision affects subsequent decision-making. In theory, by 
accepting government funds, an NGO loses one of its defining characteristics, namely being non-
governmental. Yet, with such an overbearing central government, China creates a much less 
distinct nongovernmental sector than is common in democratic societies. In the next section, I 
will explore how using (or not using) government money plays out in the Chinese context.      
Using Government Funds 
Figure 25 shows the decision tree I created to model the ways the decisions to accept or 
not accept government money affect subsequent decision-making. All of the organizations in this 
model were offered government funds. Thus, they made a decision to accept or not accept them. 
                                                 





Figure 25: Using Government Funds 
 
To honor the late Robert Van Kemper, I made the above diagram clean and 
straightforward.71 Yet, the simple layout conceals underlying complexity. Indeed, the ‘yes’ and 
‘no’ branches yield only three possible outcomes: (1) closing an organization, (2) single city 
expansion, and (3) multi-city expansion. However, survey data reveals that individual 
founders/directors have a range of experiences with these possibilities. In this section, I will 
explore how these experiences give insights into their decision-making processes and the 
resulting outcomes.   
Despite the heavy-handed policies of the Chinese state, the decision not to accept 
government money does not inevitably doom an NGO. After declining government money, 
                                                 
71 Professor Kemper was a strong proponent of Tufte’s (1983) approach to precise and 
uncluttered data visualizations. I hope this dissertation lives up to his high standards. 
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several organizations in my sample managed to expand their operations within the city where 
they started. Later in this section, I will compare specific case studies of this occurrence with the 
experiences of NGOs that expand their programs with government funds. To start, however, it is 
important to note that the ‘no’ branch does yield the possibility of an organization closing down. 
At the time of field research, all of the organizations in my sample were still in operation. Yet, 
some informants reported that organizations they had previously founded or directed were forced 
to shut down after the decision not to accept government money. One case stands out as 
representative of this experience. 
Daisy Li (pseudonym) founded and now directs a program that provides job training and 
placement for secretaries, most of whom are women. This is the second female-focused 
organization she has started. Prior to starting her current program, she ran an organization that 
offered skills training to female factory workers. She had worked in a factory for fifteen years 
herself and was able to develop a very effective curriculum to help her former co-workers 
advance to higher-paying jobs within their company. In fact, that company hired her to conduct 
onsite classes for its employees. Other factories in the area soon hired her to do the same for their 
employees. Daisy believes that the factories thought her program helped increase worker 
productivity. So, it was a win-win, because many of the participants in her courses also wound 
up getting promoted. 
Within six years, Daisy was contracted at half a dozen factories to conduct monthly 
training classes. She had fifteen fulltime employees and at least that many volunteers helping her 
with logistics, program development, and fund raising. She had two large corporate sponsors and 
a number of small donors. At that point, her program was sustainable, both financially and in 
terms of impact. Shortly thereafter, a local government official approached her with an offer of 
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substantial funds to help her improve and expand the program. In fact, he offered her more 
money than she was getting from all other funding sources combined. As a stipulation of the 
money, he would serve as an official advisor to her organization. This requirement made her 
wary. Based on her experiences, and echoing the problems faced by “legal” organizations in the 
previous section, she knew that the government often undermined any attempts to organize 
factory workers. Thus, she politely but firmly declined the offer. 
Within a couple months, one of her corporate sponsors unceremoniously ceased its 
donations. The other soon followed suit. She suspected that this was retribution by the 
government official, but of course she would never know conclusively. With increased funding 
from small donors, she was able to maintain a scaled-down version of her program. Yet, within 
another few months the money ran out, and she had to let go all of her employees and shutter the 
organization. It was not for another three years that she was able to start her current program.   
The Chinese government is often heavy-handed, yet seldom overt in its restrictions of 
civil society activities. Several other informants had experiences similar to Daisy’s. The 
government’s handling of unwanted civil society activity seems most analogous to its censoring 
of online content. When someone types a sensitive term into a Chinese internet search engine, 
one of two things happens. Either the search halts to a crawl and eventually times out, or clicking 
on the linked search results causes a similar slowdown and stall. For example, in the Fall of 
2017, I typed “June 4”72 into Baidu, the largest Chinese search engine. This is the date of the 
infamous Tiananmen massacre, one of the most highly censored incidents on the Chinese 
internet. To my surprise, this search term returned nearly two million hits. None of the results 
were related to Tiananmen, but instead referenced supposed events in other years on June 4. I 
                                                 
72 6 月 4 日 
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clicked every link on the first five pages of search results. In each case, I eventually received an 
error message. 
 These types of misdirection and misrepresentation are commonly employed by the 
Chinese authorities. Akin to sensitive search terms, the government is also suspicious of 
nongovernmental activities. As I discussed in the previous section, this applies to some NGO 
programs more than others. However, several of my informants report experiences similar to 
Daisy’s, in which their programs were abruptly undermined after turning down government 
support, or even disagreeing with unsolicited advice from government officials. This is perhaps 
the clearest evidence that, in the long run, few NGOs in China are ever truly non-governmental. I 
will discuss the theoretical implications of the next chapter. 
 As I hinted above, some NGOs are able to maintain and even expand their programs after 
refusing government funds. In other words, declining state money is not necessarily the kiss of 
death. However, the decision tree above makes clear that without government funds, 
organizations are unable to expand beyond a single city. In fact, the government has instated 
laws prohibiting civil society organizations from having offices in more than one city. This is in 
line with its efforts to minimize the influence of the nongovernmental sector, as well as any 
institutions or collectivity of people becoming too large and influential. This, of course, limits 
the scope and impact of effective programs. Yet, it also localizes programs, allowing them to 
tailor their efforts to the needs of specific groups of migrants. This has important implications for 
the decision making of the founders/directors. Later in this section, I will discuss how the 
decision to accept government funds affects program expansion. 
 The government restrictions on expansion have significant effects on strategic planning. 
Not surprisingly, the founders/directors who decline state money do not spend a lot of time 
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considering how to expand their programs beyond a single city. In one sense, this is another 
example of how government intervention suffocates civil society. However, most of my 
informants take a more glass-half-full view. They are aware of the benefits of expanding to other 
cities, but they appreciate the ability to focus on their local programs. This is particularly 
important for creating a sense of community. As I discussed earlier, migrants lack traditional 
support networks, i.e., family, friends, and neighbors in their hometowns. Thus, some of the most 
beneficial work of the organizations in my study involves fostering a sense of community among 
the migrants in a particular neighborhood. In general, they achieve this by offering migrants a 
safe space to share their frustrations, learn from the experiences of other migrants in their area, 
and engage in group activities. As we have seen in several case studies in the preceding chapters, 
sometimes this involves serious issues, for example how to apply for compensation after a 
workplace injury or how to navigate a discriminatory labor market. Many times, however, it is 
more about bringing migrants together for communal activities, such as game nights, concerts, 
and movie screenings. After all, shared leisure time, as much as hardship, is what unites a 
community. 
This is the mission of the Temple of Migrant Workers, an NGO founded by one of my 
informants, Wu Wei (pseudonym). The organization’s name (also a pseudonym) reflects Mr. 
Wu’s belief in the need for migrants to have a refuge from the often-hostile policies of the 
government and hostile attitudes of society-at-large. In fact, Mr. Wu thinks that the government 
mistrusts NGOs because they focus too much on the hardships of migrants. The government 
promotes a narrative that life for migrants is actually pretty good. Such a view is strangely 
optimistic, and fairly delusional, but goes a long way to underscore what it clearly views as 
acceptable collateral damage in the process of economic development. The reality, of course, is 
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that migrants lack access to basic social services, education for their children, and most legal 
protections. Despite the official rhetoric, these factors have the effect of making migrants feel 
very unwelcome in their new homes. In fact, Wong and Leung (2008) point to social support as 
one of the key factors affecting the mental health of migrant workers in China. 
 Mr. Wu knows this feeling well. Twenty years ago, he came to the city as a migrant 
worker. He was fortunate to have worked as a mechanic in his hometown. He got a good-paying 
job in the city. He fixed factory equipment, a skill that was in high enough demand that he 
received frequent raises. He stresses that he has enjoyed a life far better than most migrants. It is 
important to note, however, that he and his family still live in the same urban village to which he 
originally migrated. His humility is admirable. Yet, his standard of living is remarkably lower 
than the urban middle class. Nonetheless, he has devoted a lot of his time and personal resources 
to make life better for his fellow migrants.  
 He saved up his money, and with the help of several small donors, he rented a courtyard 
near his house. Over several years, he and his friends renovated the buildings to create a 
sanctuary for people in the neighborhood. The four single-story structures that line the courtyard 
house a small lending library, a game room, a community kitchen, and a thrift store. He uses 
money from the sale of donated clothing to fund other activities. At the back of the courtyard is a 
larger, two-story building that he turned into an auditorium where he holds regular performances 
free-of-charge. Sometimes there are plays. At holidays there are elaborate performances, for 
example a dragon dance for the new year. I even saw him give a guitar performance with a trio 
of him and two of his friends. They were really good! 
 During my three weeks with Mr. Wu, the center was very well used. During the day, 
older people used the gaming rooms to play mahjong and talk for hours over tea. In the evenings, 
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the center bustled with lively conversations, children darting here and there, and plenty of traffic 
in the thrift store. On the weekends, performances in the auditorium usually played to a full 
house, even more so during the holidays. 
Not surprisingly, Mr. Wu is quite popular in the community. A couple years ago, he was 
approached by a government official. Unlike the experiences of many other founders/directors in 
my study, the official did not offer Mr. Wu money for his community center. In fact, the official 
complimented Mr. Wu’s ingenuity and ability to run his organization without government 
assistance. He offered Mr. Wu enough money and resources to open a second center in another 
migrant neighborhood on the other side of the city. The official would find another manager to 
run the current center, so that Mr. Wu could focus on the new center. The plan was to open 
several of these centers across the city, and eventually expand to other cities. As I discussed in 
Chapter 2, this is in line with the government’s practice of using grassroots NGOs to develop 
effective programs that it then takes over (and takes credit for). 
 After much deliberation and soul-searching, Mr. Wu declined the offer. He thought a lot 
about why he had originally started his organization. He realized he had no interest in helping all 
migrants. He told me, “It’s a problem bigger than me.”73 He has formed bonds with the people in 
his neighborhood. In many respects, they are his adoptive hometown. His organization is merely 
a vehicle to help them. He stresses that his organization would not exist without them. In this 
way, he defines his role as a good person in terms of his role within a local community, not on a 
larger scale. I will discuss the broader implications of this in the next chapter. 
Admittedly, less than five percent of the organizations in my sample run programs in 
more than one city. As the decision tree above indicates, all of these receive greater than fifty 




percent of their funding from the government. Interestingly, of the organizations that receive 
greater than half of their funding from the government, more than eighty percent operate in 
multiple cities. This indicates that the government recognizes the benefits of scaling up effective 
programs. Thus, it seems likely that more and more GONGOs will begin to operate in multiple 
cities. It follows that more and more NGOs will relinquish both financial and managerial 
autonomy to the government. So, how do the founders/directors of such organizations factor into 
their programs once they are effectively taken over by the government? 
The simplest answer is that it is largely up to them. Given the small number of such 
organizations in my sample, I can only make limited conclusions. Yet, my data suggest some 
significant factors that influence how the founders/directors make decisions regarding this 
situation. For all of the founders/directors in my study, their programs are more than simply a 
job. At one point or another in my interactions with everyone in my sample, I heard them say, 
“This is my life’s work.”74 For some, like Mr. Wu, this statement signifies a parent-child 
relationship. Mr. Wu gave birth to his organization, continues to nurture it, and is unwilling to 
hand over control simply out of convenience. In many ways, his life has come to be defined by 
his role in the organization and the ways it situates him within the community. Others, however, 
prioritize the success of their programs over their roles within them. 
Objectively, both of these approaches can result in effective programs. In this type of 
situation, the temperament and preferences of the founders/directors appear to have the greatest 
impact. While some founders/directors decide to reject government funding or leave their 
organizations if they cannot retain control, others remain at their organizations even after the 
government takes them over. The latter perspective, i.e., prioritizing the program above all else, 




is less easily analogized than a situation like Mr. Wu’s. Are these founders/directors akin to 
helicopter parents, micromanaging their children even after they go off to college? Are they 
really just empty-nesters who are struggling to accept that their little babies are all grown up? 
More accurately, this decision seems rooted in an entrepreneurial spirit, defined not only in terms 
of founding an organization but also in terms Schumpeter’s (1934) notion of entrepreneurs as 
innovators who respond to needs in society (see also Cohen and Levinthal 1990). This 
innovation is not a one-time action but an ongoing process of improving societal problems. The 
impact of such motivations on decision-making is well exemplified by the case of Du Xin 
(pseudonym). 
Mr. Du (pun intended) was, like many founders/directors, a migrant himself. In his early 
twenties, his favorite band went to university in Beijing. On a whim, he decided to move 
hundreds of miles from his hometown to be closer to them. He got a job washing dishes at the 
cafeteria and was able to go to all their concerts. His impulsiveness was well-tempered by an 
innate desire to improve himself. These character traits have defined much his professional life. 
He soon learned about the adult gaokao and decided to take it. The gaokao is a college entrance 
exam taken by high school students. The adult version is somewhat less rigorous, but still 
enables people with a passing score to attend university.75 
He passed the test and was accepted into a computer engineering program at another 
university in the city. After graduation, he secured a good job in the tech industry. Within a few 
years, he became a VP. After a successful career, he wanted to help other migrants do what he 
                                                 
75 Mr. Du thinks that the assumption of the adult test is that life experience can compensate for 
lower academic aptitude. As usual, it is impossible to know the exact thinking of the Chinese 




had done. So, he started a program to get university students to volunteer to teach migrants prep 
courses for the adult gaokao. In fact, one of the members of his favorite band become a major 
donor to the program, and even attended events to talk with migrants. 
 Mr. Du estimates that more than ninety percent of the migrants in his program passed the 
adult gaokao. This enabled them to receive professional training and get significantly better jobs 
than they could before attending his program. Not surprisingly, after a few years, the government 
offered to take over his program. Without hesitation, he accepted their offer. He remained on as 
an advisor and helped them expand the program to several other eastern cities. Though he 
dislikes the inefficiency of government bureaucracy, he acknowledges that state funding has 
allowed his program to help far more migrants than he could on his own. Moreover, he has come 
to realize that his time and effort can be better spent on establishing new programs. It is here that 
his entrepreneurial spirit shines through. 
 In the course of running the adult gaokao program, his thinking on the migrant situation 
evolved. He has come to understand that the root of the problem is not finding migrants better 
jobs in the city, but rather giving them ways to make money in their hometowns so they can 
avoid coming to the cities in the first place. In this vein, he started an online marketplace to help 
local farmers sell their products.76 Unlike the experiences of the organization I discussed in 
Chapter 3, Mr. Du has found that Chinese consumers care that they are helping local farmers, 
and he advertises this by telling the stories behind each of the products he sells online. He buys 
direct from farmers, paying them on average eighty percent of the final retail price. He uses the 
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net profit to maintain the online store and subsidize shipping costs. He has also raised significant 
funding from venture capital77 and has plans to expand his program to several more provinces.  
 He has already received support from local governments and expects to hear from 
national officials in the next few years. After all, his program is right in line with their goals of 
keeping people in the inner provinces. This is the type of thinking China needs. If the central 
government is going to disincentivize migrants to stay in the cities, then it needs to instate more 
programs that give them money-making opportunities in their native provinces. It will be 
interesting to follow up in a few years to see where this program has progressed, whether the 
government has continued to support it (if not take it over), and how Mr. Du’s thinking about the 
migrant problem has evolved. 
Despite the theoretical implications of an NGO accepting government money, my data 
suggest that in China this is not an inherently bad decision. Just as in China, NGOs in other 
authoritarian countries, such as Kenya, become integrated into the system of governance (Brass 
2012). In this way, they are serving the core purpose of civil society, namely to mediate between 
government priorities and the needs of society at large. In the end, the limiting factor in the 
effectiveness of accomplishing this goal comes down the decision-making of the 
founder/director and his or her skill in negotiating between often competing interests. Naturally, 
asymmetrical information and political headwinds factor heavily. Yet, even in such a top-heavy 
political and economic environment such as China’s, the decisions made by individuals remain 
central to civil society organizations. 
In the end, the decisions of the founders/directors in my sample boil down to an issue of 
scale. They can only expand their programs beyond a single city if they accept government 




support. For some, this is an acceptable compromise. The increased impact of scaling up 
outweighs the loss of autonomy. For others, the government is the primary cause of migrant 
issues in China. As one informant stated, “I’m fixing the problems that the government 
created.”78 State interference is not reconcilable with the effectiveness of their programs. Thus, 
they sacrifice scale for the purity of a local impact. 
Across contexts, scalability is one of the biggest challenges for NGOs. Many 
nongovernmental programs become less effective because of issues with replicability, i.e., the 
effectiveness with which an organization can reproduce the programs that it initiates (Bloom and 
Smith 2010, 134). In fact, Weber, Kroeger, and Lambrich (2014, 115) note that effectively 
replicating an NGO program is rare because local knowledge is not readily transferable to a new 
location, even within the same country. 
This speaks to the wisdom of the informants in my sample who shirk scalability that 
piggybacks on government interference. Political headwinds often hobble NGO programs. An 
unfortunate example of this is that due to a recent wave of populism in the United States, the 
government has drastically cut support for NGOs that run environmental programs (see Tabuchi 
2017). This effect is even more pronounced in authoritarian systems. For example, in Jordon the 
monarchy prioritizes regime survival even in the midst of an economic crisis, a situation that 
NGOs are uniquely situated to ameliorate (Wiktorowicz 2002). 
Much like Jordan, the Chinese state seeks to control its nongovernmental sector through 
repression and oversight. However, as my informants reveal, even in the most repressive political 
systems, the founders/directors of NGOs are ultimately responsible for defining the effectiveness 
                                                 




of their programs. For everyone in my sample, this definition is exclusively about improving 
migrants’ lives. Regardless of whether they accept government money, none of them appear to 
be compromising on their own interpretations of this prime directive. The personal motivations 
of the founders/directors of NGOs is largely absent from existing anthropological literature. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, it tends to prize considerations of state malfeasance over the ways 
individuals exert their own agency to correct government wrongdoings. In the next chapter, I 




CHAPTER 7: DATASET CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this chapter, I explore how my dataset contributes to empirical generalizations, i.e., 
what Lund (2014, 226) defines as claiming that localized events are valid for a larger context. 
Toward this end, I discuss how my dataset provides answers to my core research questions: What 
obstacles have the founders/directors encountered, and what are their successes and failures in 
dealing with these? What motivates them and how does their decision-making reflect their 
perceptions of what it means to be a good citizen and a good person in twenty-first century 
China? How do migrant issues ripple through the rest of society? What do the perspectives and 
experiences of the founders/directors reveal about state-society relations in the Chinese 
development model? Finally, what progress do the founders/directors see, and what societal and 
political changes do they view as necessary for lasting change to occur? In the concluding 
section, I discuss the limitations of my dataset and propose future research to answers questions 
for which this study did not provide satisfactory evidence. 
Failing Forward 
 Peters’ (1991, 261) notion of “failing forward” informs my assessment of how the 
founders/directors have dealt with obstacles faced by their organizations. However, the realities 
of Chinese civil society complicate this process of learning from past challenges and failures. I 
hypothesized that government interference is one of the main obstacles faced by Chinese NGOs. 
My data suggest that this is not so clear cut. The vital question becomes: What is the end goal of 
a migrant-focused NGO? 
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I posed this question to all the founders/directors in my sample. The unanimous response 
was some version of “to improve migrants’ lives”. Yet, this straightforward answer conceals a lot 
of room for interpretation. The variations in meaning are largely a function of how the 
founders/directors view their own roles. For some, developing their vision is secondary to the 
eventual impact of their programs. For people in this category, government support is not only a 
means to this end but is often built into their strategies from the start. One informant who 
eventually accepted government money bluntly stated, “I was just waiting for them [government 
officials] to notice me.”79   
My data suggest that accepting government money tends to help NGO programs expand, 
either within a single city or into multiple cities. The founders/directors who reject offers of 
government assistance tend to do so not based on a lack of necessity but rather on philosophical 
grounds. This ideological resolve may resonate with outside observers. Yet, does it actually help 
the founders/directors realize the stated purpose of their programs, namely to improve migrants’ 
lives? 
 Again, experiences vary. Some founders/directors create sustainable, impactful programs 
without government support. While their organizations are limited in scope, they have deep 
impacts on local communities. Other founders/directors want to expand their programs to 
improve as many migrants’ lives as possible. My data, in support of previous studies, suggests 
that in China this requires government support. Based on my research, I would advise any NGO 
in China to consider government intervention in terms of benefits to their mission statement and 
not philosophical opposition. 




It is well beyond the data from this research to wade into a debate on human nature and 
innate philanthropy. Yet, as I have discussed throughout this dissertation, nearly every person I 
interviewed during the course of fieldwork mentioned strong philosophical motivations 
undergirding their charitable work. The frequency of these deep conversations speaks to their 
sincerity. It also seems safe to say that a well-defined personal philosophy is necessary, yet not 
sufficient for founding and directing an impactful NGO program. Such an endeavor requires 
many of the same accounting, strategy, and marketing tactics involved with running any 
business. These are made all the more challenging for the nongovernmental sector in China 
which is undoubtedly more regulated than the business sector. 
The fact is that NGOs rarely succeed without incorporating strong business strategies into 
their philosophical motivations. Like it or not, NGOs in China cannot fully take advantage of 
such strategies without government support. Most of the founders/directors in my sample 
expressed concern about how government intervention would change (and worsen) their 
programs. However, my research suggests that, beyond philosophical principles, these fears are 
neither straightforward nor entirely founded. 
This stems from the government’s paradoxical approach to migrants. Outwardly, the state 
seeks to minimize the hardships faced by migrant workers. Many of the policies that result from 
this stance are cruel, for example bulldozing migrant neighborhoods or preventing migrants’ 
children from attending school. Conversely, the state seems fixated on the migrants as a potential 
(and actual) cause of widespread civil unrest. It is desperate for solutions that do not contradict 
the former and minimize the latter. It is thus no surprise that the government supports an NGO 
like Mr. Du’s adult gaokao initiative (discussed in the previous chapter). This type of program 
shows that migrants can have real opportunities for upward mobility. 
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I am not suggesting that the founders/directors should abandon their principles. Moral 
outrage from civil society is likely one of the main factors motivating government interest in 
helping migrants. Yet, the Chinese state is unlikely to relinquish control of such a major social 
issue. As discussed in Chapter 2, historical precedent suggests that the government will continue 
to exert enormous influence over the narrative and policies regarding migrant workers. Given the 
increasingly strict governance of the nongovernmental sector, NGOs in China that want to honor 
their mission statements must, like trees in a storm, bend but not break to the state’s will.80 This 
is a practical matter of institutional survival. NGOs must increasingly find balance between their 
moral foundations and the reality of what the government will tolerate. This appears to be the 
most likely path to improving migrant’s lives.        
More than Morality 
 Both Aristotle and Kant argue that the moral value of an action is a function of the way in 
which it is chosen (discussed by Korsgaard 2014). Why people are doing things often tells us as 
much about who they are as what they are doing. For this reason, I studied decision-making to 
understand what if any moral values motivate the founders/directors. In general, they are all 
defining what it means to be a good person and a good citizen in terms of helping migrants. Most 
attribute their motivations to Confucian ideals or other philosophical traditions that promote 
service to the community. One informant cited Gandhi as her inspiration for wanting to improve 
society. Several others were inspired by Muhammad Yunus, who won the Nobel Peace Prize for 
developing micro-lending which has economically empowered poor populations who were 
ignored or discriminated against by traditional banks. This supports Kleinman’s (2007, 3) notion 
                                                 
80 I have heard this sentiment expressed in a variety of different ways. One of the most common 




that people who seek a moral life take action when something in their local moral environment 
seems wrong. 
 This appears to be true for the founders/directors in my sample. It goes a long way to 
support Payton and Moody’s (2008, 96) assertion that philanthropic work is one of the primary 
ways by which people manifest their moral imaginations. Yet, such grandiose statements do not 
accurately reflect the underpinnings of day-to-day decision-making for the founders/directors in 
my sample. In fact, most of them only mention their moral outlook when I ask them specific 
questions about it. Kleinman (2007, 26) notes that moral decisions are not a result of prolonged 
self-reflection or adherence to a universal moral code, but more typically a response to pressing 
local circumstances. Of the existing literature, this comes closest to explaining the initial 
decision to start an NGO for the people in my sample. Yet, even it skims the surface of the root 
decision-criteria, namely the connections of the founders/directors to specific individuals and 
groups of people. 
 Either in word or action, no one in my sample thinks they can help every migrant worker 
in China. Some accept money from the government and expand their programs to more than one 
neighborhood. Yet, most operate in a single community, serving the needs of people to whom 
they make or already have strong personal connections. In a sense, this is a form of moral 
favoritism. However, it also speaks to the localization of good deeds. More than anything, 
though, it moderates recent claims that Chinese society is undergoing a fundamental shift, driven 
as much by moral change as by government policies and programs (e.g. Kleinman 2011, 25).  
Supporting Rolandsen (2008), my research found that the people in China who are highly 
committed to helping others exist on the fringes of society. Unlike Rolandsen’s research 
population, mine are not simply part-time volunteers. The founders/directors in my sample have 
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committed to full-time endeavors. Measured by level of commitment, they represent the upper 
echelon of moral action in their society. Yet, even accounting for everyone in China who makes 
any level of commitment to helping people outside of their normal social networks, including 
volunteer work or making small charitable donations, we still wind up with a minuscule 
proportion of the overall population. Thus, it is difficult to argue that Chinese society is 
undergoing a fundamental shift in morality. 
I admire the optimism of Kleinman and his colleagues. Yet, they seem to have conflated 
localized and isolated behavior with widespread phenomena. For example, the uptick in 
charitable donations and volunteerism following the 2008 earthquake has been inconsistent at 
best over the past decade. It is typically correlated more with viral social media content than 
broad interest in social issues. Furthermore, while there are more and more NGOs in China, there 
are also increasingly skeptical societal attitudes toward their operations and allocation of funds. 
Of course, NGOs do not represent the only moral outlet for civil society. Yet, Payton and Moody 
(2008) definitely have a point about their preeminence in this role. 
Thus, the question becomes: What exactly does the behavior of the founders/directors in 
my study represent? In the next chapter, I explore the broader impacts of my research, answering 
Lund’s (2014) all important question: Of what is this a case?       
The Promise of Progress 
 The founders/directors in my sample face mundane obstacles, common for running any 
business or organization. These include managing revenue streams, addressing staffing issues, 
reassuring investors and donors, and dealing with public relations. Navigating each of these is 
complicated by strict government oversight. I have discussed this in detail in the previous 
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chapters. Yet, the stresses on the founders/directors extend beyond the workplace. Their career 
choices are at odds with prevailing societal norms regarding professional and financial success.  
Aside from the attorneys in my sample, none of the founders/directors have much 
personal wealth (self-reported). They live humbly, take public transportation, and lack many of 
the material trappings common among the urban middle class. Most of my informants report 
being regularly asked some version of the question, “Why don’t you want to make more 
money?”81 Such judgmental inquiries come from family, friends, and sometimes even the 
migrants themselves. After all, the migrants aspire to the education level and personal 
connections enjoyed by most of the founders/directors. They could likely have much higher 
paying jobs and still have time to help migrant workers, a fact several informants pointed out 
themselves. 
Yet, the progress needed to improve migrants’ lives requires a full-time commitment. 
None of my informants actually said this, but it is clear from observing and participating in the 
daily operations of their organizations. As I have discussed throughout this dissertation, 
migrants’ circumstances are quite precarious. At any time of day (or night), they can face crises 
which threaten to throw their lives into turmoil. One morning, for example, I awoke to a long 
string of text messages from the founder of the organization at which I was currently conducting 
participant observation. They began at just after two o’clock in the morning and ended around 
six. He was keeping me up to speed on a crisis facing one of the migrants that frequented the 
community center he had started. She was a worker at a factory on the other side of the city. 
After a long day of overtime, she got into an argument with her manager. At around ten o’clock 
in the evening, he fired her. She was told to pack her things and vacate the room she shared with 
                                                 
81 A common phrasing: 我不想挣更多的钱了 
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four other workers on the factory campus. Having nowhere else to turn, she contacted the 
founder. 
By that point, public transportation in the city had ceased service until morning. Using a 
ride sharing app, the founder had a driver pick up the woman in front of her factory and bring her 
to his home. His wife cooked her a hot meal and they made her a bed on the floor of the living 
room in their small house. After interviewing the founder later that day, I realized that by eight 
o’clock in the morning, when I was caught up on the situation, he had already found her a shared 
room with several other migrants in the area. Within a week, he was able to tap a connection at a 
nearby factory to secure her another job without needing a reference from her previous manager. 
This incident made it abundantly clear that my commitment to migrant issues is nothing 
compared with the devotion of the founders/directors in my sample. They not only believe that 
their work is helping but, more importantly, that the migrant situation must be improved. All of 
them are proud to be Chinese and admire the progress China has made in the past forty years. 
Yet, they are unanimously ashamed of the migrant situation and believe that without improving 
it China can never truly be proud of its accomplishments. I do not have a direct quotation to 
represent this sentiment, but countless examples like the case above speak far louder than words. 
Durkheim (2005) would frame this in terms of the divided self, whereby there is an 
ongoing conflict between self-interest and the duty to serve others. He claims that “there is no 
moral act that does not imply a sacrifice” (Durkheim 2005, 37). Echoing Kant, he goes on to 
argue that this sacrifice inevitably humiliates individuals, even if they, like the 
founders/directors, accept it with enthusiasm. However, this perspective removes agency from 
the process of helping others. None of my informants view their work as a sacrifice. I found no 
evidence of them being humiliated, even by insulting questions. They view their work as 
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necessary and make their decisions accordingly. Their work has value for them (and certainly for 
Chinese society) because of the promise of progress. 
This does not adhere to materialistic measures of success, which have come to permeate 
Chinese society. It represents an interesting incarnation of Deng Xiaoping’s famous 
proclamation: Some who could (but chose not to) get rich are beginning to help those who 
cannot.82 This is clearly not the widespread phenomenon that other researchers have prematurely 
heralded. It signifies that China, like all countries, can give birth to certain people who commit to 
taking action on their moral outrage. This goes beyond the casual interest in social issues from 
which other researchers extrapolate larger trends. 
In the modern era, China has yet to produce figures such as Gandhi and Muhammad 
Yunus, both of whom took action on their outrage to bring about lasting change. This is likely 
due to the strongarm tendencies of the government. In a variety of ways, the Chinese state is 
even more paternalistic than the British Empire was in India. Anyone who begins to exert 
significant influence over social issues, for example the Dali Lama or Ai Weiwei, are summarily 
persecuted.83 Thus, while they may be inspirational, they are not particularly effective in 
bringing about lasting social change. 
China’s development model has diverged in significant ways from the development 
process in Western countries. Notably, capitalism has not coincided with democracy. Thus, it is 
unwise to assume that public concern for social issues will take on the democratic qualities of 
                                                 
82 As I discussed in Chapter 2, the original statement was: 一部分先富起来 (“Some must get rich 
first”). 
83 As the spiritual leader of Tibet, a region China views as its own, the Dali Lama has been 
forced into exile in India. Ai Weiwei was once an architect coveted by the government. He was 
even commissioned to design buildings for the Beijing Olympics. After criticizing the 
government’s record on human rights and disaster management, he was jailed and eventually 
forced into exile in Germany. 
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civil discourse and collective action that it has in the West. For this reason, the founders/directors 
in my study do not embody a society-wide shift in morality. Rather they represent what I call a 
“promise of progress”. The impacts of their programs are not far-reaching. They do not receive 
widespread support, either from the government or society at large. Yet, their commitment each 
and every day sets an example of how to solve social issues that affect at least a quarter of 
China’s population. They have learned to work within and quietly subvert the official 
mechanisms that continue to disenfranchise their fellow Chinese citizens. 
The long-term impacts of this grassroots movement will determine what (if any) societal 
shift comes next in China. In the following section, I propose a strategy to gather evidence on 
these impacts and to answer unanticipated questions that came up in the course of fieldwork. 
Future Directions 
 I gathered a lot of data during fieldwork. I wound up with more than fifty typed, single-
spaced pages of notes on my observations alone. I also produced hundreds of pages from 
interviews and data I collected from my other methods. As detailed in the preceding chapters, 
analyzing these data have provided a broad perspective on the experiences and decision-making 
of the founders/directors of migrant-focused NGOs in China. In turn, this analysis suggests that 
recent trends in Chinese society may not be as clear cut as previously thought.  
 Despite the breadth and depth of my dataset, the analysis for this research would benefit 
from two categories of additional data. Both are related to understanding how the 
founders/directors help migrants create new economic relationships. First, I would like to collect 
data on the social networks of migrants, with a focus on the economic components of their 
connections. Second, I would like to conduct a five-year restudy to assess what (if any) impacts 
the NGO programs have on migrants’ lives. 
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 The focus of this dissertation is on the founders/directors themselves. For this reason, 
most of the data I gathered was on their experiences and perspectives. Other than a brief survey 
and informal conversations, I relied on the extensive body of previous research to frame the 
migrant situation in China. However, analyzing my data made clear that existing research does 
not adequately (or at all) explain how the migrant situation is changing. Previous studies 
thoroughly detail the hardships faced by migrants, but largely create a static snapshot of these 
circumstances. 
 To remedy this knowledge gap, first I would construct egocentric social networks for a 
sample of migrants from both of my field sites. I would stratify this sample to represent migrants 
from provinces that neighbor the cities, who are likely native speakers of standard mandarin, and 
those from more distant provinces, who are more likely to be native speakers of local dialects 
with standard Mandarin as a second language. This sampling choice derives from Dong (2011) 
who points to language barriers as a significant factor affecting the experiences of migrant 
workers in Chinese cities. I would also use quota sampling to include representative numbers of 
men and women. Within each of these gender categories, I would seek to include migrants who 
have worked in the cities less than five years and more than five years. Based on the research for 
this dissertation, the method described above would produce a sample representative of the range 
of migrant demographics and experiences. 
 In order to operationalize potentially new economic relationships created by NGO 
programs, I would use structured interviews to gather data from each informant in my sample on 
(1) their relatedness to individuals they interact with over a four-day period (three weekdays and 
one weekend day), (2) the multiplexity of these relationships, i.e., whether they have more than 
one type of relationship with each person (e.g., coworkers, neighbors, or the founders/directors 
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of NGOs), (3) what is being exchanged in each interaction (e.g., money, a service, or 
information), and (4) any demographic information the informant knows about individuals in his 
or her network. 
 I would analyze these relational data to create sociomatrices which give insights into the 
nature of connections within the egocentric networks (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 77). I would 
pay particular attention to the homophily in the networks, that is the extent to which individuals 
form ties with people similar to themselves (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). I would 
define “similarity” in terms of gender, legal residency (either urban or rural), and socioeconomic 
level, as well as culturally specific categories of relatedness (e.g., native village or university 
classmates). 
I would also seek to understand how the founders/directors of NGOs are situated in the 
migrant networks within structural holes, i.e., the absence of ties between two parts of a network. 
Are they able to function like Granovetter’s (1977) “weak ties” as a means of connecting 
otherwise separate parts of a network? Such a circumstance is exemplified by the case of the 
founder who secured a new job for the migrant woman without the need for a reference from her 
former employer (discussed earlier in this chapter). Avenarius (2003) stresses the importance of 
such connections for migrants seeking employment outside of homogenous social networks. 
Applying this metric to migrant networks will offer insights into how their connections to the 
founders/directors of NGOs create and redefine economic relationships. 
 The research for this dissertation already supplies evidence that these relationships exist 
and gives insights into their nature. The social network analysis proposed above would 
strengthen (and likely complicate) their structures and influence on migrants’ lives. Toward this 
end, I would also like to conduct a follow-up impact assessment in five years. It would be 
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particularly interesting to see how the nongovernmental landscape changes over this period. 
Which of the founders/directors in my sample still run their original organizations? Have the 
number of organizations increased? Is there a difference in the relative change in number 
between my two field sites? 
 I would of course like to restudy the informants in my original sample. I would re-
administer the survey I used in this study and conduct follow-up interviews to understand how 
their perspectives and experiences have changed (or remained the same). Yet, I would also like 
to answer the questions above more from the migrants’ perspective than I did in this dissertation. 
I would use the brief migrant survey I employed for this study as a baseline but dive deeper into 
the interconnectedness between the circumstances migrants experience in their communities and 
the programs offered by NGOs. 
Due to neighborhood stigmatization, a strong relationship often exists between living in 
an impoverished neighborhood and having poor access to social services (e.g., Airey 2003, 
Davidson, Mitchell, and Hunt 2008, Kelaher et al. 2010). This is particularly significant for 
migrants in China who face not only the stress of adapting to new living and working conditions, 
but also tenuous legal status. Thus, to understand the migrants’ perspective on the availability of 
social services in their neighborhood and their perceived benefits (as compared to how the 
founders/directors perceive the situation), I would create a Chinese language neighborhood 
stigma survey, combining elements from the research instrument employed by Wutich et al. 
(2014) as well as the World Bank (2011) social capital assessment tool (SOCAT). Combined 
with the data from this dissertation, the network analysis and impact assessment described above 
would create a more comprehensive perspective on the interrelatedness of migrant issues and 
Chinese society at large. 
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CHAPTER 8: BROADER IMPACTS 
 
 In this chapter, I delve into analytical generalizations. Lund (2014, 226) defines these as 
the “identification of fundamental or constituent properties in an event or phenomenon.” While I 
do not assume external validity, this form of abstraction situates the results of my research within 
ongoing theoretical debates about the role of the state in shaping civil society. China represents a 
case of this occurring in an alternative to the Western model of economic development, one of 
capitalism in the absence of democracy. 
Associational Life 
The NGOs in my study operate at the intersection of changing state-society relations. The 
ways their founders/directors make decisions reflect the interaction of government priorities with 
societal needs. As discussed in the Introduction, existing literature positions this 
nongovernmental activity within considerations of the state’s role in shaping the organizational 
structures of NGOs as well as the goals of their programs (notably, Cheng, Ngok, and Zhuang 
2010, Hsu, Hsu, and Hasmath 2017, Lu 2009, Yu 2011).  
Absent from this framework are the ways that the founders/directors create “associational 
life” for both themselves and the migrants they serve. Previous studies highlight the benefits for 
migrants of being part of non-state associations, particularly in terms of insulating such 
vulnerable and politically underrepresented populations from malicious government policies 




As discussed in the previous chapter, this study did not produce data to evaluate the 
effectiveness of NGO programs. Several of the case studies make clear that the 
founders/directors appear to have the migrants’ best interests in mind. Yet, given the 
government’s prioritizing of business interests over the problems faced by migrants, the tangible 
gains made by NGO programs are likely minimal. For example, despite legal aid to seek 
compensation for workplace injuries, I did not find any examples of the migrants receiving 
significant payouts from their companies. As noted in Chapter 1, such limits on 
nongovernmental programs are particularly pronounced in state-dominated societies such as 
China’s.         
The other universal characteristic of migrant workers is that they leave their homes in 
pursuit of economic opportunities. Thus, they lack the sense of community inherent in their place 
of origin. This is the problem for which NGO programs are perhaps most effective. The case 
studies discussed throughout this dissertation make clear that NGOs create symbolic and often 
physical homes for the migrants. They often serve this purpose for the founders/directors as well, 
who were typically migrant workers themselves. Despite being relatively better off in 
comparison to other migrants, the founders/directors frequently report continued feelings of 
being outsiders in the cities. This is exemplified by the founder of Women Work, who describes 
being very unsettled seeing the poor treatment of domestic workers at social functions (discussed 
in Chapter 5). 
In this way, my research supports existing literature on the ways migrants’ associational 
lives improve their access to social capital (e.g., Morales and Giugni 2011), employment 
opportunities (e.g., Beall 2014), and a sense of community (e.g., Moya 2005). Much of this same 
literature also points to political integration as an additional benefit of being associated with 
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migrant-focused organizations. This appears to be true in democratic societies, such as 
Switzerland (Eggert and Giugni 2010) and Sweden (Myrberg 2011). Yet, in non-democratic 
societies, such as Nigeria (Meagher 2010), being associated with non-state organizations often 
ensnares migrants in a web of double discrimination. Their vulnerability as migrant workers is 
compounded by the government’s mistrust of NGOs. This is of course also true in China. Several 
case studies in this dissertation illustrate that NGO involvement in labor disputes often draws the 
ire of local governments, and can even lead to violent conflict. 
Despite differing perspectives, the consensus of existing literature seems to be that the 
benefits of associational life for migrants is highly contextual. Yet, regardless of context, there 
are typically benefits for migrants. As my research shows, there are also benefits for the 
founders/directors in terms of their identities as former migrants, as well as providing them with 
an outlet for their moral outlook. One of the main deficiencies of previous studies is that they 
present non-state associations as self-realized entities. The benefits (or lack thereof) for migrants 
emanate from the institutional level. These studies attribute agency to the associations 
themselves, using phrasing such as “the organizations provide” or “NGOs struggle with”. My 
research, however, points to the centrality of individual decision-making in the formation and 
maintenance of associational life.  
Empirical evidence from this dissertation suggests that I am not simply engaging in 
semantic nitpicking. The organizations in my study are vehicles for social change. Their 
programs, however, are driven by the founders/directors. It stands to reason that this is true for 
all NGOs across contexts. Yet, this self-evident reality is rarely mentioned in the literature. The 
significance of this becomes most apparent in light of the above discussion about the actual 
benefits of NGO programs for migrants. These only tangentially have to do with measurable 
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improvements to employment situations and legal status, particularly in nondemocratic systems. 
The most direct benefit involves an improved sense of community. 
In a practical sense, the founders/directors make decisions to create and sustain 
“communities of practice”. I do not use this term in the sense of a group of professionals 
engaging in situated learning (see Wenger 1999), even as it pertains to NGO professionals 
(Hasmath and Hsu 2016). More than anything, the founders/directors in my sample build spaces 
for sharing the knowledge they gained as migrants themselves, dealing with many of the same 
problems faced by the migrants they now seek to help. This is not general knowledge. It is 
specific to each individual founder/director. I did not gather data to assess the effectiveness of 
individual programs. Yet, it stands to reason that any measurable success is a direct function of 
the value of knowledge imparted, i.e., how well it can be applied to the specific problems facing 
the current cohort of migrant workers. 
Naturally, the value of knowledge does not remain static. As government policies change 
and economic circumstances evolve, the applicability of experiential knowledge is likely to 
fluctuate. Yet, regardless of outcomes, the efforts of the founders/directors to share their 
knowledge have enormous value in and of themselves. In China’s cities, migrant workers 
experience daily microaggressions from their employers and society-at-large, not to mention the 
structural violence they face from hostile government policies. These are common experiences 
for migrants worldwide. More than knowledge, the founders/directors in my sample offer a 
sympathetic ear and a safe space for migrants to relax and regroup. Given the hostility of their 
environments, having access to such a refuge is perhaps of the greatest value. The founder of 
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Women Work reiterates the importance of this for migrant workers: “I wish there had been 
someone to do this for me.”84  
It seems safe to assume that the founders/directors of migrant-focused NGOs across 
contexts provide similar non-tangible benefits. Much like their Chinese counterparts, their 
organizations are likely imbued with their own experiences and personalities. Thus, the literature 
on migrants’ associational life would benefit greatly from more considerations of the individuals 
at the heart of non-state associations. As the Chinese case makes clear, migrants are not simply a 
disenfranchised population in need of outside assistance. At least some of them, like the 
founders/directors in my sample, employ their own success to take ownership of problems faced 
by the larger group. In the following section, I discuss the implications of this for societal 
changes in twenty-first century China.    
The Ends of Individualism 
Beyond cross-contextual comparisons, my research most strongly contributes to the 
literature on changing state-society relations in China. As I discussed in Chapter 2, scholars 
across disciplines agree that in the new millennium the Chinese state has significantly reduced 
the social safety net. This continues a trend originating from the onset of Deng Xiaoping’s 
economic reforms. He ended the Mao-era policy of “the iron rice bowl”85, a system under which 
millions of people were given guaranteed lifetime employment at state-owned enterprises. Deng 
all but removed communist ideology from economic policy-making, arguing that socialism 
should not equate to shared poverty and that there is gloriousness in getting rich.86 His policies 
encouraged private enterprise and personal wealth accumulation. This new economic 
                                                 
84 我希望有人为我做这个事情。 
85 铁饭碗 
86 This is what Deng referred to as “socialism with Chinese characteristics”: 中国特色社会主义  
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environment promoted individual initiative, and naturally led to a dramatic increase in the 
standard of living for millions of Chinese citizens.87 
Due to the state’s reduced role in ensuring economic outcomes, individualism has come 
to permeate many aspects of twenty-first century Chinese society. On this point, most China 
scholars are in agreement. Where they diverge is on the consequences of this individualism. On 
the one hand, there appears to be pervasive self-interest – a “me first” mentality – that prizes 
personal gain over benefits to society-at-large. This is of course a common critique of capitalism. 
Lazzarato (2009, 129) argues that “the proliferation of profit is motivated by selfish impulses, so 
that there is no space in the totalizing space of the market for…the invention of unique 
collectivities” (see also Boltanski and Chiapello 2005, 175, Hilgers 2010, 354). 
Adam Smith (1976, 7) conceived of the butcher, the brewer, and the baker all working in 
their own self-interest to put food on the rest of our dinner tables. In this holy grail of capitalist 
production, society benefits from individual selfish acts. However, as Smith himself notes, it is 
not out of benevolence that these business people provide us with sustenance; they are motivated 
by profit. This is a weak guarantee that the food they produce is either healthy or safe to 
consume. 
In 2008, the Chinese experienced this in the worst possible way. In order to increase the 
perceived protein content of infant formula, more than twenty companies in China diluted their 
products with melamine, an industrial chemical typically used as a fire retardant in plastics. This 
resulted in more than fifty thousand hospitalizations, and several babies died from complications 
(e.g., Branigan 2008). 
                                                 
87 In the next chapter, I discuss the billion Chinese citizens who have not shared equally in this 
prosperity.    
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This kind of cost-cutting measure clearly does not benefit society-at-large. It is 
unfortunately common around the world. For example, in the 1980s a U.S. company produced 
apple juice for children that contained no apples (e.g., Buder 1987). In the long term, these 
deceptions rarely benefit the companies. In the wake of revelations of their malfeasance, both the 
Chinese and American companies faced enormous public and political backlash. This serves as a 
stark reminder of the potential costs of an unchecked profit-motive. 
As in all capitalist systems, heightened individualism naturally leads to varying degrees 
of selfishness. This is less of a moral judgement than a reality of people needing to fend for 
themselves. Ma and Adams (2014) posit that in China this effect is particularly pronounced due 
to the scarcity of nearly every resource. More than a billion people in China must compete not 
only for food and social services, but also for housing, university enrollment, employment, and 
even license plates.88 Given such limited resources and such a rapidly growing middle class, it 
comes as little surprise that competition is fierce. People even go to such lengths as using fake 
fingerprints to cheat on the gaokao, China’s college entrance exam (e.g., Campbell 2016). 
In this socioeconomic environment, a person’s value is largely determined by material 
possessions and individual accomplishments. The Chinese use the word suzhi to refer to a 
person’s quality.89 This term has increasingly entered into popular discourse in the twenty-first 
century. Hsu (2007, 189) asserts that the prevalence of this conceptualization implies a 
prevailing societal view that a person’s overall quality can be determined by superficial 
                                                 
88 In China’s largest cities, there are now lotteries for license plates. In Beijing, for example, 
there is an estimated one-in-725 chance of getting a license plate in any given lottery (Guo 




characteristics such as dress, speech, and educational and professional credentials. Kipnis (2006) 
directly attributes the pervasive use of suzhi to increased competition for limited resources. 
As with the generalized selfishness discussed above, it is understandable that people 
come to value the traits required to succeed in the market economy. Yet, as Jankowiak (2004) 
points out, increased individualism also leads to increased individual responsibility, not only for 
oneself but also for others. Kleinman et al. (2011) supply ample evidence for this in China in 
terms of increased volunteerism and expanded awareness for the plights of others (see also 
Rolandsen 2008, Yan 2009). I discussed this in detail in Chapter 2. 
It becomes clear that twenty-first century China is shaped by varying manifestations of 
individualism, ranging from opportunism to altruism. Thus, the founders/directors of migrant-
focused NGOs represent a convergence of the individualism and market economics that have 
come to define Chinese society. Indeed, they imbue deep empathy into their work. Yet, their 
decision-making is also significantly influenced by political and economic realities. They are 
entrepreneurs, competing for the same limited financial resources as so many others. 
Typically, the founders/directors of NGOs are not as unscrupulous as people in the 
private sector. Yet, such a characterization is also highly subjective. Both the Chinese 
government and public remain skeptical of nongovernmental programs. Thus, from their 
perspectives, the motivations of the nongovernmental sector can appear as self-serving as even 
the most illicit private sector activities, for example the burgeoning underground license plate 
counterfeiting industry (again see Guo 2016). This comparison is perhaps more precise than it 
first appears. Much like quotas for license plates, the government seeks to limit the number of 
migrants in cities. Much like the counterfeiters, the founders/directors in my sample find ways 
around official policy to respond to societal demands – in their case, the needs of migrants. 
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From an anthropological perspective, this is a highly flawed comparison. Relative to the 
counterfeiters, the moral value of migrant-focused NGO programs is irrefutable. Yet, in some 
cases, middle class Chinese will even get married for the purpose of securing a license plate 
(e.g., Carlson 2017). It seems safe to assume that, from their perspective, the counterfeiters are 
bringing a lot more value to society than the founders/directors of NGOs whose motivations 
remain opaque and removed from common experience. 
This dissertation reveals a variety of shared motivations among the founders/directors. 
These include influential past experiences, being a migrant themselves, and a generalized 
dissatisfaction with the status quo, particularly in local settings. As mentioned in Chapter 3, my 
single biggest bias is that I admire my research participants. I think their work is impactful and 
much needed in China. Yet, my subjectivity is largely inconsequential for framing their place in 
the trajectory of Chinese society. As discussed in the Introduction, there are simply too few 
migrant-focused NGOs to situate them within a larger moral awakening. Moreover, the amounts 
of time and resources committed by the founders/directors suggest that they do not fit neatly 
within the “part-time” charity described in the literature as evidence of increased morality (e.g., 
Rolandsen 2008). 
In the end, the NGO response to China’s enormous migrant problem complicates the two 
prevailing explanations for the outcomes of individualism. Yet, it also reveals a lot about how 
the Chinese state sets priorities. Anagnost (1997, 75) suggests that just as Chinese society-at-
large has become preoccupied with personal quality, so too has the government become fixated 
on the quality of the population as a whole.90 In one sense, this has to do with Deng Xiaoping’s 




directive that some people must get rich first in order for everyone to benefit. Toward this end, 
the government has placed a high value on industrialization and private enterprise. 
Yet, Anagnost (1997, 76) also points out that the government’s view on the quality of its 
people is “a discourse of lack, referring to the failure of the Chinese people to embody 
international standards of modernity, civility, and discipline.” In this way, its support of the 
founders/directors in my sample, though often tangential, is perhaps the strongest evidence to 
date that the state, and not just a few Chinese people, seeks to evaluate societal quality beyond 
mere materialistic ends.    
Twenty-first century Chinese society is defined both by selfishness and selflessness, 
albeit in unequal proportions. Many Chinese chase middleclass materialism; most of the 
population is as of yet unable to; and a few seek to remedy this inequality. As part of the last 
category, the experiences and decision-making of the founders/directors in my sample spotlight a 
small but significant positivity in the all-too-often bleak narratives coming out of China. I devote 
the concluding chapter to this contribution of my research.  
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CHAPTER 9: FINAL REMARKS  
 
 Since 2012 I have devoted myself to understanding China. I have delved into the 
literature on its history, politics, and culture. Armed with the insights I gained from previous 
research, many of which I have discussed in the preceding chapters, I have spent nearly two 
years in country, exploring a variety of aspects of twenty-first century Chinese society. I have 
investigated how expat entrepreneurs learn to bribe and apply this knowledge to enter the often-
restricted social networks of Chinese business associates. I have looked at emic perspectives on 
parents and grandparents allowing children to urinate on busy urban streets. A national poll 
found that only eleven percent of Chinese find fault with this practice (Chen 2014). It is a 
poignant reminder of China’s rapid transition from a predominantly rural society to one in which 
nearly half the population now lives in cities (Wines 2012).   
 Both of these topics are intricately woven into the fabric of twenty-first century Chinese 
society. Either of them offers enough depth and breadth for an engaging dissertation. Yet, my 
late mentor, Victoria Lockwood, “gently” suggested that I dig deeper into the social soul of 
China. “Are there people doing good there?” she once asked me. This simple question conceals a 
nearly all-encompassing reality of doing research on China: almost every topic that gets attention 
portrays one or several negative aspects of the country, its government, and even its people. The 
most common tropes are corruption, both at the governmental and interpersonal levels, pollution 
– air, water, and food – low quality manufacturing, and of course military aggression. The list 
could go on. More than any other context, China strains the limits of cultural relativism. 
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Yet, Dr. Lockwood and I shared a belief in the potential of local-level development 
programs to produce quantifiable improvements to people’s lives. Together we discussed 
countless case studies of such programs around the world. One of the most common threads in 
these cases are the characteristics of the people who founded and direct them. They are, for a 
variety of reasons, imbued with a deep social conscience, i.e., a desire to improve the lives of 
others. 
The negative accounts of China, from both the news media and academia, had to be 
missing a major piece of what was going on in China. One day while perusing the isles of an 
upscale grocery store in Beijing, I noticed that many of the prepackaged fruits and vegetables 
had the characters 有机 in bold type on the label. I looked them up in the dictionary on my phone 
and found that the main definition is organic. After some internet research, and asking a few 
knowledgeable connections in China, I learned that 有机 was not an official measure of quality. 
There was seemingly no certification board, and the use of these characters on food packaging 
appeared to be more of a marketing tool than a guarantee of organic farming practices. 
However, it was noteworthy to find these characters so ubiquitously used in high-end 
food stores in China. Based on frequent concerns of food safety, it seemed fair to assume that 
middleclass consumers were increasingly willing to pay more for foods labeled organic. Aside 
from misleading advertising, I began to wonder if there actually were organic farms in China. 
Not surprisingly, with 1.4 billion people to feed, most farming in China is largescale, and uses 
any and all means to maximize agricultural output. This includes pesticides, chemical fertilizers, 
and growth hormones of every variety. 
While attending a presentation on environmentalism one night in Beijing, a few of the 
attendees told me about an organic food delivery service they had just subscribed to. This type of 
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community supported agriculture (CSA) has become quite popular in US cities, but I was 
surprised to find in China. I did another internet search and found a half dozen or so similar 
businesses serving Beijing (and another dozen in other east coast cities). Over the next couple 
weeks, I visited the farms that supplied these CSAs. In each case, they were actively employing 
organic farming techniques equal to any I have encountered in the rest of the world.91 None of 
the operations had more than a couple hundred customers, but these customers were very loyal. 
It became clear that, following Hathaway’s (2013) investigation of environmentalism in China, 
these few CSAs were the seeds of an organic movement with the potential for enormous growth. 
This topic, like the expat entrepreneurs and kids urinating in the street, had the breadth, 
depth, and cultural relevance to warrant doctoral research. After a lot of consideration, I realized 
that studying organic farming in China, much like in most countries, would be largely about 
middle- and upper-class consumers. Admittedly, there is a lot of value (and money) in 
understanding evolving consumer habits, especially in a country as populous as China. Yet, I 
wanted to honor the guidance of my committee chair (a decision which gained even more weight 
after her untimely passing).     
The fact of the matter is that a billion people in China are NOT in the middle class. 
Typically, we hear about the roughly 300 million people that make up China's middle class. This 
figure makes marketers drool and is the cause for much self-congratulation by the central 
government. Even the most cynical China watchers concede a hearty applause. Indeed, over the 
                                                 
91 During two years at the Norman Borlaug Institute for International Agriculture at Texas A&M, 
I was involved in assessing the impacts of several organic farming projects throughout Asia. 




past generation, improvements to the lifestyles of this rising middle class are nothing short of 
amazing. 
Of course, in China having 300 million people in the middle class means that 
approximately one billion people have yet to reach this socioeconomic level. This group includes 
marginalized rural populations, the urban poor, and nearly 300 million migrant workers. While 
the business opportunities and economic success stories typically come from the middle class, I 
knew in my heart that my research topic would be among the one billion people forgotten or left 
behind by China's breakneck development trajectory. 
As in so many cases, the ideal topic was right under my nose the whole time. Migrant 
workers are the central characters in so many chapters of China’s economic development. As I 
discussed in the Introduction, China has been made by migrants. Much like the United States, 
Chinese economic development has been driven by hard-working men and women who leave 
their homes to seek better opportunities. 
At a time when China and the United States frequently clash over trade agreements (e.g., 
Hsu 2015), military agendas (e.g., Glaser 2012), and even international aid projects (e.g., Sun 
2015), Americans tend to be presented with a narrative of the Chinese as a calculating competitor 
(e.g., Pew 2012), even a growing threat (e.g., Navarro 2015). At the nation-state level, these 
concerns may be justified. Yet, the most populous country in the world is not simply defined by 
its government’s policies. It is comprised, like our own country, of individuals striving to create 
meaningful lives for themselves. They are not simply passive actors in a domineering political 
economy. The perspectives and experiences of Chinese citizens working to improve their own 
lives and the lives of their fellow citizens should resonate with Americans and humanize a proud 
people whose aspirations are not so foreign from our own. 
 180 
 
APPENDIX 1: MIGRANT SURVEY 
 
1) How old are you? 
   18-25 
   26-35 
   36-45 
   46-55 
   56-65 
   65+ 
 
2) What is your gender? 
   Male 
   Female 
 
3) Do you have children? 
   Yes 
   No 
 
4) If so, how many? 
   1 
   2 
   3 
   4 
   More than 4 
 
5) In what province/city where you born? 
 _________________________ 
 
6) What ethnicity are you? 
    _________________________ 
 
7) How long have you lived in Beijing/Shenzhen? 
   1-3 years 
   4-6 years 
   7-9 years 
   More than 9 years (please specify): _____________ 
 
8) If you could live anywhere, would you…? 
   Stay where you are 
   Move to a different part of Beijing/Shenzhen 
   Return to your home province 



















Financial Services (Banking, 
Loans, etc.)      
Healthcare      
Professional Training      
Education/Daycare for Children      
Subsidized Housing      
Other:      
 
10) Who offers the services that are available to you? (Check all that apply.) If a service is not 
available to you, please leave it blank. 
 





(Banking, Loans, etc.) 
      
Healthcare       
Professional Training       
Education for Children       
Subsidized Housing       
Other:       
 
 
11) What services do you need that are not available to you? (If there is more than one, please 
list the top three, in order of importance to you.) 
  
Most important:  _______________ 
 2nd most important:  _______________ 
 3rd most important: _______________ 
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   18-25 
   26-35 
   36-45 
   46-55 
   56-65 
   65+ 
 
2) 您的性别是？ 
   男性 
   女性 
 
3) 您有小孩么？ 
   有 
   没有 
 
4) 如果有的话，您有几个小孩？ 
   1 
   2 
   3 
   4 








    _________________________ 
 
7) 您住在北京/深圳多久了？ 
   1-3 年 
   4-6 年 
   7-9 年 
   超过 9 年 (请详细说明): _____________ 
 
8) 如果您可以住在任何地方，您会…? 
   呆在现在您在的地方 
   搬去北京/深圳的另一个地方 
   返回您出生的省份 


















     
医疗保健      
职业培训      
小孩子的教育/日间护理      
建房补贴      















      
医疗保健       
职业培训       
小孩子的教育       
建房补贴       







最重要的:  _______________ 
 第二重要的:  _______________ 
 第三重要的: _______________ 
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APPENDIX 3: NGO SURVEY 
 
 
1) How long ago was this organization started? 
 0-3 years 
 3-6 years 
 6-9 years 
 9-12 years 
 12+ years 
 
2) How long have you worked for this organization? 
 0-3 years 
 3-6 years 
 6-9 years 
 9-12 years 
 12+ years 
 








 Board Member 
 Volunteer 
 Other: __________________ 
 
5) Why do you work here? (Please check all that apply.) 
 Good salary 
 Helping others 
 Good benefits 
 Good work environment 
 Other: __________________ 
 






7) What is your highest level of education? 





7a) If you attended university, what was your major? 
 Business 
 Finance 
 Social Science (e.g., sociology, history, etc.) 
 Literature 
 Other: __________________ 
 









8a) If so, where? ___________________________ 
 
8b) If so, for how long? 
 A semester 
 An academic year 
 1-4 years 
 More than 4 years 
 
































 Other: __________________ 
 






13) For each category of employee, approximately how many work at your organization? 
 
 
None A few Several Most All 
Full-time      
Part-time      
Volunteer      
Have a college degree      
Below 30 years old      
Male      













14) What goods and/or services does your organization offer? Please list no more than three core 
types of goods/services in order of importance to your business. 
 
 Good/Service 
Most Important:  
2nd Most Important:  
3rd Most Important:  
 
 
14a) Why is the most important good/service important to your organization? (Please check all 
that apply.) 
 It is profitable 
 More and more people want it 
 It is affordable to our customers 
 It helps our customers have better lives 
 It is higher quality than the goods/services offered by other organizations 
 Other: ___________________________ 
 
14b) Why is the 2nd most important good/service is important to your organization? (Please 
check all that apply.) 
 It is profitable 
 More and more people want it 
 It is affordable to our customers 
 It helps our customers have better lives 
 It is higher quality than the goods/services offered by other organizations 
 Other: ___________________________ 
 
14c) Why is the 3rd most important good/service is important to your organization? (Please check 
all that apply.) 
 It is profitable 
 More and more people want it 
 It is affordable to our customers 
 It helps our customers have better lives 
 It is higher quality than the goods/services offered by other organizations 














15) Who are the main beneficiaries of your organization’s goods/services? If your organization 
has several groups of clients/recipients, please list the top three in order of importance: 
 
1st group of beneficiaries ___________________________ 
 
2nd group of beneficiaries ___________________________ 
  
3rd group of beneficiaries ___________________________ 
 
16) What are the main problems your organization’s good/services help to solve? If your 
organization is trying to solve more than one problem, please list the top three in order of 
importance. 
 
1st in terms of importance ___________________________ 
 
2nd in terms of importance ___________________________    
 
3rd in terms of importance ___________________________    
 
16a) What are the main reasons you think these problems are important to solve? If there are 
several reasons, please list the top three in order of importance. 
 
1st in terms of importance ___________________________ 
 
2nd in terms of importance ___________________________    
 
3rd in terms of importance ___________________________    
 
17) What is the main goal of your organization? 
 __________________________________________________ 
 
17a) Is your organization accomplishing this goal? 
 Yes 
 Yes, but not entirely 






















17b) What criteria does your organization use to determine the success of its goods/services? 











Profits      
# of Customers      
Market Share      
Community Improvement      
Reducing Costs      
Reducing Price      
Publicity      
Awards      
 
 
17c) How does your organization measure these criteria? (Please check all that apply.) 
  Financial Reports 
  Customer Surveys 
  Assessment by independent consultant 

























18) What are your organization’s main sources of income? (Please give the approximate 
percentage for each.) 
 
Source of Income Percentage 
Sale of goods and/or services % 
Membership Fees % 
Investor Funds % 
Government subsidies/grants % 
Grants/donations from NGOs % 
Donations from individuals % 
Donations from companies % 


















18a) How have your organization’s sources of income changed over the past 3 years? 
 
Source of Income Increased Decreased Unchanged 
Sale of goods and/or services    
Membership Fees    
Investor Funds    
Government subsidies/grants    
Grants/donations from NGOs    
Donations from individuals    
Donations from companies    
Contributions from founders    
Other:    
 
 



































Previous professional experience      
Salary/Earning potential      
Access to funding/investment      
Fulfilling work      
Benefits to the community      
Benefits to society      
Opportunities for advancement      
Status of doing this kind of work      
Support of prominent businesses      
Government support      
Support from family/friends      
Support from the community      
A book I read/Idea I heard      
Other:      
 










21a) If so, with what other businesses/organizations does your organization partner? (Please 
check all that apply.) 
 Another local business 
 A large national/international business 
 An NGO 
 Local government 
 National government 
 The media 
 A local community group 
 Other: ___________________________ 
 











22b) If yes, what makes them similar to your organization? (Please check all that apply.) 
 Offer similar goods/services 
 Serve a similar group of people 
 Trying to solve a similar problem 
 Other: ___________________________ 
 




23a) If so, from whom or what entity? (Please check all that apply.) 
 Another business 
 An NGO 
 Local government 
 National government 
 The media 
 Social Media 
 An individual (not part of a business or the government) 
 The local community 




23b) If so, what kind of opposition? (Please check all that apply.) 
 Financial 
 Legal 
 Bad publicity 
 Other: ___________________________ 
 




23d) What action did you take to address the opposition? (Please check all that apply.) 
 None 
 Legal 
 Public relations 
 Adjusted business practices 
 Other: ___________________________ 
 


















    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 








































26) What changes has your business experienced in the last 5 years? (Please check all that 
apply.) 
 Greater competition from other businesses 
 Increased funding/investment 
 Decreased funding/investment 
 New management 
 Expansion of the business within this city/to other cities? 
 Increased cost of producing goods/services 
 Increased price of good/services to customers 
 Increased number of customers 
 Increased government regulation of your business 
 Greater public interest in your business 
 
27) If your organization has experienced greater government regulation, what areas of your 
organization has this affected? (Please check all that apply.) 
 Sources of funding/investment 
 Taxes 
 The production of good/services 
 Revenue/Profitability 
 Affordability of good/services 
 Partnerships 
 Other: ___________________________ 
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Previous professional experience      
Salary/Earning potential      
Access to funding/investment      
Fulfilling work      
Benefits to the community      
Benefits to society      
Opportunities for advancement      
Status of doing this kind of work      
Support of prominent businesses      
Government support      
Support from family/friends      
Support from the community      
A book I read/ Idea I heard      








 0-3 年 
 3-6 年 
 6-9 年 
 9-12 年 
 12+ 年 
 
2) 您为这个机构工作几年了？ 
 0-3 年 
 3-6 年 
 6-9 年 
 9-12 年 





















































 1-4 年 






































没有 几个 少数 大部分 全部 
全职      
兼职      
志愿者      
有一个大学学位      
在 30 岁以下      
男性      



































































第二重要 ___________________________    
 







第二重要 ___________________________    
 



















不重要 有些重要     重要 非常重要    最重要 
利益      
受益人的数量      
市场占有率      
对社区的改善      
降低成本      
降低价格      
宣传      




  财务报告 
  客户问卷 
  独立顾问的评估 




































资金来源 增加 减少 不改变 
产品或者服务的销售    
成员费用    
投资者资金    
政府的补助/资金    
从其他非营利组织得来的奖金
/捐款 
   
从个人得来的捐款    
从公司得来的捐款    
从创建人得来的捐赠    






























之前的职业经历      
薪水/挣钱的潜力      
有权使用资金/投资的机会      
令人开心满足的工作      
对社区的好处      
对社会的好处      
提升的机会      
做这种工作的身份      
著名企业的支持      
政府的支持      
家庭/朋友的支持      
社区的支持      
我读过的一本书/听到的一个主
意      















































































    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
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